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This study is based on a narrow legal examination of the two contemporary state 
bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb in Pennsylvania and Nebraska. Legal 
research and legal analysis are the primary methods used to investigate whether these 
two statutory bans meet the judicial and legislative tests under the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom 
Protection Act. The study applies the Sherbert standard as articulated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court—a three-part judicial test that courts use to apply the strict scrutiny 
standard to Free Exercise cases. The study also applies the U.S. Supreme Court’s Smith 
standard, also known as the general applicability test, which requires that government 
regulations involving religion must be “neutral and generally applicable,” and cannot 
“target religious conduct for distinctive treatment.”  
This study examines the 123-year history of legal bans on public schoolteachers’ 
religious garb, with special attention to Pennsylvania’s current anti-religious-garb statute 
   
was the first of its kind in the United States. It was enacted in 1895 in response to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling that held Catholic nuns were permitted to wear 
religious garb (habits) while teaching in public schools. Nebraska’s anti-religious-garb 
law, a replica of Pennsylvania’s ban, was first enacted in 1919 and repealed in 2017. 
Although at the time this study was published (May 2018), the study notes that earlier 
attempts to repeal it failed. The study uses Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb statute to 
legally define religious garb as “any dress, mark, emblem or insignia indicating the fact 
that such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order, sect or denomination.” 
The study concludes the following: Pennsylvania’s and Nebraska’s statutory bans 
on teachers wearing religious garb in public schools (1) failed the general applicability 
test under Smith and (2) substantially burdened religions, as defined under the provisions 
in Sherbert and the Religious Freedom Protection Act (RFPA). The statutes (3) partially 
met the rational basis test, but when faced with strict scrutiny, the statutes (4) failed to 
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I – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The following study is based on a narrow legal examination of the two 
contemporary state bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb in Pennsylvania and 
Nebraska. Legal research and legal analysis are the primary methods used to investigate 
whether these two statutory bans meet the judicial and legislative tests under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Pennsylvania 
Religious Freedom Protection Act. 
Pennsylvania’s current anti-religious-garb statute was the first of its kind in the 
United States.1 It was enacted in 1895 in response to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
decision2 to permit Catholic nuns to wear religious garb (habits)3 while teaching in public 
schools. Nebraska’s anti-religious-garb law, a replica of Pennsylvania’s ban, was first 
enacted in 19194 and repealed on March 27, 2017.5 According to Attorney Darrel 
                                               
 
1 The Pennsylvania General Assembly first enacted the Pennsylvania Statute 24, § 11-1112 in 1895, in 
response to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s affirmation of Catholic nuns from wearing habits while 
teaching in state public schools. The Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1949 and 1982. 
2 Hysong v. Gallitzin School District, 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. Herr, 
229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68 (1910). 
3 In this context, the religious garb in question were the habits of the order of the Sisters of St. Joseph.   
4 Neb. Code § 79-898 (2016). This statute was first enacted in 1919 (c. 248, § 1, p. 1018) and reaffirmed in 
1922, 1929, 1943, 1949, and 1994 and repealed in 2017. 
5 On January 5, 2017, Nebraska State Senator Jim Scheer from District 19 introduced bill NE LB62, 
designed to repeal the prohibition on the “wearing of religious garb by teachers in public schools.” The bill 
was passed the Education Committee by a vote of 36 to 1, with its last hearing occurring on January 17, 
2017. The bill passed on final reading with thirty-nine in favor and five against. Nebraska LB62 2017 was 
signed by the Governor on Mar. 27, 2017 and reads “A Bill for an Act relating to schools; to eliminate 
provisions prohibiting the wearing of religious garb by teachers in public schools; to eliminate penalties; 









Huenergardt of Lincoln, Nebraska, there is no record of any prosecutions under 
Nebraska’s state’s statute,6 which was first passed in 1919; however, other data shows 
that public schoolteachers were wearing religious garb while teaching but the statute was 
not enforced.7 Pennsylvania has a history of prosecutions (see Chapter II – Relevant Case 
Law) and its anti-religious-garb statute is still active today. Similar to Nebraska, in 
Pennsylvania there have been contemporary attempts to repeal the anti-religious-garb 
statute; however, Pennsylvania was not successful.8 The recent legislative activities in 
these two states suggest that the subject of public schoolteachers’ religious garb is still an 
active legal question. 
Because Nebraska repealed its anti-religious-garb law midway through this study, 
research timeline was limited from 1894 to 2016. This research project, therefore, 
predated Nebraska’s repeal, giving me the chance to keep intact the research design of 
                                               
 
the people of the State of Nebraska, Section 1. The following sections are outright repealed: Sections 79-
898 and 79-899, Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska.” 
6 There was evidence of religious-garb-wearing teachers but no prosecution of them. See: C. A. Sorensen, 
Attorney General of Nebraska and George W. Ayres, Assistant Attorney General of Nebraska. Letter to Mr. 
P. F. O’Gara, Attorney at Law, Harington, Nebraska. Regarding “Schools—Sectarian Schools Not Entitled 
to Share in State School Funds.” Office of the Attorney General, State of Nebraska, March 15, 1930. (“I 
am… of the opinion that the law forbidding the wearing of a sectarian garb in the school room by a teacher 
in the public schools of this state is a valid enactment… The fact that the State Superintendent did not 
revoke [teachers’] certificates [who]… knowingly violated a state law and committed an act which was a 
crime against the state… and that neither they nor the members of the district school board were prosecuted 
by the local authorities as they might have been, for a gross violation of a state law, does not in my opinion 
absolutely bar the State Superintendent from asserting that the school over which they presided was not 
entitled to a share of the state school funds.”) 
7 Mark A. Kellner. “Pennsylvania teachers can't wear 'religious garb' to class but a repeal effort may be 
possible.” Desert News, December 12, 2014. 
8 In May 2011, Pennsylvania Representatives DePasquale (D-York) and Tallman (R-Adams/York), along 
with 17 Representatives, introduced House Bill, No. 1581, designed to repeal Pennsylvania anti-religious-









using two case studies—Nebraska and Pennsylvania—from which to conduct my legal 
analysis, beginning with defining “religious garb.” 
The legal definition of this prohibited type of religious expression on the language 
is based on Pennsylvania’s statute, which defines religious garb as “any dress, mark, 
emblem or insignia indicating the fact that such teacher is a member or adherent of any 
religious order, sect or denomination” (Appendix A. Glossary of Legal Terms).9 
Similarly, Nebraska’s statute defined religious garb as “any dress or garb indicating the 
fact that such teacher is a member or an adherent of any religious order, sect, or 
denomination.”10 
Overview of Research Questions 
In this context, I use two research questions to drive my study: first, whether the 
anti-religious-garb laws in Pennsylvania and Nebraska are permissible under federal law; 
and second, whether Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb law is permissible under 
Pennsylvania state law. I focus this second question narrowly on a single state because 
the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the Religious Freedom Protection Act in 
2002, a state statute that “prescribes the conditions under which government may 
substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion,”11 whereas Nebraska has no 
such state statute. 
                                               
 
9 Pennsylvania Statute 24, § 11-1112 (2016). This statute was the first in the United States, enacted in 1895. 
It was reaffirmed in 1949 and 1982.  
10 Neb. Code § 79-898 (2017). This statute was first enacted in 1919 (c. 248, § 1, p. 1018) and reaffirmed in 
1922, 1929, 1943, 1949, 1994, and 1996 and repealed in 2017. 






Primary Line of Inquiry: Free Exercise Standards 
To elaborate, my primary research question focuses on whether these two 
contemporary state statutes are permissible under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which declares that “Congress shall make 
no law… prohibiting the free exercise” [of religion].12 The U.S. Supreme Court applied 
the constitutional guarantee to one’s free exercise of religion to all state laws in 194013 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, which proclaims that no state shall “deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”14 Therefore, I use my primary 
research question to analyze whether Pennsylvania and Nebraska’s anti-religious-garb 
laws are permissible under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
I use legal research methods to examine two standards that federal courts have 
used to analyze the constitutionality of Free Exercise claims: the strict scrutiny and 
general applicability tests. Strict scrutiny means that a state must narrowly tailor 
regulations that may substantially burden one’s free exercise of religion by using the least 
restrictive means possible to further a compelling governmental interest. I will refer to 
strict scrutiny as the Sherbert standard because of its prominent use in the landmark case 
                                               
 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Please note that I do not ask whether these state anti-garb laws violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting the 
establishment of religion,” which was applied to the states in 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U.S. 1 (1947). Establishment Clause questions fall outside the scope of this study.  
13 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).  









Sherbert v. Verner. 15 (See Chapter II for a complete discussion of these italicized phrases 
and the historical development and current use of strict scrutiny in Free Exercise cases.) 
The general applicability test requires that government regulations must be 
“neutral and generally applicable,” which I will refer to as the Smith standard because of 
its prominent use in the controversial case, Employment Division v. Smith.16 (For a 
complete discussion see my literature review of Free Exercise standards in Chapter II.) 17 
In further clarifying the meaning of the general neutrality standard, the U.S. 
Supreme Court made explicit in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) 
that “Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be 
shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise 
Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.”18 Laws 
that are hostile toward or suppress religious beliefs or practices are not neutral nor 
generally applicable.19  
                                               
 
15 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) for a 
somewhat looser application of the Sherbert standard. 
16 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
17 As I detail later, the general neutral provision was affirmed in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990), which denied unemployment benefits to drug counselors who used peyote as part of a Native 
American ritual. In response, Congress sought to restore the strict scrutiny standard when passing the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) the 
U.S. Supreme Court found that Congress overstepped its constitutional enforcement powers when seeking 
to apply RFRA to the states, thus limiting the strict scrutiny test to federal laws. As a result, state 
legislatures began to pass their own “mini-RFRAs.” 
18 See the unanimous decision, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 at 28 
(1993).  
19 In discussing the bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb, Thomas C. Berg writes, “One might 
think that because the statutes single out religiously motivated conduct for restriction, they should be 
subject to strict scrutiny - and likely invalidation - under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, or under Title VII, the federal statute prohibiting employment discrimination on 
the basis of, among other things, religion. But this situation is complicated by the fact that teachers are state 









The Smith decision supports this line of thinking. In speaking for the majority, 
Justice Scalia held that “a State would be ‘prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] if it 
sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious 
reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display.”20 As I demonstrate in 
Chapter IV, the state bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb in Pennsylvania and 
Nebraska were designed to regulate specific activity (“wearing any dress, mark, emblem 
or insignia”) because the nature of the activity was explicitly religious (“indicating the 
fact that such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order, sect or 
denomination”).21 
Given this statutory language, I use the U.S. Supreme Court’s rationale in Smith22 
to justify that the Sherbert standard applies to the question of anti-religious-garb laws in 
Pennsylvania and Nebraska because these statutes were designed to target and suppress 
particular forms of religious expression.23 
                                               
 
Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in the United States, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1277 
(2005), p. 19. Also see: Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) in which the 
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that the City of Hialeah violated the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment when banning the religious practice of animal sacrifice, when the city permitted the 
killing of animals for other purposes, such as food production.  
20 In Smith, the Court makes the caveat that “no cases of ours have involved [this] point.” Employment 
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), at 877-78. This argument is further advanced in the “Historical and 
Legislative Background of the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act” section of Combs v. 
Dubois, 468 F.Supp.2d 738, 37 (W.D. Pa. 2006).  
21 Pennsylvania Statute 24, § 11-1112 (2018). 
22 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), at 877-78.  
23 As I will discuss in Chapter IV – Presentation and Analysis of Findings, the Oregon Supreme Court, 
when upholding Oregon’s anti-religious-garb law, admitted that “the religious significance of the teacher’s 
dress is the specific target of this law. The law singles out a teacher’s religious dress because it is religious 
and to the extent that its religious significance is apparent when the wearer is engaged in teaching.” The 
Oregon Supreme Court explicitly stated that Oregon’s anti-religious-garb law was “not a general 
regulation, neutral toward religion on its face and in its policy, like the unemployment benefits standards 
that we sustained against attack under the Oregon Constitution (though not under the First Amendment) by 
claimants who had been discharged for religiously motivated conduct in Smith v. Employment Division, 






Therefore, in my primary research question about federal law, I apply both the 
Smith (neutral and general applicability) and Sherbert (strict scrutiny) standards to ask 
whether the contemporary anti-religious-garb laws in Pennsylvania and Nebraska violate 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
Specifically, I use the Smith standard to ask whether these particular state bans on 
public schoolteachers’ religious garb are neutral and generally applicable laws. Because 
I find in Chapter IV that the answer is “no,” I then proceed to ask whether these anti-garb 
statutes pass the three parts of the strict scrutiny test: (a) do the statutes substantially 
burden public schoolteachers’ free exercise of religion, regardless of whether they are 
incidental or fundamental burdens? (b) Are these burdens justified by serving a 
compelling government interest? (c) If so, did the legislative bodies in Pennsylvania and 
Nebraska narrowly tailor the regulation by using the least restrictive means possible? 
These judicial standards allow me to analyze whether the anti-religious-garb laws in 
Pennsylvania and Nebraska are permissible under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Secondary Line of Inquiry 
My secondary research question is based on a distinct legal jurisdiction: 
Pennsylvania state law. Specifically, I ask whether Pennsylvania’s 1895 statutory ban on 
public schoolteachers’ religious garb violates the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom 
Protection Act of 2002 (RFPA, pronounced riff-pa).24 
                                               
 






In seeking to mirror the federal standards used to test the validity of Free Exercise 
claims under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Pennsylvania’s RFPA uses 
the same language as the federal general applicability and strict scrutiny standards. This 
will prove convenient in conducting both a federal- and state-based analysis of 
Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb law. Specifically, RFPA states that “an agency shall 
not substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion, including any burden which 
results from a rule of general applicability.”25 It further stipulates that “An agency may 
substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion if the agency proves, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the burden is all of the following: (1) In furtherance 
of a compelling interest of the agency; (2) The least restrictive means of furthering the 
compelling interest.”26  
Twenty states have enacted similar religious freedom protection statutes.27 
Pennsylvania is unique in that it is the only legal body in the United States, in both 
federal and state law, that uses a four-part test to determine whether a government agency 
“substantially burdens” a person’s religious freedom. This becomes the first line of 
inquiry used by a court; meaning, similar to the Sherbert standard, if the plaintiff 
demonstrates their religion is burdened then the state must articulate a compelling state 
interest and illustrate how it is achieved in the least restrictive means possible. Unique to 
Pennsylvania is the Four-Part Substantial Burden Test in the RFPA, which clarifies that 
an agency substantially burdens a person’s religion when the state’s action:  
(1) Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by 
a person’s sincerely held religious beliefs; (2) Significantly curtails a 
                                               
 
25 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. §2404, section 4a. 
26 Ibid., §2404, section 4b. 






person’s ability to express adherence to the person’s religious faith; (3) 
Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities which are 
fundamental to the person’s religion; (4) Compels conduct or expression 
which violates a specific tenet of a person’s religious faith. 
 
It is important to note that RFPA stipulates that a plaintiff need only prove, with 
“clear and convincing evidence,” one of these four substantial burdens exist in order to 
trigger RFPA’s strict scrutiny standard.28 
Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act includes an additional 
complexity that is important to note in this introduction. It begins with a “Definitions” 
section that legally defines religious exercise as the “practice or observance of religion 
under section 3 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.”29 This means that the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly required its state courts draw upon state court 
interpretations of the Pennsylvania Constitution to define religious exercise and not rely 
on federal definitions of “free exercise” as interpreted under the federal constitution. 
The reasons for this stipulation, which I further explain in Chapter II – Literature 
Review, are straightforward: first, these religious freedom protections in Pennsylvania’s 
Constitution predate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;30 second, the 
religious freedom protections in the Pennsylvania Constitution are unlike any other state 
or federal laws; and, third, RFPA and other state religious freedom protection statutes 
were designed to empower states to expand Free Exercise protections by using state 
                                               
 
28 For example, the plaintiffs in Combs v. Dubois, 468 F.Supp.2d 738 (W.D. Pa. 2006) only claim that the 
state violated one of the four-part substantial burdens listed in RFPA, the No Constraining Conduct Based 
on Religious Tenets principle. Although they failed to prevail, the federal District Court of the Western 
District of Pennsylvania did not require that they prove more than one or all of the substantial burdens. 
Affirmed in Combs v. Dubois, 540 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir. 2008). 
29 Ibid., § 2403. Definitions, P.L. 1701, No. 214. 
30 The PA. CONST. was enacted on Sept. 28, 1776; fifteen years later, on Dec. 15, 1791, the states ratified 






constitutions. For a complete discussion of this last point, see my examination of the 
“Increased Reliance on State Religion Clauses” and in Chapter II – Literature Review. 
These are the state-based provisions I will use to ask in my secondary question, 
whether Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb law violates Pennsylvania’s RFPA. In my 
primary research question, I will use the previously discussed Smith and Sherbert federal 
standards to ask whether Pennsylvania and Nebraska’s anti-religious-garb laws are 
permissible under the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Together, these two 
questions create the scaffolding for my two-part study of anti-religious-garb laws under 
federal and state law. 
Significance 
Having introduced my legal questions and the standards by which I will answer 
them, the next part of this introductory chapter is dedicated to demonstrate that scholars 
consider the legal question of anti-religious-garb laws to be one worth studying and that 
this research project has real-world significance. 
I begin this next section by surveying the historical context for the 123-year old 
debate in the United States, which started when the Pennsylvania General Assembly 
passed the first anti-religious-garb law31 in response to the 1894 decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to permit Catholic teachers to wear religious habits in the 
public classroom.32 Legislators and State Superintendents in twenty-one states followed 
                                               
 
31 Ibid., Pennsylvania Statute 24, § 11-1112 (2016), originally passed as P.L. 395 on June 27, 1895. 
32 Hysong v. Gallitzin School District, 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. 






Pennsylvania’s lead in banning public schoolteachers from wearing religious garb 
throughout their states, through either state statutes or administrative regulations. 
I analyze these historic origins and subsequent developments in relation to the 
relevance of contemporary legal challenges to state anti-religious-garb laws in the United 
States that have recently been used to deny employment to Catholic,33 Muslim,34 and 
Sikh35 public schoolteachers for wearing head coverings. 
In doing so, I demonstrate that the current dilemma over whether teachers can 
wear religious garb in the public classroom in the United States is neither an isolated 
problem nor unique to one time and place.36 It is a historical quandary with contemporary 
significance—domestically and globally.37 
The significance of my contribution to these debates broadly, and to the literature 
on education law more specifically, comes in three forms. First, I demonstrate that there 
are substantial and unresolved legal questions as to the constitutionality of state garb 
statutes under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act. These questions 
include whether the state bans violate federal neutral and generally applicable and strict 
                                               
 
33 In 2016, Sister Madeleine Miller was denied employment as a substitute teacher because she sought to 
wear a Catholic habit while teaching. Grant Shulte (2017) “Nebraska targets ban on religious garb worn by 
teachers,” Associated Press, Jan. 17, 2017; Michael Shively (2017) “Legislative Bill Would Eliminate 100-
Year-Old Religious Garb Law,” KWBE Nebraska News Chanel, Jan. 18, 2017. 
34 United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
35 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 (1986), app. Dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (1987). 
36 Liberty and Freedom of Conscience: Right to Wear a Religious Garb in Public Schools. 9 MICH. L. REV., 
(1911), pp. 352-353; Virgil C Blum, Religious Liberty and the Religious Garb, and Religious Garb in the 
Public Schools: A Study in Conflicting Liberties. 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 22, (1955), 875-88 and 888-95; 
Edmund E. Reutter, Teachers’ Religious Dress: A Century of Litigation. WEST’S EDUCATION LAW 
REPORTER (1992); Caitlin S. Kerr, Teachers’ Religious Garb as an Instrument for Globalization in 
Education. 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (Winter 2011), p. 539-561. 
37 Lyal S. Sunga and Nathan C. Walker, Freedom of Religion or Belief through Law: Current Dilemmas 






scrutiny standards and whether they violate Pennsylvania’s unique, four-part substantial 
burden test.     
Second, I identify and correct the factual errors in the literature about the 
historical bans on teachers’ garb, such as how many U.S. states previously had similar 
regulations and the legal outcomes of these laws.  
Third, I briefly situate this historical and contemporary conflict in the United 
States within the current discussion in the United Nations and in the European Union 
about government bans on religious garb in public schools. Specifically, I review how the 
question of government regulation of religious garb worn by both teachers and students 
in public schools has recently erupted in six countries and in the European Court of 
Human Rights.38 These cases illustrate how the historic conflicts in the United States 
mirror the current legal disputes around the globe today. Taken together, this introductory 
material demonstrates the real-world significance of this research topic, one that scholars 
have long since determined is an unresolved legal issue. 
Scholarship on Anti-Religious-Garb Laws 
The interdisciplinary scholarship on regulating public schoolteachers’ religious 
garb in America is vast for the mere fact that this legal problem spans 123-years and has 
                                               
 
38 The European Court of Human Rights used Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights to 
justify legal restrictions on religious expression. The first part of Article 9 uses the language from Article 
18 of the UDHR, and the second part guarantees that “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall 
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.” Cases include Dahlab v. Switzerland, No. 42393/98, 15 Jan. 2001; Leyla 
Sahin v. Turkey No. 44774/98, 10 Nov. 2008; El Morsli v. France, No. 15585/06, 4 Mar. 2008; Dogru v. 
France, No. 27058/05, 4 Dec. 2008; Kervanci v. France, No. 31645/04, 4 Dec. 2008; Aktas v. France, No. 
43563/08, 17 July 2009; Bayrak v. France, No. 14308/08, 17 July 2009; Gamaleddyn v. France, No. 
18527/08, 17 July 2009; Ghazal v. France, No.29134/08, 17 July 2009; J. Singh v. France, No. 25463/08, 






impacted, at some point, schools in twenty-two U.S. states. Scholars from the fields of 
law and education as well as religious and civic leaders and journalists have all 
contributed to this body of knowledge. Their collective contributions reveal that the 
question of public schoolteachers’ religious garb is significant, historic and relevant 
today, as noted in the following five bodies of literature. 
In Chapter II – Literature Review and References, I first will show that nation’s 
leading law and religion scholars have drawn upon the conflicting case law on public 
schoolteachers’ religious garb. This scholarship demonstrates that this is an important, 
longstanding and unresolved legal matter. Second, I will demonstrate that elected and 
appointed officials from various levels of government have made formal statements or 
issued regulatory policies to address this matter. Third, I will illustrate how educators and 
education associations have published studies, commentaries, and manuals to guide 
teachers and policymakers on this legal question. Fourth, I will show how religious and 
civic liberty groups have consistently asserted themselves in the public debate on this 
complicated church/state issue. And fifth, I will detail how journalists have been 
reporting on this topic for over 13 decades, suggesting that the subject of public 
schoolteachers’ religious garb is one worth reporting and one that captures the public’s 
attention. These five areas have helped me understand the historical significance of this 
longstanding legal question.  
Historical Context 
 Since 1894, there have been eleven U.S. cases that have directly addressed the 






supreme courts that applied state laws.39 Cases filed under these state laws were based on 
a variety of causes of action derived from state constitutional clauses and state statutes.40 
As a result, the historical context for this set of case law is quite complex.  
For instance, only two state courts took up the federal question of religious garb 
under the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment Clause: The New Mexico Supreme Court 
(1951) issued a negative ruling against Catholic teachers because of strong evidence of 
sectarian instruction and indoctrination,41 whereas the Kentucky Court of Appeals (1956) 
used the federal Establishment Clause to issue a positive ruling for Catholic teachers 
because the trial court found no evidence of sectarian teaching.42 
The Mississippi Supreme Court was the only state court in the United States 123-
year history on public schoolteachers’ religious garb that took up the federal question of 
the U.S. Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause. The Mississippi Supreme Court relied on 
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions43 to apply the standard of strict scrutiny to affirm an 
                                               
 
39 Six cases involved Catholic nuns: Hysong v. Gallitzin School District, 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894), 
overturned in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68 (1910); O’Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1906); Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444 (1936); Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 
1940); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501; 236 P.2d 949 (1951); and Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (1956). 
Other cases involved a Mennonite teacher in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68 (1910); a Sikh 
teacher in Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 (1986), app. Dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (1987); 
an African Hebrew Israelite teacher in Mississippi Employment Security v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 
(1990); a Muslim teacher in United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990); 
and a Protestant Christian in Nichol v. Arin, 268 F.Supp 2d 536 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
40 Cases filed under a variety of clauses under state constitutions, such as, “right of conscience” clauses, 
“establishment” clauses, “no preference” clauses, “no aid to religion” clauses, “no sectarian teaching” 
clauses, “no diversion” of funds clauses, “authority” of legislature clauses; as well as under “authority” of 
superintendent statutes. For a complete discussion, see the “Case Law” section in Chapter II. Literature 
Review. 
41 Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501; 236 P.2d 949 (1951). 
42 Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (1956). 









African Hebrew Israelite teacher’s petition to periodically wear an Ethiopian headdress 
(January 1990).44 It is noteworthy to mention that Mississippi did not at the time have and 
never did have a state ban on religious garb—the teacher’s employment was simply 
denied because of the school’s decision not to permit religious garb. This is important 
because it highlights a consistent legal trend in case law regarding religious garb: “Where 
no such statute or regulation is involved, the case usually turns on the applicability and 
effect of constitutional or statutory provisions, variously phrased, which, in effect, 
prohibit sectarianism in public schools.”45 
In April 1990, three months after the Mississippi Supreme Court had issued its 
positive ruling for the teacher, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the controversial 
Employment Division v. Smith, in which drug counselors were denied unemployment 
benefits after being fired for using peyote for sacramental purposes46 (See the section on 
“Evolution of Free Exercise Standards” in Chapter II – Literature Review for a complete 
discussion of Smith and its implications for this study.) The Smith decision quickly 
eclipsed the Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling that provided exemptions for the African 
Hebrew Israelite teacher to wear a headdress while teaching in a public school. 
Four months later, in August 1990, a Philadelphia public schoolteacher sought 
employment accommodations to wear a hijab (Muslim headscarf) under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against her,47 further 
reinforcing the Smith-era trend of courts’ denying accommodations for religious 
                                               
 
44 Mississippi Employment Security v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (1990). 
45 AMERICAN LAW REPORT, 60 A.L.R.2d 300, 1a. 
46 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 






minorities, as explained in detail in Chapter II – Literature Review. Since then, the legal 
landscape has changed dramatically. 
In reaction to Smith, and in a unique moment of bipartisanship, members of 
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.48 Known as RFRA 
(pronounced riff-ra), it received the unanimous support of members of the House of 
Representatives, and 97 of 100 U.S. Senators voted for the bill; President Bill Clinton 
then signed it into law. Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the effect of 
RFRA to federal laws,49 leading state legislatures to create their own state RFRAs. The 
purpose of the federal and state RFRAs was to mandate that governments use the 
standard of strict scrutiny when balancing the Free Exercise of individuals against the 
government’s compelling interests. Currently, twenty states have adopted RFRA 
legislation,50 and four states have pending RFRA bills.51 Thirteen additional states have 
“RFRA-like protections provided by state court decisions,”52 which I detail in Chapter II 
– Literature Review.  
                                               
 
48 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb through 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4. 
49 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
50 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 52-571b (1993); R.I. Gen. Laws §§42-80.1-1 to -4 (1998); Ill. Comp. Stat. 
Ann. 35/1-99 (1998); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§761.01-.05 (1998); ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01 (ratified in 1999); 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann §§41-1493-1439.02 (1999); S.C. Code Ann.§§1-32-10 to -60 (1999); Tex. Civ. Prac. 
& Rem. Code. Ann §§110.001-0.12 (1999); Idaho Code Ann. §§73-401 to -404 (2000); N.M. Stat. §§28-
22-1 to -5 (2000); Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 51, §§251-258 (2000); 71 Pa. Stat. Ann §§2401-2407 (2002); Mo. 
Ann. Stat. §§1.302-.307 (2003); Va. Code Ann. §§57-1 to -2.02 (2007); Utah Code Ann. §§63L-5-101 to -
403 (2008); Tenn. Code Ann. §4-1-407 (2009); La. Rev. Stat §§ 13:5231-5242 (2010); Kentucky – H.B. 
279, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2013) Kansas Ch. 60 Procedure, Civil Article 53, §§ 60-5301 to -5305 (2013); 
Mississippi. Source: Marci A. Hamilton, www.rfraperils.com. 
51 Georgia’s Preventing Government Overreach on Religious Expression Act (H.B. 29); Indiana’s Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (H.B. 568); Michigan’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (S.B. 0004); and 
Wyoming’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (H.B. 0083).  







Of the two states with anti-religious-garb laws—Pennsylvania and Nebraska—
Pennsylvania was the only legislature to enact a state RFRA, the Pennsylvania Religious 
Freedom Protection Act of 2002. Nebraska is only one of four states with no strict 
scrutiny provision in state law, which is why I turn to the Free Exercise and jurisprudence 
to test the legality of Nebraska’s anti-religious-garb law.  
 Chapter II – Relevant Case Law illustrates that, to date, no court has applied strict 
scrutiny to a state ban on religious garb—neither in a federal Free Exercise case nor in a 
state RFRA case. As a result, no court has determined (1) whether public schoolteachers 
are substantially burdened by these laws, (2) whether the state has a compelling interest 
for denying employment to teachers who wear religious garb, and (3) whether that 
interest is narrowly tailored and achieved by the least restrictive means possible. In 
addition, no court since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its Smith ruling has ruled on the 
question of whether an anti-religious-garb statute is a “neutral law of general 
applicability.”53 These issues serve as the scaffolding for my legal analysis in Chapter IV 
– Presentation and Analysis of Findings. 
Global Context 
To demonstrate the contemporary relevance of my study, I begin by showing 
precisely which kind of garb-wearing teacher is burdened by anti-religious-garb laws 
                                               
 
53 Although, four years before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Smith, the Oregon Supreme Court did 
admit in 1986 that the state’s anti-religiou-garb law “is not a general regulation, neutral toward religion on 
its face and in its policy, like the unemployment benefits standards in Smith v. Employment Division, 301 
Or 209, 721 P2d 445 (1986), and Black v. Employment Division, 301 Or 221, 721 P2d 451 (1986).” Cooper 









today (Appendix C). Throughout Chapter II – Literature Review, I provide examples of 
how state and federal courts have heard grievances from a diverse group of public 
schoolteachers who use identified as African Hebrew Israelite (headdress),54 Catholic 
(habit),55 Mennonite (bonnet),56 Muslim (hijab/headscarf),57 Protestant Christian (cross 
necklace)58 and Sikh (turban).59  
Although these examples derive from real teachers who have challenged anti-
religious-garb laws, such laws impact a wide range of religious adherents. We can turn to 
other forms of religious garb for examples, some of which derive from cases involving 
the students in public schools as well as military personnel and police officers: Buddhist 
(dharma wheel insignia), Catholic (rosaries,60 devotional scapular/two rectangular pieces 
of cloth,61 or an Ash Wednesday marking,), Church of the Brethren (hair covering and 
long dress),62 Daoist (yin yang), Hindu (bindi/red dot or Om symbol), Jewish 
                                               
 
54 Mississippi Employment Security v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (1990). 
55 Hysong v. Gallitzin School District, 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. 
Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68 (1910); O’Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1906); Johnson v. 
Boyd, 217 Ind. 348 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1940); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501; 236 P.2d 949 (1951); Rawlings v. 
Buttler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (1956). See also Grant Shulte (2017) “Nebraska targets ban on religious garb worn 
by teachers,” Associated Press, Jan. 17, 2017; Michael Shively (2017) “Legislative Bill Would Eliminate 
100-Year-Old Religious Garb Law,” KWBE Nebraska News Chanel, Jan. 18, 2017. 
56 Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68 (1910). 
57 United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
58 Nichol v. Arin, 268 F.Supp 2d 536 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
59 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 (1986), app. Dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (1987). 
60 Student case: Chalifoux v. New Caney, 976 F.Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
61 An example highlighted by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 
(1986). 









(yarmulke/skullcap,63 beard,64 tzitzit/knotted tassel,65 mezuzah pendant,66 
tichel/headscarf), Native American (hair length),67 Nazirite (hair length),68 Rastafarian 
(dreadlocks),69 Shriner (fezz, hat), Sikh (kirpan),70 Wiccan (pentacle), Yogi (saffron 
robe),71 and so on. 
I share these examples to make the point that the contemporary legal question of 
statutory bans on religious garb in Pennsylvania and Nebraska may burden a variety of 
garb-wearing teachers in public schools. Given the diversity of the religious expressions, 
the contemporary relevance of the study of bans on religious garb has real-world 
consequences on public schoolteachers both domestically and globally.  
As of 2006, at least thirty-two countries throughout the world prohibit some kind 
of private acts of devotion in public places.72 Studies demonstrate that countries with high 
restrictions on religion have greater increases in social hostilities and violence.73 The 
                                               
 
63 Student case: Menora v. Illinois, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982). 
64 Student case on religious garb: Rocco Parascandola, “Hasidic NYPD Recruit Fired Over Beard.” New 
York Daily News, June 9, 2012. See also, “Lawyer for defendant claims the ‘city has come up with an after-
the-fact rationalization’ by saying facial hair would prevent him wearing a gas mask with a proper fit.” 
Rocco Parascandola, “Hasid cop recruit Fishel Litzman bashes NYPD’s terror claim in firing over refusal 
to trim beard,” New York Daily News, 27 June 2013. 
65 An example highlighted by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 
(1986). 
66 An example highlighted by Justice Ackerman’s concurrence in United States [Reardon] v. Board of 
Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
67 Student cases: Coushatta v. Big Sandy, 817 F.Supp. 1319 (E.D., Tex. 1993); Betenbaugh v. Needville 
Independent School District, 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010). 
68 EEOC, “Taco Bell Operator Pays $27,000 to Resolve EEOC Religious Discrimination Lawsuit: 
Fayetteville Restaurant Fired Worker Over Religion-Mandated Long Hair, Federal Agency Charged.” U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Press Release, 27 Apr. 2012. 
69 Flowers v. Columbia College Chicago, 397 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2005). 
70 Student case: Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995). 
71 An example highlighted by Justice Stevens concurrence in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
72 Michael Wiener, Prohibition of Wearing Religious Symbols. (Germany: Universität Trier, 2006). 
73 Pew Research Center, Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High. (Washington, DC: Pew Research 









effects are seen in all areas of society, from the public square to private workplaces. For 
instance, throughout much of the world, individuals are currently experiencing 
discrimination in employment by either not being able to find jobs because of their 
religious dress, for wearing religious symbols on the job, or for requesting days off for 
religious observance. These laws have a significant effect on the earning power of 
families given that regulations on religious expression disproportionately harm women. 
The Pew Research Center found that thirty-nine countries have enacted laws or 
issued policies “limiting women’s ability to wear religious attire” in 2012-2013,74 which 
is blatant gender-discrimination. This study further reinforced earlier studies that 
correlate increases in regulation of religion with increases in social hostilities. Take for 
instance the continent of Europe. In 2012–2013, nearly half of the region’s countries 
(twenty-one of forty-five) had at least one report of women being harassed for wearing 
religious attire. This is higher than four other regions surveyed (Americas, Asia-Pacific, 
Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa).  
Turkey, where Muslims make up approximately ninety-eight percent of the 
population75, “was the first country [in the European Union]76 to ban hijab through a 
                                               
 
Trend,” (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Sept. 18, 2013); and Brian J. Grim, Religion, Law and 
Social Conflict in the 21st Century: Findings from Sociological Research, OXFORD J.L. & RELIG., pp. 249–
271. 
74 Alan Cooperman, Peter Henne, Dennis R. Quinn, Restrictions on Women’s Religious Attire: More 
countries restrict women’s ability to wear religious symbols or attire than require women to dress a certain 
way. (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Apr. 5, 2016). 
75 Pew Research Center, Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of 
the World’s Muslim Population. (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Oct. 2009), p. 5. 
76 Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe in 1949. In 1987, Turkey applied to join the 









sweeping prohibition applicable to public schools, universities, and in the workplace for 
official employees.”77 Under the secular constitution, by 2001, over 37,000 girls had been 
expelled from school, and over 24,000 teachers had been fired for wearing the hijab, an 
Islamic headscarf.78 Under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in 
2008 the Parliament sought to rescinded the ban on the hijab,79 citing that this law had 
substantially harmed girls in completing their schooling and adult women for being able 
to work in public institutions. In 2008, the Constitutional Court overturned the 
Parliament, citing the founding secular provisions in the constitution. The BBC reported 
that this ruling could have “foreshadow[ed] a separate court case in which the ruling AK 
Party (AKP) could be banned for anti-secular activities. Some seventy-one members of 
the party, including the prime minister and the president, could also be banned from 
belonging to a political party for five years.”80 This threat did not manifest. By 2013, the 
parliament prevailed by permitting students, teachers, and other government workers (but 
not military or judiciary personnel) to wear the hijab. In a parliamentary address, Prime 
Minister Erdogan said, “A dark time eventually comes to an end. Headscarf-wearing 
woman are full members of the republic, as well as those who do not wear it.”81 
                                               
 
Turkey’s “full member” status was negotiated in 2005 and then suspended in 2016 as a result of political 
unrest and over EU members’ concerns about the lack of rule of law and human rights abuses.  
77 Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical Influences on 
the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 441, p. 453. 
78 Faisal Kutty, Ousted Turkish M.P. Merver Kavakci Calls on Canada to Help Hijab-Wearing Muslim 
Women, WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2001, pp. 44, 113. 
79 Ibid. 
80 “Court Annuls Turkish Scarf Reform,” BBC News, June 5, 2008. 
81 Roff Smith, “Why Turkey Lifted Its Ban on the Islamic Headscarf: Woman Who Work in Civil Service 









To prevent these types of legal and political conflicts, a variety of state, non-
governmental, and religious actors are making clear that restrictions on religious 
expression violate two fundamental human rights. First, Article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)82 ensures that “Everyone has the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” Second, 
article 23 §1 of the UDHR proclaims, “Everyone has the right to work . . .” and §2 states, 
“Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.”83 In 
connecting the two human rights, employers cannot make religion or nonreligion a 
prerequisite for employment—a legal principle that, as of 2016, was not being honored in 
fifty of the world’s countries.84 All of these countries have affirmed these human rights 
principles by signing either the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
                                               
 
82 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly, 10 Dec. 1948, Palais de 
Chaillot, Paris. Currently, 193 countries are represented in the United Nations; however, 56 of which are 
also members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The OIC rejected the UDHR framework when 
issuing the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam during the Nineteenth Islamic Conference of 
Foreign Ministers (Session of Peace, Interdependence and Development), held in Cairo, Arab Republic of 
Egypt, from 9–14 Muharram 1411H (July 31–Aug. 5, 1990). This declaration uses Islamic sharia law to 
affirm human rights from a non-Western perspective. 
83 As enacted at the Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Session of Peace, 
Interdependence and Development), held in Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, from 9–14 Muharram 1411H 
(July 31–Aug. 5, 1990).   
84 The Pew Research Center found that “50 of the 198 countries and territories included in the study had at 
least one law or policy regulating women’s religious attire in 2012 and 2013… About three-quarters of 
those countries (39 of the 50, or 78%) had a law or policy limiting women’s ability to wear religious attire, 
while about a quarter (12 of the 50, or 24%) had at least one law or policy requiring women to wear 
particular attire.” Alan Cooperman, Peter Henne, Dennis R. Quinn, Restrictions on Women’s Religious 









or the Organisation of the Islamic Conference’s Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in 
Islam.85 
Throughout Europe, for example, current bans on religious garb remain a highly-
contested topic, affecting employees, students, and teachers. In 2011, the British Prime 
Minister David Cameron publicly announced his support for employees’ wearing crosses 
in the workplace months before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled 
against British Airways for banning the practice.86 In contrast, the same court, with the 
same justices, affirmed France and Turkey’s decisions to expel pupils for wearing 
religious garb while in public schools.87 In the British Airways case, the ECHR 
                                               
 
85 The 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam provides (my italics for emphasis): “All human 
beings form one family whose members are united by their subordination to Allah and descent from Adam. 
All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, language, belief, sex, religion, political affiliation, social status or 
other considerations. The true religion is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human 
integrity” (Art. 1a). It further states that: “All human beings are Allah’s subjects, and the most loved by 
Him are those who are most beneficial to His subjects, and no one has superiority over another except on 
the basis of piety and good deeds” (Art. 1b). Article 13 states, “Work is a right guaranteed by the State and 
the Society for each person with capability to work…without any discrimination between males and 
females… [and access] to fair wages for his work without delay, as well as to the holidays allowances and 
promotions which he deserves.” Adopted at the Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 
(Session of Peace, Interdependence and Development), held in Cairo, Egypt, 9–14 Muharram 1411H (31 
July to 5 Aug. 1990). 
86 In Eweida v. United Kingdom (nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) the European Court of 
Human Rights, in a five-to-two decision, ruled that the UK violated Article 9 (freedom of religion) when 
they banned Christians from wearing crosses while at work. The case was brought forth by a British 
Airways employee, a geriatric nurse, a registrar of wills (births, deaths, marriages), and a Relate counselor.  
87 In Dogru v. France, (ECHR, no. 27058/05 Dec. 4, 2008) the European Court of Human Rights 
unanimously affirmed France’s decision to expel Muslim students who “attended physical education 
classes wearing their headscarves” and found no violation of Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In 2008, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, “the Court held by 
sixteen votes to one, that there had been no violation of Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion) of the European Convention on Human Rights” when a Muslim medical student was prevented 
from wearing a headscarf because the ban was “necessary in a democratic society.” See also the six cases 
issued in 2009 in which Muslim and Sikh students were expelled for wearing religious garb: Aktas v. 
France (43563/08), Bayrak v. France (14308/08), Gamaleddyn v. France (18527/08), Ghazal v. France 









characterized the employee’s “desire to manifest her religious belief” as a “fundamental 
right” emphasizing that “a healthy democratic society needs to tolerate and sustain 
pluralism and diversity.”88 Meanwhile, the same justices in the same court characterize 
the Muslim student’s wearing headscarves in Turkey and France was not only “an 
ostentatious act that would constitute a source of pressure and exclusion” but one that 
was inconsistent with the “requirements of secularism in state schools.”89 These 
contradictory rulings that privileged one religion over another sent the message that 
European states may ban Muslim students from wearing garb in public schools, even 
though the states cannot ban Christian employees from wearing religious garb while 
working in private corporations.  
Additional patterns ensued. In 2011, the ECHR affirmed the decision of leaders of 
Italy’s public schools to display crucifixes in state school classrooms, finding “no 
sectarian influence.” Yet, in 2013, the ECHR Court affirmed Switzerland’s decision to 
dismiss a Muslim convert for failing to remove her hijab while teaching in the state 
school because the students were “easily influenced.”90 Citing complaints of customers 
being disturbed by workers who wore Muslim headscarves, in March 2017, the ECHR 
                                               
 
88 Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom (nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, ECHR 4th 
Section, Jan. 15, 2013). 
89 §§ 61-78 of Dogru v. France, (ECHR, no. 27058/05 Dec. 4, 2008) and Kervanci v. France, (ECHR, no. 
31645/04, Dec. 4, 2008).  









issued two rulings in Belgium91 and France92 that upheld the policies of private 
employers to prohibit Muslim employees from wearing religious garb while working.  
The judicial inconsistencies in allowing a Christians but not Muslims to wear 
religious garb, within the same courts, are just as prevalent as are the discrepancies found 
across government agencies and across European countries. As a result, leading human 
rights lawyers and human rights bodies have deemed these rulings against Muslims to be 
ineffective and discriminatory.93 As a result of these lively debates, governments in 
Europe continue to be particularly entangled in controversies over religious garb.  
Take the case of Fereshta Ludin, who moved to Germany at the age of fifteen. 
She previously lived in Saudi Arabia and was born in Afghanistan in 1972.94 She 
attended the University of Baden-Württemberg and became a certified schoolteacher. In 
1998, she applied for a teaching position but was denied by the Oberschulamt Stuttgart 
[English: Supervisory School Authority of Stuttgart] because she sought to wear a hijab 
                                               
 
91 Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions, C-157/15 (Court of Justice of the European Union, Mar. 14, 2017). 
states, “the prohibition on wearing an Islamic headscarf, which arises from an internal rule of a private 
undertaking prohibiting the visible wearing of any political, philosophical or religious sign in the 
workplace, does not constitute direct discrimination based on religion or belief within the meaning of that 
directive.” 
92 Bougnaoui v. Micropole, (Court of Justice of the European, Mar. 14, 2017) states, “the willingness of an 
employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have the services of that employer 
provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be considered a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement.” 
93 Rapporteur’s Digest on Freedom of Religion or Belief: Excerpts of the Reports from 1986 to 2011 by the 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Arranged by Topics of the Framework for 
Communications. Special Rapporteurs: Mr. Heiner Bielefeldt (Germany) Aug. 2010–present; Ms. Asma 
Jahangir (Pakistan), Aug. 2004–July 2010; Mr. Abdelfattah Amor (Tunisia), Apr. 1993–July 2004; Mr. 
Angelo d’Almeida Ribeiro (Portugal), Mar. 1986–Mar. 1993. See also Lindholm, Tore, Durham, W. Cole 
Jr., and Tahzib-Lie, Bahia G., et al. Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook, Leiden, The 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004. 
94 Human Rights Watch, Discrimination in the Name of Neutrality: Headscarf Bans for Teachers and Civil 









while in the classroom. In 2003, the German Federal Constitutional Court, in a 5–8 
decision, ruled in her favor.95 The high court held that “neutrality” could also be 
interpreted as “open inclusive neutrality” designed to accept all citizens and to promote 
cultural integration. Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court also concluded that the state 
legislatures did have the authority to regulate the religious dress of teachers in public 
schools, an echo of the decision the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave in its 1894 
decision in favor of Catholic nuns.96 In both instances, the German and Pennsylvania 
state legislatures used the courts’ decisions as permission to enact anti-religious-garb 
statutes. For instance, the legislature of the state of Baden-Württemberg enacted a 
statutory ban on teachers’ religious garb, which was later affirmed in the Federal 
Administrative Court. Germany’s anti-religious garb court rulings and legislation is of 
particular interest to this study because of the similar fact patterns and legal outcomes to 
that of Pennsylvania’s bans on teachers’ religious garb. Although she had the legal right 
to appeal, Ms. Lundin ultimately decided not to fight this new statutory ban; instead, she 
began teaching in a private Islamic elementary school in Berlin. Perhaps this was the 
court’s desired outcome seeing that they ruled that “the effect was not excessive because 
                                               
 
95 Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1436/02 of 24 Sept. 2003. The Court has two senates, of 
which both have eight members. A senate majority is required in most cases and a two-thirds vote in 
special cases (see § 15 IV 1 BVerfGG). 
96 Hysong v. Gallitzin School District, 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. 









Muslim teachers who wear the headscarf could still find employment in private 
schools.”97 
The outcome of her case led state legislatures in Germany to justify banning 
Muslims from teaching in public schools while continuing to permit garb-wearing 
Christians, exempting “the respective exhibition of Christian and occidental educational 
and cultural values or traditions.”98 To illustrate this point, by 2009, half of Germany’s 
Länders (English: states) made it illegal for Muslim women to wear headscarves in 
public employment, specifically in public schools.99 A majority of the German states with 
bans on religious garb grant exemptions to Christians. The state of Berlin, for instance, 
prohibited the wearing of religious garb by public officials but exempted those who wear 
small pieces of jewelry, which, yet again, privileged Christian expression. Similarly, in 
Bavaria, Muslim headscarves were prohibited; however, Catholic nuns were permitted to 
wear their habits while teaching.100 Only recently were these bans found unconstitutional.  
                                               
 
97 Erica Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European bans on the wearing of religious 
symbols in education. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), p. 167, citing Ludin v. Baden-Württenberg 
(Ludin III), Federal Administrative Court, Germany (BVerwGE), 24 June 2004, 2 C 450.03, 14. 
98 The Act Amending the School Code of Baden-Württemberg, supra note 19, asserts that “the respective 
exhibition of Christian and occidental educational and cultural values or traditions does not contradict the 
duty of behavior according to sentence 1,” which states, “Teachers at public schools . . . are not allowed to 
exercise political, religious, ideological or similar manifestations that may endanger or disturb the 
neutrality of the country towards pupils or parents or the political, religious or ideological peace of the 
school.” For a legal discussion see Ruben Seth Fogel, “Headscarves in German Public Schools: Religious 
Minorities are Welcome in Germany, Unless—God Forbid—They are Religious,” 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
(2006-2007), notes 149-151, p. 638 
99 Eight German states prohibit public schoolteachers from wearing visible religious garb: Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Saarland. In 
addition, Hesse and Berlin have enacted similar bans applied to many civil servants. 
100 GVBI, Erstes Gesetzzur Änderung des Schulgesetzesfür das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 13 June 2006, 










In March 2015, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, ruled in favor of two 
Muslim teachers from the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, holding that the state ban was 
discriminatory in nature, privileging Christians and penalizing people from other 
religions.101 The Court held that a “blanket ban on religious expression . . . based on the 
outward appearance of educators” was incompatible with Germany’s constitution,102 thus 
striking down all state statutes banning public schoolteachers from wearing religious garb 
while teaching. 
In summary, the 17-year legal struggle to resolve the question of teachers’ 
religious garb in Germany’s public schools has strong similarities to the historical 
dilemma of the 123-year-old saga in Pennsylvania. In both locations, courts initially ruled 
in favor of garb-wearing religious minorities yet permitted state legislatures to use the 
rule of the majority to decide whether a statutory ban was necessary. The legislative 
process was then used to enact anti-religious-garb laws, while garb-wearing public 
schoolteachers from majority religions continued to wear religious garb because of either 
legislative exemptions or inconsistent application of the law.  
As I further assert in Chapter IV – Presentation and Analysis of Findings, this 
legal pattern reinforces the trend in the United States of relying on statutory provisions, 
such as state Religious Freedom Protection Acts, to protect religious minorities rather 
than relying on the Constitution itself. Although the origins of these trends are 
understandable given the controversies over the Smith decision, I will later argue that it 
                                               
 
101 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 27 Jan. 2015 - 1 BvR 471/10 - paras. (1-31). 
102 Art. 1 Human dignity; Art. 2 Personal freedoms; Art. 3 Equality before the law; Art. 4 Freedom of faith 
and conscience; Art. 12 Occupational freedom; Art. 33 Equal citizenship in public service. Deutscher 






has a concerning effective because if religious liberty is truly a fundamental 
constitutional and human right, then it should not be granted or denied by representatives 
of a majority. 
In contrast, several recent political, legislative, and judicial actions around the 
world are worth noting. In January 2016, more than 250 Islamic leaders published a 
historic declaration for majority-Muslim countries to protect the religious freedoms of 
non-Muslims because of the recognitions that religious minorities were often targets of 
discrimination.103 This monumental statement rooted its authority in the Charter of 
Medina, a constitutional guarantee issued precisely 1,400 years ago earlier as a 
“constitutional contract between the Prophet Muhammad . . . and the people of 
Medina.”104 In this moment in time, members of the majority religion used theological 
and legal principles that were historically rooted in Islamic law to protect religious 
minorities in Islamic countries. 
Similarly, in August 2012, Pakistani Muslim leaders petitioned lawmakers on 
behalf of a fourteen-year-old Christian girl who faced the death penalty for allegedly 
using pages of the Quran to cook food.105 This was a profound turning point in Pakistan’s 
history.106 For the first time, leaders of the Muslim majority made a concerted effort to 
                                               
 
103 Marrakesh Declaration: Executive Summary of the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious 
Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities, Jan. 25–27, 2016.  
104 Ibid., p. 1. 
105 Shah, Saeed (2012) “Pakistani Muslim Leaders Support Christian Girl Accused of Blasphemy.” The 
Guardian, 27 Aug. 2012. 
106 In 2007, Pakistan was rated the second most “social hostilities involving religion” in the world, and in 
2010, it was the highest. See Brian J. Grim, Rising Tide of Restrictions on Religion, (Washington, DC: Pew 
Research Center, 2012). The actions of Islamic leaders in Pakistan in 2012 are especially significant, given 









exempt a religious minority from a blasphemy law.107 This became the first action to 
follow the historic words that Pakistan had expressed at the United Nations five months 
earlier. In March 2012, the Human Rights Council of the UN passed a proposal put 
forward by Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, titled 
“Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, 
incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief.”108 The 
resolution explicitly omits the “defamation of religion,” thus conceding that laws that ban 
the criticism of religion often result in increased violence. This is unprecedented. For the 
first time, leaders of an Islamic theocracy agreed to release the grip of blasphemy and 
defamation laws.  
The irony, of course, is that Pakistan’s “blasphemy statutes have their origins in 
the country’s colonial past when British rulers first introduced penalties for insulting any 
religious beliefs. These laws remained in effect after Pakistan’s independence in 1947 
and have since increased in severity.”109 (The United States is not immune to such 
history; Pennsylvania blasphemy law was overturned in 2010.)110 
These examples illustrate the turbulent and conflicted nature of the current global 
conversation about legal restrictions on religious expression. In some contexts, people 
learn from the ills of the past to counter human rights abuses in the present. In other 
                                               
 
107 Ibid. Grim. 
108 Human Rights Council, Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and 
Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence Against, Persons Based on Religion or Belief. United 
Nations General Assembly, A/HRC/22/L.40, 18 Mar. 2013. 
109 Angelina E. Theodorou, Which countries still outlaw apostasy and blasphemy. (Washington, DC: Pew 
Research Center), July 29, 2016. 
110 Compare Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824) with Kalman v. Cortes, 723 
F.Supp 2d 766 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2010). See also Kalman v. Cortes, Brief Amici Curiae of the Jewish Social 
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contexts, leaders emerge from countries whose majority rejects globalization. For these 
reasons, it is important for me to situate this brief survey of the global significance of the 
bans on religious garb within the current political trends occurring around the world and 
in the United States.  
Research Design 
Methodology 
Throughout this study, I use both legal research111 and legal analysis112 methods 
to construct a study about the two contemporary state bans on religious garb worn by 
public schoolteachers in Pennsylvania and Nebraska. 
                                               
 
111 Amy E. Sloan, Basic Legal Research: Tools and Strategies. (Frederick, MD: Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business, 2012); Emily Finch and Stefan Fafinski, Legal Skills, Third Edition. (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), chapters 1-7; Suzanne E. Rowe, Legal Research, Legal Writing, and Legal 
Analysis: Putting Law School into Practice, 29 STETSON L. REV. 1193, pp. 2-12 (2000), pp. 2-12; Christina 
L. Kunz, Deborah A. Schmedemann, C. Peter Erlinder, Matthew P. Downs, Ann L. Bateson, The Process 
of Legal Research: Successful Strategies. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1989); Michael D. 
Murray and Christy H. DeSanctis, Legal Research Methods: Legal Research and Writing. (New York, NY: 
Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press, 2009). 
112 David S. Romantz and Kathleen Elliot Vinson, Legal Analysis: The Fundamental skill (2nd ed.). (North 
Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2009). A subset of this literature focuses on scholarly writing. See 
Eugene Volokh, Academic legal writing: law review articles, student notes, seminar papers, and getting on 
law review. (New York, NY: Foundation Press, 2010). Volokh attributes this formulation to Stephen L. 
Carter, Academic Tenure and “White Male” Standards: Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 
2065, 2083 (1991); Chapter 11 “Developing a Research Plan” in Amy E. Sloan, Basic Legal Research: 
Tools and Strategies. (Frederick, MD: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012); Chapter 1, section C “The 
Process of Scholarly Writing” in Elizabeth Fjans & Mary R. Falk, Scholarly Writing for Students: Seminar 
Papers, Law Review Notes, and Law Review Competition Papers. (New York, NY: Thomson West, 2000), 
pp. 11-12; Katie R. Guest Pryal, Short Guide to Writing About Law. (Harlow, United Kingdom: 
Longman/Pearson Education, 2010); Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing law dissertations: An 
introduction and guide to the conduct of legal research. (Harlow, England: Pearson/Longman, 2007). 
Although Salter & Mason focus on research in the United Kingdom, the following sections are interesting 
in the context of research done on U.S. Law: “What is Research?” (pp. 5-6) and “What is a [Legal] 









I gained exposure to these methods through law classes, independent study 
classes, and dissertation seminars113 and by participating in training sessions with 
attorneys and law librarians about how to conduct research on United States law.114 These 
educational experiences exposed me to two distinct bodies of literature: first, the 
textbooks and journal articles about best practices for directing legal research projects 
and second, publications about legal writing and analysis. Collectively, these tools 
prepared me to take the following five steps. 
In the first step, under the advisement of my dissertation committee, I synthesized 
“judicial tests” by “cause of action.” A judicial test is a legal standard or set of principles 
that judges use to measure the legitimacy of a person’s petition before the court. Plaintiffs 
make these assertions by filing their case by cause of action or the law that they can use 
to bring a suit against a defendant or the legal right on which they want the court to 
affirm their case.115 I organize sections of my literature review and methods chapter by 
the following causes of action. I examine the constitutional claims a public schoolteacher 
could use to challenge a state’s anti-religious-garb law. I then analyze the origins, 
developments, and status of judicial tests under Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,116 as well as under federal statutes, such as 
Congress’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
                                               
 
113 Teachers College Columbia University courses: Spring 2010, “Topics in Law and Education” with 
Professor Elana Sigall, Esq.,; Spring 2011 “Education Equality: Role of Law” with Professor Jay Heubert; 
Spring 2011 and Autumn 2011 “Research and Independent Study” classes with Professor Jay Heubert, 
Esq.; and dissertation advisement sessions with Professors Jay Heubert, Esq. and Janice Robinson, Esq. 
from 2012–2018. 
114 See Chapter III––Methodology for an overview of these educational experiences.  
115 “What is Cause of Action?’ BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Online Legal Dictionary 2nd ed. 






1964. I then examine similar laws and judicial tests under State Constitutions and 
comparable state-level Religious Freedom Restoration Acts. In taking this first step, I was 
able to discern which judicial tests and causes of action are directly related to or 
irrelevant to my topic or ones that have already received substantial attention in the 
academic literature on anti-religious-garb laws. Ultimately, I concluded that I would 
conduct my study using, solely, the most authoritative judicial tests under the Free 
Exercise clause––strict scrutiny and neutral laws of general applicability117 (which I also 
refer to as the Sherbert and Smith standards). I also use the four-part “substantial burden” 
standard in Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002118 to test the legal 
validity of Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb law of 1895. 
In so doing, I was prepared to take the second step, to collect primary and 
secondary source documents. I used a variety of legal research tools119 and research 
methods120 to find and analyze primary text (i.e., cases, statutes, legislative documents) 
and secondary sources (i.e., academic articles, reports, and books; American Law Report; 
legal digests, encyclopedias, and dictionaries; news commentaries). Together, this step 
prepared me to test the legitimacy of sources and identify holes in the literature.  
In the third step, I articulated narrow legal research questions that I could 
rigorously examine in Chapter IV – Presentation and Analysis of Findings. In my primary 
                                               
 
117 The strict scrutiny test requires that the government narrowly tailor regulations that may substantially 
burden one’s free exercise of religion by using the least restrictive means possible to further a compelling 
governmental interest. The general applicability test requires that government regulations must be “neutral 
and generally applicable” and cannot single-out particular religious practices.   
118 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2401-2407, approved Dec. 9, 2002. 
119 Examples include LexisNexis, legislative websites, U.S. REPORTS, Code of Federal Regulations, and so 
on. See Chapter III – Methodology for complete list. 
120 Examples include IRAC method (issue, rule, analysis, outcome) for briefing cases and using Shepard’s 






research question, I ask whether the state bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb 
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. My two secondary questions 
are based on the judicial tests I analyzed in the second step. (A) Are the contemporary 
Pennsylvania and Nebraska statutes that ban public schoolteachers’ religious garb neutral 
and generally applicable laws (the Smith standard)? (B) Do these two anti-religious-garb 
statutes pass the federal strict scrutiny test (the Sherbert standard), meaning (i) do the 
statutes substantially burden public schoolteachers’ free exercise of religion; if so, are 
they incidental or fundamental burdens; (ii) are these burdens justified by serving a 
compelling government interest; and (iii) if so, did the Pennsylvania and Nebraska 
legislatures narrowly tailor the regulations by using the least restrictive means 
possible?121 
In my secondary research question, I ask whether the 1895 Pennsylvania anti-
religious-garb law is legally permissible under the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom 
Protection Act of 2002 (RFPA). Specifically, I ask whether the anti-religious-garb law 
passes RFPA’s four-part “substantial burden” test, which states that an agency 
substantially burdens a person’s religion when the states action: “(1)  Significantly 
constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by a person’s sincerely held 
religious beliefs; (2)  Significantly curtails a person’s ability to express adherence to the 
person’s religious faith; (3)  Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to engage in 
                                               
 






activities which are fundamental to the person’s religion; (4)  Compels conduct or 
expression [that] violates a specific tenet of a person’s religious faith.” 
These two research questions prepared me to take the fourth step—to set the 
parameters of the facts. Similar to how a trial court reviews the “finding of facts,”122 I 
will determine which precise information will allow me to most effectively answer my 
research questions and which information I will set aside. 
In the final step, I will conduct a legal analysis in Chapter II – Literature Review 
and Chapter IV – Presentation and Analysis of Findings. In these chapters, I will employ 
a series of legal analysis methods, such as deductive analysis, rule-based reasoning, 
analogical reasoning, and identifying logic fallacies.123 
In summary, I began by participating in training sessions with my doctoral 
committee and professors at Teachers College Columbia University as well as external 
attorneys and law librarians about how to conduct legal research. Then I examined the 
literature on legal research and legal analysis and writing. These experiences prepared 
me to take five steps in designing my research project: (1) synthesize judicial tests by 
cause of action, (2) collect primary and secondary material, (3) articulate narrow legal 
questions, (4) set the parameters of the facts, and (5) conduct a legal analysis. Together, 
these legal research methods and legal analysis techniques prepared me to construct my 
research design. 
                                               
 
122 For definitions see Findings and Conclusions by the Court, FED. R. CIV. P. 52 and “Finding of Fact: 
This term applies to the conclusion reached by the court, arbitrators and is the determination of truth after 
consideration,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Online Legal Dictionary 2nd ed. Accessed at 
www.thelawdictionary.org/finding-of-fact. For a scholarly analysis of this legal method see George C. 
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The questions surrounding the legality of public schoolteachers’ wearing religious 
garb are of particular interest to four groups of civic leaders that serve as my primary 
audience: (1) legislators, judges, and attorneys who study bans on religious garb; (2) 
school boards and administrators who determine teacher dress codes along with hiring 
and termination policies; (3) public schoolteachers and leaders of teachers’ unions who 
study the rights of civil servants and employment rights of educators; and (4) researchers 
in the fields of religion, law, and/or education who examine the cultural nature of 
religious expression, the legal protections for religious expression, and the intersection of 
religion in the public square.   
Organization 
In Chapter II – Literature Review, I survey the historical decisions issued by state 
courts regarding the perennial legal conflict of bans on public schoolteachers’ religious 
garb, beginning in 1894. After reviewing this case law, I discuss the evolution of various 
judicial tests under distinct causes of action: The Free Exercise clause in the U.S. 
Constitution; federal statutes, such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act; and comparable state statutes and religion clauses in state 
constitutions.  
In Chapter III – Methodology, I explain how my study is based on five steps 
based on established methods described in the literature on legal research and legal 
analysis. In step one, I synthesized “judicial tests” by “cause of action.” Judicial tests are 
the legal standards used by the courts, and a cause of action is the law that gives a 






documents. In step three, I articulate narrow legal questions. In step four, I conduct a 
legal analysis based on analytical reasoning techniques such as identifying logic fallacies 
and using deductive analysis. 
In Chapter IV – Presentation and Analysis of Findings, I will use my research 
questions to conduct a legal analysis of the two anti-religious-garb statutes in 
Pennsylvania and Nebraska. I will start with an examination of the statutes under the Free 
Exercise standards: The Smith standard of neutral and general applicability and the 
Sherbert standard of strict scrutiny (substantial burdens, compelling state interests, and 
narrowly tailored, least restrictive regulations). I will use my findings and analysis in a 
concluding discussion of the constitutionality of these two anti-religious-garb laws. Then 
I will also conduct a legal analysis of 1895 Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb law under 
Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002, with special attention to the 
state statute’s unique four-part substantial burden test. 
In Chapter V – Conclusion, I will synthesize the analytical contributions this 
project makes to the legal study of these two state bans on religious garb and, more 
broadly, the study of legal restrictions on religious expression in the United States and 
around the globe. I will then examine the implications that this research may have on my 
primary audiences: (1) legislators, judges, and attorneys who study, create, and challenge 
bans on religious garb; (2) school boards and administrators who determine teacher dress 
codes, hiring, and termination policies; (3) public schoolteachers and leaders of teachers’ 
unions who study the rights of civil and employment rights of educators; and (4) 
researchers in the fields of religion, law, and/or education who examine the nature of and 






public life. Then I will acknowledge the limitations of this study and propose a series of 
recommendations for future research. I conclude the dissertation with an overview of 






II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The purpose of this legal literature review is, first, to survey and analyze relevant 
case law, statutes, regulations, and secondary sources, as it relates to government 
regulation of religious garb worn by public schoolteachers. These regulations include 
statutory bans enacted by members of state legislatures, administrative bans introduced 
by superintendents, and, in one case, a statewide ban enacted through a public 
referendum.1 This legal history reveals a contradictory legal picture, which further 
illustrates why this topic has been and remains a complicated religious liberty question—
for the mere reason that public schoolteachers have “authority over children in the 
classroom” and are “representatives of the state.2 
Another complication in this case law is found in the fact that midway into the 
history of bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb, the U.S. Supreme Court first 
incorporated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to the states.3 This was done 
                                               
 
1 On June 29, 1948, the North Dakota voters passed Initiative 1, an “initiated state statute,” led by 
Protestant ministers of the Committee for the Separation of Church and State to prohibit school teachers’ 
religious dress (which only effected Catholic nuns at the time). According to the Legislative Manual, 
Official Vote of North Dakota Primary Election, 1948, 104,133 (53%) people voted in favor of the statute 
and 92,771 (47%) voted against. Linda Grathwohl (1993) “The North Dakota Anti-Religious-Garb Law: 
Constitutional Conflict and Religious Strive,” Great Plains Quarterly, University of Nebraska, Lincoln.  
2 The question of regulating public schoolteachers’ religious garb is “complicated by the fact that teachers 
are state employees with authority over children in the classroom,” Thomas C. Berg, “On the Permissible 
Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in the United States,” 19 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 1277 (2005), p. 19. A legal analysis of public schoolteachers’ religious garb “is complicated… by the 
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Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in the United States,” 19 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 1187., p. 28. 
3 The U.S. Supreme Court incrementally applied the five freedoms of the First Amendment to the U.S. 









through the Fourteenth Amendment—a post-Civil War law that prohibited any state from 
depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”; or 
denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”4 By 
applying the religion clauses in the First Amendment to the states, the Supreme Court 
fundamentally changed the legal system. Although it is clear that the federal Bill of 
Rights applies to state laws, the U.S. Supreme Court has not, yet, ruled on the perennial 
conflict of state bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb. 
I proceed to analyze the evolution of the judicial tests used by the courts to 
examine Free Exercise claims. I pay particular attention to the fact that, to date, only one 
court has used a Free Exercise standard to test the constitutionality of state bans on 
teachers’ religious garb under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, in a case 
that was quickly overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith.5 This standard, strict scrutiny, was applied and developed in Sherbert6 
and applied in Yoder.7 As defined in the first chapter, the strict scrutiny test requires that 
the government narrowly tailor regulations that may substantially burden one’s free 
exercise of religion by using the least restrictive means possible to further a sufficiently 
compelling governmental interest. Then I turn to the general applicability test under 
                                               
 
freedom of the press in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); freedom of assembly in De Jonge v. 
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); the free exercise of religion in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); 
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“petition Government for a redress of grievances” in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
5 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
6 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 









Smith, which requires that government regulations must be “neutral and generally 
applicable.”8 I also consider the noncontroversial legal principle that prevents the 
government from targeting particular religious practices9 for government regulation. 
I analyze how, in response to Smith, when two Native American plaintiffs were 
denied unemployment benefits for having used peyote, Congress sought to restore the 
strict scrutiny standard when passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(RFRA).10 In City of Boerne v. Flores (1997),11 the U.S. Supreme Court found that 
Congress overstepped its constitutional enforcement powers when seeking to apply 
RFRA to the states, thus limiting the strict scrutiny test to federal laws.12 In response to 
this ruling, twenty states have since passed their own “mini-RFRAs,” which restored the 
Sherbert (strict scrutiny) standard through state laws, such as the Pennsylvania Religious 
Freedom Protection Act of 2002. These significant legal conflicts between the judicial 
and legislative systems fundamentally changed the religious liberty jurisprudence at the 
federal and state level. 
                                               
 
8 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
9 In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) the U.S. Sup. Ct. unanimously 
held that the City of Hialeah violated the Free Exercise Clause when banning the religious practice of 
animal sacrifice while permitting the killing of animals for other purposes, such as food production. 
10 42 USC. § 2000bb through 42 USC. § 2000bb-4. 
11 521 U.S. 507. 
12 The strict scrutiny standard was affirmed in its application to federal laws in Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). In seeking to clarify the Court’s 
understanding of Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously determined in Gonzales that the federal 
government violated the federal RFRA when it failed to “narrowly tailor” its implementation of the 










In this context, I conduct a survey of the legal evolution of religious liberty 
protections at multiple levels, beginning with federal statutes. I examine the recent 
developments in federal RFRA13 case law as well as analyze how the cause of action 
changed since the Smith decision. For instance, plaintiffs who experienced religious-
based discrimination in the workplace when wearing religious garb sought remedies 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 For these reasons, I briefly examine the 
impact of those cases, although Title VII ultimately falls outside the scope of this study. 
Next, I analyze the religious freedom provisions in state constitutions15 and state 
statutes. I demonstrate how, since Smith, state Supreme Courts have been using the 
religion clauses in state constitutions to expand religious liberty claims, thus building 
upon the established authority and protections in the U.S. Constitution.16 In turning to 
state statutes, I summarize the status of “mini-RFRAs,”17 which state legislatures began 
to pass in response to the U.S. Supreme Court limiting the federal RFRA to the federal 
government. I also look at comparable state-level employment statutes that prohibit 
religious-based discrimination.18  
                                               
 
13 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 U.S. 2751 (2014). 
14 United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 Sup. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
15 Specifically, NEB. CONST. no compulsion clause of art. I §16, the no sectarian Instruction clause of art. 
VI §11 and PA. CONST. no compulsion clause of art. II and the no sectarian instruction clause of art. VII 
§18. 
16 William J. Brennan, The Bill of rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of 
Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550 (1986). See also Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional 
Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275 (1993), 
which documents how state constitutions are “understood and invoked only in relation to the federal text 
and merely supplements the federal ‘floor’ of rights” (at 290). 
17 Juliet Eilperin, 31 States Have Heightened Religious Liberty Protections, The Washington Post, Mar. 1, 
2014. Eugene Volokh, What Is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Dec. 
2, 2013. www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy. 
18 Specifically, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and Nebraska Fair Employment Act, which prohibit 






In summary, the following literature review situates the history of state 
regulations of public schoolteachers’ religious garb in the context of different laws that a 
plaintiff can currently use to bring suit against the two states that have anti-religious-garb 
laws: The Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the nondiscrimination provision 
in the federal workplace statute, Title VII, and comparable remedies in state constitutions 
and state statutes. In conducting this review, I became better prepared to apply legal 
research methods to determine the scope of my study. In Chapter III – Methodology, I 
explain why I focused my legal analysis in Chapter IV – Presentation and Analysis of 
Findings, on applying judicial standards under the Free Exercise clause to test the 
constitutionality of two state anti-religious-garb laws and analyzing whether 
Pennsylvania’s 1895 anti-religious-garb law is valid under Pennsylvania’s Religious 
Freedom Protection Act of 2002. In the final chapter, Chapter V – Conclusion, I make 
recommendations for future research.19 
Literature on Teachers’ Religious Garb 
The interdisciplinary scholarship on regulating public schoolteachers’ religious 
garb in the United States is vast for the mere fact that this legal problem spans 123 years 
and has affected, at some point, schools in twenty-two U.S. states. Scholars from the 
fields of law and education along with religious and civic leaders and journalists have all 
                                               
 
19 Future studies may employ the judicial tests under (1) alternate constitutional claims under the No 
Establishment and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. CONST.; (2) federal statutory 
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (3) claims under state constitutions, such as NEB. 
CONST. no compulsion clause of art. I §16, the no sectarian instruction clause of art. VI §11 and PA. 
CONST. no compulsion clause of art. II and the no sectarian instruction clause of art. VII §18; as well as (4) 
claims under state statutes, such as the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act and Nebraska Fair Employment Act, the latter two of which prohibit employment 






contributed to this body of knowledge. Their collective contributions reveal that the 
question of public schoolteachers’ religious garb is significant, historic, and relevant 
today, as noted in the following five bodies of literature. 
Five Bodies of Literature 
First, the nation’s leading law and religion scholars have drawn upon the 
conflicting case law on public schoolteachers’ religious garb to demonstrate that this is an 
important, longstanding, and still unresolved legal matter. Second, elected and appointed 
officials from various levels of government have made formal statements or issued 
regulatory policies to address this matter. Third, educators and education associations 
have published studies, commentaries, and manuals to guide teachers and policy makers 
on this legal question. Fourth, religious and civic liberty groups have consistently 
asserted themselves in the public debate on this complicated church/state issue. And fifth, 
journalists have been reporting on this topic for over twelve decades, suggesting that the 
subject of public schoolteachers’ religious garb is one worth reporting and one that has 
and continues to capture the public’s attention. These five bodies of literature have 
informed my study.  
Legal scholars. More than 150 legal journals, books, casebooks, and 
commentaries have dedicated sections to analyzing laws and regulations that ban 
educators from wearing religious garb while teaching in public schools (see References). 
As illustrated in the backmatter and referenced throughout Chapter IV – Presentation and 
Analysis of Findings, we know the importance of this subject for the mere fact that 
leading attorneys and law professors have commented on this question: Heiner Bielefeldt, 






Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Sarah Barringer Gordon, T. Jeremy 
Gunn, Kent Greenawalt, Alvin W. Johnson, Steven D. Jamar, Leonard A. Krug, Philip B. 
Kurland, Douglas Laycock, Daniel Mach, John T. Noonan, Jr., Martha C. Nussbaum, Leo 
Pfeffer, Charles J. Russo, Brett G. Scharffs, Oliver S. Thomas, Frank H. Yost, and 
Eugene Volokh, to name a few. 
The common themes that emerge from these commentaries, and from legal 
scholars as a whole, are that (1) the question of public schoolteachers’ religious garb is a 
complicated legal question; however, (2) it is not so complicated that it cannot be 
resolved. For the most part, there is consensus among legal experts from a wide range of 
ideological perspectives that public schools should not single out teachers’ religious garb 
for government regulation. There are, however, some disagreements on how best to 
balance the interests of garb-wearing teachers, their students, and the state. However, 
most agree that although this question is not now as vitriolic in the U.S. as the debate 
occurring in European countries, it does remain an important, unresolved legal issue in 
the United States. 
 Government officials. Elected and appointed agents of the state have also been 
engaged in this debate in the United States for more than twelve decades. As illustrated 
throughout this study, some of these government actors were state superintendents or 
school boards that had issued regulatory provisions either banning schoolteachers from or 
permitting public schoolteachers to wear religious garb. Others were state attorneys 
general who had issued legal commentaries or elected officials who had made political 
statements. Some state agencies have recently issued model policies, such as the 






federal government agencies20 have weighed into the debate, such as the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the U.S. Department of the Interior, and 
even the U.S. State Department (see backmatter for a complete list). This second body of 
literature demonstrates that this longstanding issue has received the attention of an array 
of civil servants. 
 Educators and education associations. Similarly, the question of public 
schoolteacher’s religious garb has received the attention of, naturally, those most 
affected: educators. As a result, education journals and professors of education have 
regularly contributed to this body of knowledge, as have professional associations that 
have published studies, commentaries, and manuals to guide teachers and policy makers 
on this legal question. These include the Association for Supervision and Curriculum 
Development, the National Association of Elementary School Principals, the National 
Education Association, the National School Board Association and Council of School 
Attorneys, and the National Council for the Social Studies. As cited throughout this 
                                               
 
20 President Ulysses S. Grant’s “Quaker Policy,” inspired by Friends’ assimilation of Indians in 
Pennsylvania, used public funds to hire Christian missionaries whose church boards would govern the 
federal education of Indians. President Grant hired nuns from the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions to 
convert indigenous Americans to Christianity while serving as teachers in federal schools––and who did so 
while wearing religious garb. The federal government also hired garb-wearing teachers to teach in “Indian 
prison schools” designed “to teach the Indian prisoners European dress, the English language, and 
Christianity.” The goal was to “kill the Indian but save the man,” a phrase coined by Captain Richard H. 
Pratt. For more details, see Ulysses S. Grant, Second Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1873; Dee Brown, Burry 
My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West. (Dumfries, NC: Holt, Rinehard and 
Winston 1971); Francis Paul Prucha, Americanizing the American Indians: Writings by the “Friends of the 
Indian” 1880–1900. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973); Takaki, Ronald, Iron Cages: Race 
and Culture in 19th-Century America. (New York: Oxford University Press 1979); Wolfgang Mieder, 
“‘The Only Good Indian Is a Dead Indian’: History and Meaning of a Proverbial Stereotype.” The Journal 
of American Folklore, Vol. 106, No. 419; David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American 









study, educators and education associations have contributed to this third body of 
literature by either studying the implications of these bans, issuing critiques or warnings, 
or developing training materials to equip teachers to understand the laws in their local 
school districts. 
Religious and civil liberties groups. It has been said that “all politics is local.”21 
Local religious groups throughout the last thirteen decades have voiced their opinions 
about public schools’ employing teachers who wear religious garb. For instance, in 1886, 
the New York Evangelist reassured its Protestant constituents that the synod of New 
York’s Committee on Religion and Public Education recommended that “everything 
sectarian, such as a particular religious garb, should be avoided.”22 Similarly, Christian 
Union, another Protestant publication, reported in 1891 the Minnesota’s State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction’s saying that the Sisters of Charity’s “presence [in 
public schools] is obnoxious [and] unacceptable by reason of the significance of their 
religious garb, [therefore] the board must either retire them or require” them to remove 
their habits.23 
In response to the ruling on the first anti-religious-garb lawsuit in 1894, New York 
Evangelist published a letter by a Catholic resident critiquing the Catholic nuns for 
teaching in public schools saying, “There is no doubt that the Gallitzin [Pennsylvania] 
venture has proven a mistake; it is the hope of most Catholics that it may never be 
repeated.”24 Meanwhile, The Herald of Truth, another Protestant publication, reported 
                                               
 
21 Attributed to the former Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Tip O’Neill. 
22 “Meeting of the Synod of New York,” New York Evangelist, Oct. 28, 1886. 
23 Wayland Hoyt, “That Fairbault School,” Christian Union (Nov. 7, 1891) 44, 19. 






that Pennsylvania’s proposed anti-religious garb bill will “unfortunately include other 
classes of religious people of the Protestant faith, such as the Mennonites, the River 
Brethren, the Quakers and the Drunkards, among whom are many of our best and most 
active and acceptable teachers.”25 
Denominational publications not only reveal what is at stake for various religious 
communities but also show the historical tensions between Protestant and Catholics. They 
also demonstrate that the political problem of teachers’ religious garb predated the first 
anti-religious-garb case in 1894. Over the years, many other denominational publications 
covered this debate, including The American Sentinel, Catholic Bulletin, The Christian 
Century, Christian Post, Christian Science Monitor, the Islamic Schools League of 
America, the journal for Jewish Family & Children’s Services, the Liberty Magazine, the 
Sikh Coalition, and SikhNet, to name a few. 
Many of these religious groups received support from a wide variety of religious 
and civic liberty groups. Daniel Mach, the director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union’s Program on Freedom of Religion and Belief explained in an interview with 
Humanist.com that “although public schoolteachers don’t shed their constitutional rights 
at the schoolhouse gate, when they are in class they act as representatives of the 
government and must take care not to promote, endorse, or denigrate any religious 
viewpoint, or religion in general.”26 Similarly nuanced statements have been made by 
other civil liberties and legal education nonprofit organizations, such as the Anti-
                                               
 
25 “The Religious Garb,” Herald of Truth, May 1, 1895. 
26 Joan Reisman-Brill, “The Ethical Dilemma: Can Teachers Wear a Cross to School?” TheHumanist.com, 
Apr. 17, 2013. Referencing the line, “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” expressed by Justice 






Defamation League, Council on American-Islamic Relations, the First Amendment 
Center, Human Rights Watch, the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding at 
Georgetown University, and so on. 
Journalists. The fifth body of literature came from journalists who influenced 
public opinion regarding this legal question. Their reports, spanning twelve decades, 
affirm this subject’s importance by archiving various political and legal conflicts. The 
consistency by which the media has and continues to report on these developments 
suggests that this is a perennial and unsettled issue that captures the public’s attention.  
Dozens of articles were written about Pennsylvania’s religious garb controversy 
in the fourteen months between the time the Pittsburg Board of Education terminated the 
employment of the Sisters of Mercy for wearing habits while teaching (March 14, 1894), 
to the time the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in favor of the nuns (November 12, 
1894), to the time the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the nation’s first anti-
religious-garb law (May 29, 1895). During this brief period, this case became a national 
story—as evidenced by its being published in The Chicago Daily News, The Chicago 
Tribune, The Baltimore Sun, The Indianapolis Journal, The Indianapolis News, The 
Maine Farmer, The New York Times, Owosso Times [Michigan], Pittsburg Interior, The 
Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg Post-Gazette, Plattsburgh Daily Press, Reno Evening Gazette 
[Nevada], The Washington Post, The Washington Times, and other periodicals. In 
contemporary terms, the story went viral. This media attention may have influenced 
leaders who ultimately issued anti-religious-garb statutes or regulatory policies in twenty-






The most recent cases over the regulations of teachers’ religious garb have also 
received national attention. For example, the Associated Press, published throughout the 
nation’s newspapers, reported on the teacher’s aide in Pennsylvania who was fired in 
2002 for wearing a cross necklace.27 The AP published articles about the 2010 repeal of 
Oregon’s anti-religious-garb law “originally enacted for [the] KKK to keep Catholics out 
of public schools” and the statute’s contemporary use to terminate the employment of a 
Sikh teacher.28 Moreover, in January 2017, the AP reported on the new legislative 
proposal to repeal Nebraska’s anti-religious garb ban because a Catholic nun was denied 
employment at a public school in 2016.29 
The narrow question of public schoolteachers’ religious garb in the United States 
is one drop in the ocean of world headlines about regulations on religious attire. As noted 
earlier, the Pew Research Center reported in 2016 that “more countries restrict women’s 
ability to wear religious symbols or attire than require [them] to dress a certain way.” 
Controversies over the burka, the “burkini,” garb-wearing Olympic athletes, and so on 
have dominated the headlines while a dozen countries still require women to wear 
religious attire in certain circumstances. These laws, news reports, and religious 
commentaries all highlight the fact that the regulation of religious garb remains an 
unsettled, complicated legal and cultural question. 
My hope is that my study on the narrow question of public schoolteachers’ 
religious garb in the United States may meaningfully contribute to this ageless debate. 
                                               
 
27 “Teacher’s Aide Suspended for Wearing Cross,” Associated Press, Apr. 24, 2003. 
28 “Three states still prohibit religious clothing for teachers,” Associated Press, Sept. 5, 2009. 







Relevant Case Law 
Historical Decisions in State Courts 
In this section, I examine the evolution and treatment of state anti-religious-garb 
laws and subsequent rulings on them in state courts, starting in 1894. I will demonstrate 
that during this 123-year history, there have been eleven substantive cases about bans on 
public schoolteachers’ religious garb, nine of which were state Supreme Court decisions. 
Cases filed in state courts were based on causes of action that derived from state 
constitutional clauses and state statutes, which explains why there remains an unresolved 
federal question as to the constitutionality of these state bans under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.30 I survey these court decisions 
while citing scholars who demonstrate the anti-Catholic origins31 of legal restrictions on 
religion in the late nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century. I pay 
particular attention to the anti-religious-garb cases out of Pennsylvania—specifically the 
                                               
 
30 Examples include the no religious tests for office; no religious tests for public teachers; free exercise of 
religion; right to worship; right of conscience; no establishment; no preference; no aid to religion; no 
sectarian teaching; no diversion of public funds; no authority of legislature; as well as authority of 
superintendent statutes. 
31 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals admitted in 1990, that the Pennsylvania General Assembly of 1895 
enacted this anti-religious-garb law with a “putatively anti-Catholic motivation.” United States [Reardon] v. 
Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990). For a general discussion of anti-Catholic developments 
in the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries see Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment: 
Aristocracy & Cast in America. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964). Regarding state-based no 
sectarian laws that banned public funding for private religious schooling, Professor Douglas Laycock 
argued that “‘sectarian’ initially meant something like denominational; the term arose in the early-
nineteenth-century legal battles between liberal and conservative Protestants. But Protestants closed ranks 
in response to Catholic immigration, and for the most of the ninetieth century, ‘sectarian’ was a code word 
for Catholic.” Laycock states, “Much of the American tradition of refusing to fund private schools is 
derived from nineteenth-century anti-Catholicism.” Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty: Overviews and 









two issued by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1894 and 1909.32 I explain that these 
cases dominate the legal rationales used in other court decisions and the legal scholarship 
on the subject of bans on religious garb worn by public schoolteachers in the United 
States. This sets the stage for my analysis in the Examination of Findings section of 
Chapter IV, where I track lines of arguments and judicial opinions, to further illustrate the 
strong influence that these four Pennsylvania cases had on other cases. In doing so, I 
further demonstrate the significance of why it is necessary to study Pennsylvania’s 123-
year-old anti-religious-garb law and to ask whether it is valid under the Pennsylvania 
Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002 (RFPA), which requires general applicable 
laws to meet the strict standard level of judicial review with special attention to the 
unique four-part “substantial burden” standards introduced in RFPA. 
 Enumerating causes of action in anti-religious-garb cases. Before chronicling 
the origin and evolution of anti-religious-garb laws and their legal challenges, let us take 
a birds-eye view of the various causes of action used in anti-religious-garb cases. This 
123-year old case law is particularly complicated because there have been thirty-two 
different causes of action that have been used in state and federal courts to challenge 
regulations of public schoolteachers’ religious garb. Throughout this history no court, in 
both the state and federal systems, use another case’s cause of action, other than a 1910 
case in Pennsylvania; otherwise, each legal challenge was unique (see Table 1).  
                                               
 
32 Hysong v. Gallitzin School District, 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894); Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 









As I explain in Chapter III – Methodology, a “cause of action” is a legal theory 
that plaintiffs can use to bring suit against another/others, also known as a statement of 
claim or complaint.33 For example plaintiffs may claim their rights under the federal 
constitution has been violated when filing their case under the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment. Other plaintiffs may claim their rights are violated under a state 
constitution, and file under, for example, a “no preference in religion” clause in a state 
constitution. A cause of action is simply a legal term referring to “the ground on which 
an action may be sustained” or a “right to bring a suit.”34  
As illustrated in the following table there have been thirty-two unique causes of 
action that teachers have used to challenge anti-religious-garb laws and regulations. Each 
of these statements of claim have their own set of judicial tests (i.e., federal Free Exercise 





                                               
 
33 “What is Cause of Action?’ BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Online Legal Dictionary 2nd ed. Accessed at 
www.thelawdictionary.org/cause-of-action. 








Enumerating Causes of Action 
 




Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894 
The Pa. Sup. Ct. held that 
terminating Catholic Nuns for 
wearing habits while teaching 
in a public school violated 
their rights under the PA. 
CONST. (1) “no preference” 
and (2) “no religious tests” for 
office clauses. The high court 
also rejected the state’s claim 
that employing garb-wearing 
nuns violated the (3) “no aid to 





Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910 
Pa. Sup. Ct. held that the 1895 
anti-religious-garb law did not 
violate a Mennonite woman’s 
rights under the state 
constitution’s (4) “right to 
worship,” (5) “right of 
conscience,” (6) “no 
interference,” and (1) “no 
preference,” (2) and “no 
religious tests” for office 
clauses, thus overturning 
Hysong. 
Pa. Sup. Ct. also held that the 
state’s anti-religious-garb law 
did not violate her (7) Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. CONST. (Note: this occurred 
before the U.S. Sup. Ct. 
incorporated the federal Bill of 
Rights to state laws.) 
 
U.S. v. Board of 
Ed. [Reardon] 
Federal Third Cir. 
Ct. App. 1990 
 
 The Third Circuit held that 
Alima Delores Reardon’s rights 
under (8) Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 were not 
violated when the Philadelphia 
school district terminated her 
employment for wearing a hijab 









Case, Court, Year State-Based Causes of Action Federal-Based Causes of Action 
Pennsylvania continued 
 
EEOC v. READS, 
Federal Western 
Dist. Ct. of Pa. 
1991 
 
 (A federal district judge held that 
an employer engaged in 
“religious discrimination” under 
(8) Title VII for denying 
employment to a Muslim woman 
who wore a headscarf while also 
ruling that her dress could not be 
considered “religious garb” 
under the law because not 
“many” third-grade children 
would perceive it as religious.) 
 
Nichol v. Arin 
Federal Western 
Dist. Ct. of Pa. 
2003 
 
 (A federal district judge held that 
a female “teachers’ assistant” 
was not a “teacher” under 
Pennsylvania’s education laws, 
therefore, not bound by the 
state’s anti-religious-garb law 
and was permitted to wear a 




N.Y. Ct. App. 
1906 
(highest court) 
The NY Ct. App., the highest 
court in the state, held a state 
superintendent’s termination 
of Catholic Nuns from 
teaching in public schools was 
consistent with the (9) “no aid 




Gerhardt v. Heid 
N.D. S.Ct. 1936 
Public schools employing 
Catholic nuns who wore habits 
while teaching did not violate 
the (10) “no establishment,” 
(11) no “sectarian control,” 
(12) “no aid to religion,” and 
(13) “no diversion of funds 
from public schools” clauses 
of the N.D. CONST. 
 
 
                                               
 
35 The district judge issued an extensive nonbinding opinion about the unconstitutionality of the anti-garb 
statute under the Free Exercise, Free Speech, Establishment clauses of the First Amendment and Title VII 






Case, Court, Year State-Based Causes of Action Federal-Based Causes of Action 
Indiana 
Johnson v. Boyd 
Ind. Sup. Ct. 
1940 
Ind. Sup. Ct. relied on the (14) 
“right to worship,” (15) “free 
exercise,” (16) “right of 
conscience,” (17) “no religious 
test,” and (18) “no preference” 
clauses of the Indiana 
Constitution to rule that 
employing Catholic nuns who 
wore religious garb while 
teaching did not make public 
schools parochial schools. 
 
New Mexico 
Zellers v. Huff 
N.M. Sup. Ct. 
1951 
In primary reliance of the (19) 
“free from sectarian control” 
clause of the N.M. CONST., the 
state supreme court upheld the 
State School Board’s ban on 
public schoolteachers’ religious 
garb. The N.M. Sup. Ct. also 
rejected the claim that the anti-
religious-garb law violated the 
New Mexico’s (20) “no 
religious test for teachers” 
clause. The court held that “all 
nuns…wearing clothing of 
religious significance, should be 
removed from the public 
school.” 
In citing the U.S. Sup. Ct. 
decision in Everson v. Board of 
Education, the New Mexico 
Sup. Ct. held that the hiring of 
Catholic nuns who wore 
religious garb while teaching 
violated the (21) Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment 





Mo. Sup. Ct. 
1953 
The Mo. Sup. Ct. relied on the 
state constitution’s (22) “right 
to worship,” (23) “no 
maintenance” of religion, (24) 
“no direct or indirect public 
money for religion,” (25) “no 
preference,” (26) “no public 
funds for education controlled 
by religion” clauses to rule that 
“teacher-nuns” (e.g., Roman 
Catholics) are “disqualified 
from teaching in any public 













Ky. Ct. of App. 
1956 
The state Court of Appeals 
held that the Kentucky 
Constitution’s (27) “no aid to 
religion” clause was not 
violated when employing 




Cooper v. Eugene 
School District 
Or. Sup. Ct. 1986 
 
The Oregon Sup. Ct. found 
that a female Sikh teachers’ 
right to (28) free exercise of 
religion under the OR. CONST. 
was “reasonably denied” 
when her employment was 
terminated and teaching 
license revoked for wearing a 
turban while teaching. 
(The Third Circuit claims in 
Reardon that the U.S. Sup. Ct. 
denied Cooper’s appeal for “lack 
of a substantial federal 






Miss. Sup. Ct. 
1990 
The Miss. Sup. Ct. affirmed a 
female public schoolteacher’s 
right to wear an African 
Hebrew Israelite headdress 
under the (29) “no religious 
tests,” (30) “no preference,” 
and (31) “free enjoyment of 
all religious sentiments” 
clauses of the MISS. CONST. 
The Miss. Sup. Ct. also held that 
the school violated the teachers 
(32) Free Exercise rights under 
the First Amendment to the U.S. 





                                               
 
36 Mississippi v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879. Three months 
after the Mississippi Supreme Court issued McGlothin the U.S. Supreme Court issued Smith (1990), thus 






In this study, I make a distinction between no-aid-to-religion cases and religious-
garb cases. The no-aid-to-religion-cases included the evidence of teachers wearing 
religious garb in the statement of facts for cases that take up the larger questions of public 
funding of private religious schools. More often than not,37 these cases do not isolate the 
question of public schoolteachers wearing religious garb in publics schools but, instead, 
rely on state constitutions to justify no public funds being used by private schools that are 
controlled by religious organizations.  
Table 1, therefore, does not include a cluster of associated no-aid-to-religion cases 
that focused on the question of whether either (1) a private religious school was receiving 
public funds38 or whether (2) a public school that was, in effect, being controlled and 
administered by a particular religious organization.39 In these cases, the courts 
“consider[ed] the total effect of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence in 
determining whether the school in question [was] in fact [a] free public school.” The 
practice of teachers wearing religious garb while teaching was but one part of a larger 
question in these cases and, as a result, this precise question was not singled-out and 
dissected for judicial review like the ones highlighted here. 
Table 1 illustrates the complex lineage of case law regarding regulations of 
teachers’ religious garb in public schools, controlled and managed by public authorities 
                                               
 
37 For example, in Zellers v. Huff (1951), the New Mexico Supreme Court conducted a special analysis of 
teachers’ religious garb; however, this was done in the context of a larger Establishment Clause question 
about public funds being used to operate private Catholic schools. This study separates the two so as not to 
confuse “religious instruction with public funds” and teachers’ religious garb worn in public schools, where 
there is no evidence of religious instruction. See Table 3.  
38 Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1918); State v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454 (Neb. Sup. 
Ct. 1932). 
39 Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1940); Harftst v. Hoegen 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 






with the use of public funds. These thirty-two different causes of action—anchored in a 
variety of state and federal laws—illustrate the diversity of claims presented before state 
or federal courts. The only consistent pattern is found in the states that did not have an 
anti-religious-garb statute at the time of a legal challenge—in this context, every single 
court ruled in favor of the religious-garb-wearing public schoolteacher. Whereas, the 
teachers consistently failed when challenging states whose legislatures had enacted anti-
religious-garb statutes. Only one state had both such cases: Pennsylvania. 
Origins of anti-religious-garb laws and cases: 1894–1910. The 123-year-old 
debate over public schoolteachers’ religious garb in the United States originated in 1894, 
when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in favor of Catholic nuns who were 
dismissed for wearing habits while teaching at a public school (Hyson v. Gallitzin).40 In a 
7–1 ruling, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the no preference41 and the no 
religious test for office (section 4)42 clauses of the Pennsylvania constitution to affirm the 
lower court’s ruling that it is not sectarian teaching for a devout teacher to “appear in a 
schoolroom in a dress peculiar to a religious order.” It also dismissed the claim by the 
state that garb-wearing teachers violated the no aid to religion clause43 of the 
                                               
 
40 Hysong v. Gallitzin School District, 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. 
Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68 (1910). 
41 “No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship,” PA. 
CONST. art. 1, §3 
42 “No person who acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of rewards and punishments shall, 
on account of his religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of trust or profit under 
this Commonwealth.” PA. CONST. art. 1 §4. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the strikethrough text (my 
emphasis) was unconstitutional. See: Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
43 “No appropriations… shall be made… to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation, or 









Pennsylvania constitution. Then, in one sentence, the majority issued its final ruling, 
which was to set the 123-year-old saga into motion: “The legislature may, by statute, 
enact that all teachers shall wear in the schoolroom a particular style of dress, and that 
none other shall be worn, and thereby secure the same uniformity of outward appearance 
as we now see in city police, railroad trainmen, and nurses of some of our large 
hospitals.” In modern legal terms, the court issued a call for a “neutral law of general 
applicability”44 that did not single out religion for regulation. In swift response to this 
immensely unpopular ruling, the Pennsylvania General Assembly took the authority 
affirmed by the court but not the court’s advice. The legislators enacted an anti-religious-
garb statute prohibiting public schoolteachers from wearing “any dress, mark, emblem or 
insignia indicating . . . that such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order, 
sect or denomination.”45 The anti-religious-garb law also entailed criminal penalties for 
any public-school administrator who failed to suspend or terminate the offending teacher 
after notice of a violation. 
This state-wide action, mirrored the earlier actions of a Municipal Board of 
Education in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. In anticipation of the Supreme Court’s ruling on 
Hysong, these education leaders took their own action on March 13, 1894, seven months 
before the Hysong decision issued on November 12, 1894. In a vote of twenty-nine to 
three,46 the Municipal Board passed the following resolution,47 the language of which is 
                                               
 
44 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
45 Pennsylvania Statute 24, § 11-1112 (2016). This statute was the first in the United States, enacted in 
1895. It was reaffirmed in 1949 and 1982 and remains active today. 
46 In Indianapolis News reported that “Colonel McCandless presented as resolution… [which was] adopted 
by a vote of 31 to 3.” “The Pittsburg School Row: Cutting Off the Sisters’ Salaries—The Nuns Will 
Remain.” Indianapolis News, March 14, 1894. 






strikingly similar to Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb statute passed by the legislature a 
year later (Appendix B): 
Resolved—That the wearing by any of the teachers in the schools of this 
city during school hours in the school rooms of any garb or dress 
distinctive of and indicating any religious order, or any attachments or 
adornment on their person symbolic of any such order, or of any of the 
teachings of any particular religion or creed, is sectarian within the spirit 
and meaning of section 2, article 10, of the constitution of this State. Viz: 
‘No Money raised for the support of the public schools in the 
commonwealth shall be appropriated to or used for the support of any 
sectarian school.’48  
 
In response, the American Sentinel, a newspaper based in New York City wrote, 
“This action is right… permit the wearing, in public schools, of distinctive garbs and 
symbols, which have, and are designed to have, a distinctively religious and sectarian 
influence, is clearly contrary to the spirit of American institutions.”49  
Fourteen years later, in 1910, the Pennsylvania state’s anti-religious-garb statute 
was challenged in Commonwealth v. Herr.50 This time, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
was comprised of none of the same members who had heard the previous case.51 This 
                                               
 
48 Ibid., American Sentinel, 95. 
49 Ibid., American Sentinel, 95. 
50 Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910); Judge Rice opinion, Commonwealth v. Herr, 39 
Pa. Super. 454 (1909); Judge Landis opinion in Commonwealth v. Herr, Court of Quarter Sessions of 
Lancaster County, No. 26 (1908). 
51 An unusual set of unknown circumstances—from possibly the timing of judicial elections and deaths—
led none of the justices in Hysong (1894) to also hear Herr (1910). The Hysong court consisted of a seven-
member bench: Chief Justice James P. Sterrett (serving on the court from 1878 to 1899 and as C.J. from 
1893 to 1899), Henry Green (1879 to 1900; C.J. 1899 to 1900), Henry W. Williams (1868 to 1877 and 
again in an unconnected term from 1887 to 1899), J. Brewster McCollum (1888 to 1903; C.J. 1900 to 
1903), James T. Mitchell (1888 to Jan. 1, 1910; C.J. 1903 to Jan. 1, 1910), John Dean (1892 to 1896), and 
David Newlin Fell (1894 to 1914; C.J. from 1910 to 1914). Chief Justice Fell was the only justice from 
Hysong court still serving when Herr came before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; however, for an 
unknown reason, he did not participate in the ruling. The Herr court heard the case on May 16, 1910 and 
issued the ruling on July 1, 1910. The decision lists only a five-justice panel—Jacob Hay Brown (1900 to 









entirely new court panel of five justices unanimously denied the petition of a Mennonite 
teacher who was fired for wearing “usual plain dress” in the classroom.52 The Herr court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision that the statute did not violate the Due Process clause 
of the U.S. Constitution or the freedom of conscience provisions of the state constitution. 
Rather, it found persuasive the arguments offered by New York’s highest court. 
In between these two Pennsylvania cases—Hysong 1894 and Herr 1910—the 
Court of Appeals of New York (the highest court in the state) issued a negative ruling 
against Catholic nuns who wore habits while teaching in public schools in 1906. In 
O’Connor v. Hendrick,53 members of the Order of the Sisterhood of S. Joseph of the 
Roman Catholic Church were discharged for refusing to comply with the New York 
superintendent’s regulation that prohibited teachers from wearing “distinctive religious 
garb” in the public classroom. In this case, the court asked whether the superintendent’s 
regulation was a reasonable and valid exercise of his power and whether the regulation 
was consistent with the New York Constitution. The court answered both questions in the 
affirmative. In a 7–0 opinion with one concurrence, the court upheld the superintendent’s 
regulation and thus prohibited Catholic nuns from teaching in public schools while in 
religious garb. The justices argued that the apparel was distinctly sectarian and that the 
                                               
 
John P. Elkin (1905 to 1915), and Robert von Moschzisker (Jan. 3, 1910 to 1930; C.J. from 1921 to 1930). 
These five justices issued a single-paragraph affirmation of the lower court’s 7–0 decision to affirm 
Pennsylvania’s 1895 anti-religious-garb statute, which is still in effect today. Citation for judicial terms: 
John J. Hare, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: Life and Law in the Commonwealth, 1684–2017 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2018), Appendix B: Historical List of 
Supreme Court Justices. 
52 Four decades later, the Pennsylvania General Assembly reaffirmed the anti-religious-garb statute in 1949 
and reenacted it again in 1982. It is the only anti-garb law in the U.S. that remains in effect today. 









prohibition was in accord with the public policy of the state as declared in the New York 
Constitution, which forbade the use of the property or credit of the state in “aid of 
sectarian influences.”54  
While quoting a lengthy passage in Justice William’s dissenting opinion in 
Hysong, the justices asserted, “There can be little doubt that the effect of the costume 
worn by these Sisters of St. Joseph at all times in the presence of their pupils would be to 
inspire respect if not sympathy for the religious denomination to which they so 
manifestly belong. To this extent the influence was sectarian, even if it did not amount to 
the teaching of denominational doctrine.” He argued that when the teachers refused to 
comply with the regulation after being notified, the court argued that the teachers had 
“forfeit[ed] their right to further compensation under their contract of employment.” The 
court also held that the superintendent needed “some control over the habiliments of 
teachers” to preserve “proper conduct of such schools.” In further evidence of the anti-
Catholic sentiment of the time, the court asserted, “grotesque vagaries in costume could 
not be permitted without being destructive of good order and discipline.”55 
Expansion of statutes and policies: 1910–1946. By the end of World War II, 
twenty-two states, either through state statutes or administrative policies, banned public 
schoolteachers from wearing religious garb in the classroom (Table 2). 
  
                                               
 
54 NY CONST. Art IX § 4. 
55 In a broader case about the use of public funding for private religious education, the Supreme Court of 
Iowa discussed the narrow question of teachers’ religious garb. In a 5–2 decision, the court found 
persuasive the rulings of O’Connor, stating “We united with the New York court in the view that the 
[dissenting] opinion by [Justice] Williams…” in Hysong. See Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691 (Iowa 







States Employing Public Schoolteachers Wearing Religious Garb in 194656 
Yes No 
 





3. Colorado ^ 






10. New Mexico ^ 
11. North Dakota 
12. Ohio 
13. Oklahoma 





1. Alaska (territory) 
2. Arizona ^ 
3. California 
4. Connecticut 











15. Nebraska * ^ 
16. New York 
17. North Carolina 
18. Oregon * 
19. Pennsylvania * 
20. South Carolina 
21. Washington 






4. Montana ^ 
5. Nevada 
6. New Hampshire 
7. New Jersey 
8. Rhode Island 




13. Wyoming ^ 
                                               
 
56 Source: National Education Association (1946) “Practice and Usage in Aid to Sectarian Schools and 
Sectarianism in Public Schools as Reported by State Superintendents” in “The State and Sectarian 
Education,” Research Bulletin. (Washington, DC: National Education Association of the United States), 
Vol. XXIV, No. 1, Feb. 1946, p. 24–25, 36. Notes: States in bold only are ones with state or federal courts 
that prohibited public schoolteachers from wearing religious garb at one point from 1894–2011. The 
underlined states received positive treatment by the courts. The remaining states did not litigate this 
question. Bold and underlined are states with courts with both negative and positive treatment. * Of the 
states with superintendents that reported that no employment is granted to public schoolteachers for 
wearing religious garb, only three states had statutory bans on teachers’ religious garb in 1946: Nebraska 
(enacted in 1919 and repealed in 2017), Oregon (enacted in 1923 and repealed in 2010), and Pennsylvania. 
In 1948, North Dakota enacted an anti-religious-garb law through a public ballot initiative (repealed in 
1999). In 1959, the Ohio legislature failed to pass H.B. No. 41 (1959) to prohibit “the wearing of religious 
garb by teachers in public schools.” ^ States with constitutions that include “no religious tests for teachers” 
clauses: Nebraska (1875), Colorado (1876), Montana (1889), Wyoming (1890), Idaho (1889), Utah (1889), 






In conducting this literature review on this topic, I found that a majority of 
scholars claim that twenty-two states banned teachers’ religious garb by 1946, implying 
state statutory bans—which is not accurate. I traced this claim to citations that point to a 
single study conducted by the National Education Association (NEA) in 1946, which I 
have replicated in Table 2. This data was created from a survey of superintendents; 
meaning, some superintendents were operating from their own employment policies, 
whereas others were administering laws enacted by the state legislature.  
The National Education Association study of 1946 (Table 2) revealed a divided 
country: state superintendents in sixteen states confirmed that they employ public 
schoolteachers who wear religious garb, and state superintendents in twenty-two states 
responded that they did not, whereas thirteen states either did not comment or reported 
that their laws were silent on the matter. One can interpret this to mean that these were 
statewide regulations. Of the states whose superintendents reported that they did not 
employ public schoolteachers wearing religious garb, my research reveals that only three 
of the twenty-two states actually had statutory bans on teachers’ religious garb in 1946: 
Nebraska, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. This means that in 1946, nineteen of them must 
have been enacted by the state superintendents or state school boards.  
Arizona is a special case. Its anti-religious garb regulation predates its statehood 






prohibited from wearing religious garb in federal schools.57 This study demonstrates that 
there is no evidence of a statutory ban enacted after statehood,58 even though the two 
sources59 falsely reference “Ariz. Code Annotated, 1939, sec. 54:1006.” However, this 
code makes no mention of religious garb.60 The NEA study does indicate, however, that 
the state superintendent reported that Arizona, in 1946, did not employ public 
schoolteachers who wore religious garb. This study assumes this practice was a result of 
either a local policy or an organizational custom that carried over from its time as a 
                                               
 
57 In 1912, President William Taft (1909–1913) was faced with a political crisis when the residents of the 
new state objected to Catholic nuns wearing habits while teaching in federal Indian schools in Arizona. 
Taft, who later served as the Chief Justice of the United States (1921–1930), as President signed an 
executive order banning public schoolteachers in federal schools in federal territories from wearing 
religious garb while teaching. Although the scope of my study is about state public schools this primary 
document was an important finding. It had statutory authority for the jurisdiction of federal Indian schools 
and would not serve as an enforceable statute for state public schools. Regardless, this finding led me to no 
longer assume that the historical issue of teachers’ religious garb was limited to state schools. Taft’s order, 
however, does provide more evidence of anti-Catholic legislation. 
58 There is no evidence of an anti-religious-garb statute in the state Arizona, as confirmed in the following 
documents: The School Laws of the Territory of Arizona as approved March 10, 1887 (Tucson, AZ: Daily 
Star Book and Job Print, 1893); Samuel L. Patte, code commissioner, The Revised Statutes of Arizona 1913 
(Phoenix, Arizona, The McNeil Company, 1913); C.O.Case, superintendent of public instruction, The 
School Laws of Arizona 1919 (State of Arizona, 1919); F.C. Struckmeyer, code commissioner, The Revised 
Code of Arizona 1928 (Bancroft-Whitney Company, 1930); Henry D. Ross, chief justice, The Arizona 
Code 1939 (Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1939); as well as School Laws of Arizona 1941–1949 (Phoenix, 
Arizona: M.L. Brooks, 1949). 
59 The first reference is National Education Association, “Practice and Usage in Aid to Sectarian Schools 
and Sectarianism in Public Schools as Reported by State Superintendents” in “The State and Sectarian 
Education,” Research Bulletin (Washington, DC: National Education Association of the United States, 
(1946), Vol. XXIV, No. 1, Feb. 1946, p. 24–25, 36. The second reference is Leo Pfeffer (1953) Church, 
State, and Freedom, p. 774. Pfeffer references Arizona, Henry D. Ross, Alfred C. Lockwood, and 
Archibald G. McAlister (1940). Arizona code, 1939: containing the General laws of Arizona, annotated. 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 
60 The precise language reads as follows: “Teachers 54-1006. Instruction to be non-sectarian—Penalty.—
Any teacher who shall use any sectarian or denominational books, or teach any sectarian doctrine, or 
conduct any religious exercises in his school, or who fails to comply with any provisions of this chapter 
[article], shall be guilty of unprofessional conduct, and the proper authority shall revoke his certificate. 
[Laws 1912, ch. 77, §95, p. 364; R. S. 1913, §2808; rev., R.C. 1928, §1044.] Compiler’s Note. The 
bracketed word ‘article’ was inserted by the compiler. Collateral References. Sectarianism in schools 5 A. 









federal territory, but not as a result of a statutory ban. For these reasons, Arizona is 
included in the twenty-two states that banned public schoolteachers from wearing 
religious garb, only three of which did so with state statutes: Nebraska, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania. 
Two years after the 1946 NEA study was published, North Dakota passed an anti-
religious-garb law via public referendum,61 illustrating a new kind of anti-religious-garb 
law: one enacted through a state-wide ballot measure.62 Fifty-one years later, in 1999, 
North Dakota’s Legislative Assembly repealed its anti-religious-garb law.63 Oregon’s 
legislature repealed its anti-religious-garb law in 2010.64 Nebraska’s legislature repealed 
its anti-religious-garb law in 2017.65 Currently, Pennsylvania is the only remaining state 
with an anti-religious-garb law.66 In the remaining states there is no current evidence of 
policies or regulations, suggesting that either state superintendents or state school boards 
rescinded or let expire their policies. 
                                               
 
61 Linda Grathwohl, “The North Dakota Anti-Religious-Garb Law: Constitutional Conflict and Religious 
Strife,” 766 Great Plains Quarterly. (Lincoln, Nebraska: Digital Commons, University of Nebraska, 1993). 
62 N.D. Chapter 15 General Provisions, 15-4729. “Wearing of Religious Garb by Teachers in Public School 
Prohibited. No teacher in any public school in this state shall wear in said school or while engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties as such teacher any dress or garb indicating the fact that such teacher is a 
member of or an adherent of any religious order, sect or denomination.” June 29, 1948, S.L. 1949, c. 356, 
§1. N.D. Chapter 15 General Provisions, 15-4730. “Suspension and Revocation of Teachers Certificates for 
Wearing Religious Garb. Any public school teacher who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act 
(section 15-4729) shall have his or her certificate suspected by the state superintendent of public instruction 
for one year, and upon the conviction of such teacher for a second such offense, his or her teacher’s 
certificate shall be permanently revoked and annulled by the state superintendent of public instruction as 
provided by law.” June 29, 1948, S.L. 1949, c. 356, §2. 
63 N.D. Bill No. 1034, introduced by the Education Services Committee, repealed N.D. Cent. Code § 15-47-
29; 15-47-30, Mar. 3, 1999. 
64 Or. HB 3686 (2010) amended ORS 659A.033 and repealed ORS 342.650 and 342.655. N.  
65 Neb. LB62 2017 (2017) repealed section 79-898 and §79-899. 










I find it curious that the superintendents from Nebraska and Idaho would report to 
the NEA in 1946 that their respective states did not employ public schoolteachers 
wearing religious garb when their state constitutions had no religious tests for teacher 
clauses.67 I make this point in the context of the fact that as western territories became 
states many adopted no religious tests for teacher clauses, as noted in the following state 
constitutions: Nebraska68 was the first (1875), followed by Colorado69 (1876), Montana70 
(1889), Wyoming71 (1890), Idaho72 (1889), Utah73 (1889), New Mexico74 (1911), and 
Arizona75 (1912). 
The authors of the 1946 NEA report addressed this issue directly: “The 
constitutional provision which prohibits religious belief as a qualification for public 
                                               
 
67 NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. VI §11 and IDAHO CONST. of 1890, art. IX §6. 
68 NEB. CONST., 2 Oct.1875, art. VI §11, “A religious test or qualification shall not be required of any 
teacher or student for admission or continuance in any school or institution supported in whole or in part by 
public funds or taxation. . .” 
69 COLO. CONST., 14 Mar. 1876, art. IX §8, “No religious test or qualification shall ever be required of any 
person as a condition of admission into any public educational institution of the State, either as teacher or 
student. . .” 
70 MONT. CONST., 8 Nov. 1889, art. XI §9, “No religious or partisan qualifications shall ever be required of 
any person as a condition of admission into any public educational institution of the State, either as teacher 
or student. . .” 
71 WYO. CONST., 10 July 1890, art. VII §12, “No sectarian instruction, qualifications or tests shall be 
imparted, exacted, applied or in any manner tolerated in the schools of any grade or character controlled by 
the state. . .” 
72 IDAHO CONST., 3 July 1890, art. IX §6, “No religious test or qualification shall ever be required of any 
person as a condition of admission into any public educational institution of the state, either as teacher or 
student.” 
73 UTAH CONST., 5 Nov. 1895, art. X §12, “Neither religious nor partisan test or qualification shall be 
required of any person, as a condition of admission, as teacher or student, into any public educational 
institution of the State. . .” 
74 N.M. CONST., 21 Jan. 1911, art. XII §9, “No religious test shall ever be required as a condition of 
admission into the public schools or any educational institution of this state, either as a teacher or student. . 
.” 
75 ARIZ. CONST., 5 Nov. 1912, art. XI §7, “No religious or political test or qualification shall ever be 










office has no bearing upon the decision, since these teachers are not excluded from the 
public schools merely because they are Catholic. The question then becomes whether the 
religious dress is a sectarian influence such as is prohibited in the public schools.” The 
precise question of whether an anti-religious-garb law makes non-religious-garb-wearing 
religions a prerequisite for employment is outside the scope of this study. 
The religious garb statutes in Arkansas and Tennessee also fall outside my 
research question but are worth mentioning because both states have active state statutes 
that explicitly permit the voluntary wearing of religious garb by public schoolteachers.76 
Arkansas’ law, first enacted in 1947, states, “No person shall be prohibited from teaching 
in state institutions of higher learning for the reason that the person wears the clothing of 
any established and recognized religion while teaching.”77 The Tennessee School 
Employee Religious Liberty Act of 1999 allows school employees to voluntarily “wear 
religious garb or jewelry that does not disrupt the school environment.”78 The study of 
these statutes would require a legal analysis under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. I later recommend this analysis be conducted in 
future studies.   
                                               
 
76 The First Amendment in schools: A guide from the First Amendment Center, Association for Supervision 
and Curriculum Development, p. 100. 
77 The 2010 “Authority for teachers to wear religious clothing” statute, Arkansas Code Title 6, Education 
Subtitle 5, Postsecondary and Higher Education Generally Chapter 63, Employees of State Institutions 
Subchapter 1, General Provisions § 6-63-101. Acts 1973, No. 196, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 80-1261. 
78 It also states, in section 49-6-9002(a)(4) “Neutrality to religion does not require hostility to religion. The 
establishment clause does not prohibit reasonable accommodation of religion, nor does the clause bar 
appropriate teaching about religion…” It goes on to permit school employees to voluntarily “read a 
religious book during non-instructional time; quietly say grace before a meal; and meet with other school 
employees for prayer or scriptural study before or after school or during the employee’s lunch” (49-6-






In the meantime, I return to discussing the conflicting legal developments that 
occurred in states that sought to prevent public schoolteachers from wearing religious 
garb, either through state statute or administrative regulations.  
Conflicting legal developments: 1936–1956. In continuation of the discussion of 
the origins and evolution of anti-religious-garb laws and case laws, I now move to four 
state cases that solely focused on the question of public schoolteachers’ religious garb 
from 1936 to 1956, one of which ruled against and three in favor of Catholic nuns’ 
wearing habits while teaching in public schools.  
In Gerhardt v. Heid79 (1936), the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court’s decision, saying, “wearing of the religious habit… does not convert the school 
into a sectarian school, or create sectarian control within the purview of the constitution.” 
Similar to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1894, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
closed this case by leaving the ultimate question to the legislative process: “Whether it is 
wise or unwise to regulate the style of dress to be worn by teachers in our public schools 
or to inhibit the wearing of dress or insignia indicating religious belief is not a matter for 
the courts to determine. The limit of our inquiry is to determine whether what has been 
done infringes upon and violates the provisions of the constitution.” It held that the 
wearing of religious garb did not violate the “no establishment,” “no sectarian control,” 
“no aid to religion,” and “no diversion” of funds from public schools clauses.80 As a 
                                               
 
79 Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 44 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1936). 









result, the practice continued. For instance, in 1945, the Attorney General of North 
Dakota reported that 20 school districts in eleven counties were employing 74 nuns and 
eight priests.81  
On June 29, 1948, North Dakota voters passed Initiative 1, an “initiated state 
statute,” led by Protestant ministers of the Committee for the Separation of Church and 
State, to prohibit school teachers’ religious dress (which only affected Catholic nuns at 
the time). The results were close: 104,133 (53 percent) voted in favor of the statute and 
92,771 (47 percent) voted against it.82 This anti-religious-garb statute83 is the only one in 
U.S. history enacted by the voters. Five decades later, in 1999, North Dakota’s 
Legislative Assembly repealed this public referendum.84 
In Johnson v. Boyd85 (1940), the Indiana Supreme Court issued a positive 
treatment of teachers’ religious garb just one month after the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                               
 
81 Alvin W. Johnson and Frank H. Yost, Separation of Church and State in the United States. (New York, 
NY: Greenwood Press, 1948), p. 123; “Schools—Teachers—Wearing Religious Garb,” Report of the 
Attorney General of North Dakota, Aug. 25, 1945, pp. 262-63.  
82 Legislative Manual, Official Vote of North Dakota Primary Election, 1948; and Linda Grathwohl, “The 
North Dakota Anti-Religious-Garb Law: Constitutional Conflict and Religious Strive,” Great Plains 
Quarterly, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1993). 
83 N.D. Chapter 15 General Provisions, 15-4729. “Wearing of Religious Garb by Teachers in Public School 
Prohibited. No teacher in any public school in this state shall wear in said school or while engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties as such teacher any dress or garb indicating the fact that such teacher is a 
member of or an adherent of any religious order, sect or denomination.” June 29, 1948, S.L. 1949, c. 356, 
§1. N.D. Chapter 15 General Provisions, 15-4730. “Suspension and Revocation of Teachers Certificates for 
Wearing Religious Garb. Any public school teacher who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act 
(section 15-4729) shall have his or her certificate suspected by the state superintendent of public instruction 
for one year, and upon the conviction of such teacher for a second such offense, his or her teacher’s 
certificate shall be permanently revoked and annulled by the state superintendent of public instruction as 
provided by law.” June 29, 1948, S.L. 1949, c. 356, §2. 
84 N.D. Bill No. 1034, introduced by the Education Services Committee, repealed N.D. Cent. Code § 15-47-
29; 15-47-30, Mar. 3, 1999. For rationale for the repeal, see North Dakota Legislative Management (1998) 
Minutes of the Educational Services Committee. Feb. 23-24, 1998. Bismarck, North Dakota, p. 8. 









incorporated the First Amendment to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut. Interestingly, 
the Indiana Supreme Court bypassed the U.S. Constitution and relied on clauses in the 
state constitution––“right to worship,” “free exercise,” “right of conscience,” “no 
religious test,” and “no preference”86––to rule that public schools that operate in 
“Catholic churches, display religious pictures, and employ monks and nuns as teachers 
did not make the schools parochial schools.” 
The New Mexico Supreme Court took a different approach. In Zellers v. Huff 
(1951),87 the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld New Mexico State Board of 
Education’s resolution which read: “It Is Hereby Resolved and Adopted as the policy of 
this board that all nuns, brothers, or priests of the Catholic Church, or any members of 
any other sectarian religious group, wearing clothing of religious significance, should be 
removed from the public schools throughout the state as expeditiously as circumstances 
(of) each locality allows…”88 The New Mexico Supreme Court relied on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Everson v. Board of Education89 that incorporated 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to the states. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that under Everson, public schools that employed 
Catholic garb-wearing teachers violated the “separation of church and state” principle of 
the No Establishment Clause. The state supreme court also used the “free from sectarian 
                                               
 
86 Art. 1 Sec. 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
87 Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501 (N.M. Sup. Ct. 1951). 
88 New Mexico State Board of Education resolution, Mar. 6, 1951, cited in Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501 
(N.M. Sup. Ct. 1951) at 29. 









control” clause of the New Mexico constitution90 to definitively bar Catholic nuns from 
wearing religious garb and religious insignia while teaching in public classrooms. Their 
intent was to prevent a “propagandizing effect” for the teachers’ church and preempt any 
possible introduction of “sectarian religion into the public school.”91 
In Rawlings v. Butler92 (1956), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky (a lower court 
to Kentucky’s state supreme court) ruled in favor of the 84 Catholic nuns who taught 
while wearing habits and religious emblems. The court clarified, “The Garb does not 
teach. It is the woman within who teaches.” The court warned that should the legislature 
pass an anti-religious-garb law, as other states had, lawmakers would be denying teachers 
“equal protection” under the law to freely exercise their religion as incorporated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Cantwell v. State of Connecticut.93 The court made explicit that 
the “Everson opinion has no bearing on the question of Sisters teaching in schools while 
wearing their habiliments.” 
Summary: 1894–1956. Up to this point, there have been two seasons of legal 
developments between 1894 and 1956. In the first season, we saw Pennsylvania and New 
York set the legal foundation for banning public schoolteachers from wearing religious 
garb while teaching. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of garb-
wearing teachers but explained that the authority rests with the legislative branch to 
                                               
 
90 In this case, the New Mexico Supreme Court relied on many different clauses in the New Mexico 
Constitution but narrowly focused on the “free from sectarian control” clause. In other challenges within 
the case they relied on the ““freedom of conscience,” “no aid to religion,” “no support of any sectarian, 
denominational” school, “no religious test” for teachers and students, and “free from sectarian control” 
clauses in the N.M. CONST. See: art. 2, Sec. 11; art. 9, Sec. 14; art. 12, Sec. 3; art. 12, Sec. 9; art. 21. Sec. 4. 
91 Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501 (N.M. Sup. Ct. 1951). 
92 Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S. W. 2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App., 1956). 






require all teachers to abide by a general uniform dress code. The Pennsylvania General 
Assembly then created a law that singled out religious garb for state regulation, which 
was upheld by the same justices in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court who had previously 
favored the educators. The highest court in New York relied on the state superintendent’s 
regulatory authority to ban teachers’ religious garb, further reinforced by New York’s 
constitutional requirement not to use public property to aid “sectarian influences.” These 
three cases set into motion the first season of anti-religious garb regulation, in which by 
the end of World War II, twenty-two states prohibited public schoolteachers from 
wearing religious garb, through a state statute, public referendum, or administrative 
policies.  
In the second season, from 1936 to 1956, state courts in Indiana, Kentucky, and 
North Dakota ruled in favor of religious-garb-wearing teachers; however, voters in North 
Dakota passed a statewide referendum, thus enacting the first and only anti-religious-garb 
law that was born from the ballot box. Soon after, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued 
a scathing ruling against Catholic educators. Together, these scenes reveal that the 
question of teachers’ religious garb remained a contentious, unresolved legal issue.   
In both of these seasons, state courts relied on state laws and state constitutions to 
interpret the anti-religious-garb cases, which were brought forth using a variety of causes 
of action. The contemporary cases see an increasing reliance on federal causes of action, 
which proved to be ineffective for the public schoolteachers who had lost their jobs for 






throughout this 123-year history, there was only one case94 that was filed under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. How did it come to be 
that the highest law in the land designed to protect a person’s free exercise of religion 
was not routinely used to address the question of public schoolteachers’ religious garb? 
Three reasons may be helpful to consider as I move into an analysis of the contemporary 
developments.  
First, the U.S. Constitution does not mention education.95 The governance of 
public schools was often solely left to the states—that is, until the federal territories 
created federal schools in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries and the federal 
desegregation interventions in the mid-twentieth century. Second, because the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution starts will the phrase, “Congress shall not . . . ,” it 
was understood that states had the right to regulate religion, which is why state 
constitutions have unique religious liberty provisions. Third, the U.S. Supreme Court 
only began applying the federal Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the 
states in 1940, as previously explained. Even the two anti-religious-garb cases in New 
Mexico in 1951 and Kentucky in 1956 continued to rely on state law, probably because 
education was considered to solely be a state right with state oversight.  
The contemporary anti-religious-garb cases, from 1986 to today, alternatively, 
were entrenched in the conflicts between the federal judicial and legislative branches of 
government. In later sections in this chapter, I analyze how the controversial U.S. 
                                               
 
94 Mississippi v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (MS Sup. Ct. 1990). 
95 Stephen Lurie notes that of the 11,000 proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, “there have only 
been two proposals—one by Rep. Major Owens (D-NY) and repeated efforts by Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-
IL)—for an education amendment, ever.” Stephen Lurie, “Why Doesn’t the Constitution Guarantee the 






Supreme Court’s rulings against a Jewish military chaplain and Native American 
employment counselors were swiftly overturned through congressional legislation. The 
U.S. Supreme Court later held that Congress overstepped its bounds by applying certain 
religious liberty protections to all states, which led twenty states to enact their own 
religious freedom statutes—the new legal paradigm in which I conduct this study. 
Contemporary Federal and State Developments: 1986–2017  
More recent cases and legislative initiatives on teachers’ religious garb are 
equally inconsistent in their application of federal and state law. For instance, in 1986 and 
1992, respectively, the Third Circuit Court (Pennsylvania) and the Oregon State Supreme 
Court both upheld the dismissal of Sikh and Muslim teachers for wearing head coverings. 
In contrast, in 2003, a District Court for Western Pennsylvania overturned the decision to 
dismiss a teacher’s aide for wearing a cross necklace. Interestingly, in 2010, the Oregon 
Legislative Assembly repealed its 87-year-old ban on religious garb in public 
classrooms,96 whereas Arkansas97 and Tennessee98 enacted statutes that explicitly 
                                               
 
96 The Oregon rev. statute enacted in 1923 and revised in 1965 and 1989 §§ 342.650, .655, stated, “Any 
teacher who wears religious dress while teaching in an Oregon public school shall be suspended from 
employment. Any teacher violating the[se] provisions shall be suspended from employment by the district 
school board. The board shall report its action to the Superintendent of Public Instruction who shall revoke 
the teacher’s teaching certificate.” In 2010, House Bill 3686 “repeal[ed] provisions prohibiting teachers in 
public school from wearing religious dress while engaged in duties as teachers and sanctioning teachers for 
doing so” (ORS 659A.033). 
97 Arkansas’ law states, “No person shall be prohibited from teaching in state institutions of higher learning 
for the reason that the person wears the clothing of any established and recognized religion while teaching” 
(Authority for teachers to wear religious clothing, Arkansas Code Title 6, Education Subtitle 5, 
Postsecondary and Higher Education Generally Chapter 63, Employees of State Institutions Subchapter 1, 
General Provisions § 6-63-101). Acts 1973, No. 196, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 80-1261. 
98 The Tennessee School Employee Religious Liberty Act of 1999 allows school employees to voluntarily 
“wear religious garb or jewelry that does not disrupt the school environment.” It also states, in section 49-6-









permitted public schoolteachers to wear religious garb. Nebraska’s anti-religious-garb 
law, was repealed in 2017.99 
In this section, I will examine five modern religious-garb cases, in two of which 
courts ruled against schoolteachers who wore a Sikh turban (Oregon) and Muslim 
headscarf (Pennsylvania); in three cases, courts ruled in favor of schoolteachers who 
wore an African Hebrew Israelite headdress (Mississippi), a Muslim headscarf 
(Pennsylvania), and a Christian cross (Pennsylvania). 
In Cooper v. Eugene School District100 (1986), the Oregon Supreme Court upheld 
the termination of Janet Cooper,101 a Sikh teacher who was fired for violating the state’s 
anti-religious-garb statute. The statute in question was enacted by open members of the 
Ku Klux Klan in 1923.102 The Cooper decision was issued four months after the U.S. 
                                               
 
prohibit reasonable accommodation of religion, nor does the clause bar appropriate teaching about 
religion…” It goes on to permit school employees to voluntarily “read a religious book during non-
instructional time; quietly say grace before a meal; and meet with other school employees for prayer or 
scriptural study before or after school or during the employee’s lunch” (49-6-8004.b.1, 2, 4). 
99 On January 5, 2017, Nebraska State Senator Jim Scheer from District 19 introduced bill NE LB62, 
designed to repeal the prohibition on the “wearing of religious garb by teachers in public schools.” The bill 
was passed the Education Committee by a vote of 36 to 1, with its last hearing occurring on January 17, 
2017. The bill passed on final reading with thirty-nine in favor and five against. Nebraska LB62 2017 was 
signed by the Governor on Mar. 27, 2017 and reads “A Bill for an Act relating to schools; to eliminate 
provisions prohibiting the wearing of religious garb by teachers in public schools; to eliminate penalties; 
and to outright repeal sections 79-898 and 79-899, Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska. Be it enacted by 
the people of the State of Nebraska, Section 1. The following sections are outright repealed: Sections 79-
898 and 79-899, Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska.” 
100 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1986), app. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 
(1987). 
101 After marriage, Janet Cooper converted to Sikhism, began wearing religious garb, and changed her 
name to Karta Kaur Khalsa. 
102 The Oregon Supreme Court stated that “Oregon’s 1923 predecessor to ORS 342.650 [the state’s anti-
religious-garb law] dates from the period of anti-Catholic intolerance that also gave us the initiative 
measure against private schools struck down in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).” Cooper 
v. Eugene School District No. 4J, 301 Ore. 358; 723 P.2d 298 at 26 (1986). For further discussion, see 
David B. Tyack (1968) “The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case,” The American 









Supreme Court had ruled against Orthodox Rabbi S. Simcha Goldman in 1986 for 
wearing a yarmulke while in an Air Force uniform.103 (Congress overturned Goldman v. 
Weinberger104 in the 1988 National Defense Authorization Act.)  
In reviewing the Sikh teacher’s claim, the Oregon Supreme Court explicitly 
rejected the use of federal judicial tests under the Free Exercise clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.105 Rather, the court focused on the Free Exercise Clause of the Oregon State 
Constitution and on earlier state court rulings against Native American teachers’ use of 
peyote, which four years later would become the infamous U.S. Supreme Court decision 
of Smith v. Employment Division.106 In Cooper, the Oregon Supreme Court found that the 
Sikh teacher’s right to exercise her religion was “reasonably denied” because of the 
state’s interest in preserving religious “neutrality” in public schools. The Oregon 
                                               
 
(2003) “The Little Red Schoolhouse: Pierce, State Monopoly of Education and the Politics of Intolerance,” 
20 Const. Comment. 61, Spring 2003. 
103 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that “the 
appropriate level of scrutiny of a military regulation that clashes with a constitutional right is neither strict 
scrutiny nor rational basis.” Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 236 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 734 F.2d 1531 at 
1535-1536 (1984); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
104 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). For a detailed account of these developments, see Dwight 
H. Sullivan, The Congressional Response to Goldman v. Weinberg, 121 MILITARY LAW REVIEW (1988), 
125–152. See also Pub. L. No. 100–180; 10 USC. §774 (Sup. 1987). 
105 The Oregon Supreme Court explained, “This court in fact has interpreted the meaning of these 
guarantees independently, sometimes with results contrary to those reached by the United States Supreme 
Court…The religion clauses of OR. CONST., art. I, sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, are more than a code. They 
are specifications of a larger vision of freedom for a diversity of religious beliefs and modes of worship and 
freedom from state-supported official faiths or modes of worship. The accumulation of guarantees, more 
numerous and more concrete than the opening clause of the First Amendment, reinforces the significance 
of the separate guarantees.” The Oregon Supreme Court went on to apply the “double jeopardy protection” 
when explaining that “parties should specify the statutory or constitutional sources of their claims, but also 
a party cannot, by omitting a state-based claim, force an Oregon court to hold that the state has fallen below 
a nationwide constitutional standard, when in fact the state's law, when properly invoked, meets or exceeds 
that standard.” For these reasons, the Oregon Supreme Court relied on the Free Exercise clause under the 
Oregon State Constitution.  









Supreme Court came to this conclusion by using a test similar to the “neutral and general 
applicable” test later used in Smith.107 The state’s high court found that the interest of 
preserving the “image of a nonsectarian public school” outweighed the infringements of 
her free exercise rights. It did, however, note that it would permit public schoolteachers 
to wear common decorations from a religious “heritage,” such as a necklace with a small 
cross or Star of David. No definition of “small” was offered, and neither was a distinction 
made between “common decorations” and head coverings worn by Catholics, Sikhs, or 
Muslims.  
In a peculiar turn of events, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed Cooper’s appeal 
for “lack of a substantial federal question.”108 This is highly suspect given that the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment had been extended to the states four decades 
earlier.109 
In 2010, the Oregon state legislature repealed the state’s anti-religious-garb law of 
1923,110 stating both that the original bill had been proposed by leaders of the Ku Klux 
                                               
 
107 The Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged in 1986 that the state’s anti-religious-garb law “is not a 
general regulation, neutral toward religion on its face and in its policy, like the unemployment benefits 
standards in Smith v. Employment Division, 301 Or 209, 721 P2d 445 (1986), and Black v. Employment 
Division, 301 Or 221, 721 P2d 451 (1986).” See: Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 at 19 
(Or. Sup. Ct. 1986), app. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (1987). 
108 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in reviewing Cooper, stated, “The Supreme Court dismissed 
Cooper’s appeal for want of a substantial federal question.” United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 
911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990), at 888. This may be because the Oregon Supreme Court held that “this 
case… should remain a case of ordinary administrative and statutory law before becoming a constitutional 
case.” Cooper at 4 (1986). It may also be because the Oregon Supreme Court limited the legal inquiry to 
the free exercise provisions in the Oregon constitution, with explicit rejection of the use of the free exercise 
guarantees in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
109 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
110 Oregon HB 3686 (2010) amended ORS 659A.033 and repealed the two-part anti-religious-garb law: 









Klan to prevent Catholic teachers from being employed by public schools and that the 
anti-religious-garb law violated precedents set by the Oregon Supreme Court and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s guaranteeing one’s free exercise of religion.  
The second modern case was issued three months before the U.S. Supreme Court 
issued Smith in April 1990. In Mississippi v. McGlothin111 (January 1990), the 
Mississippi Supreme Court held that a public schoolteacher’s periodic wearing of a head 
wrap as a religious cultural expression of her identity as an African Hebrew Israelite from 
Ethiopia was constitutionally protected under both the Free Exercise clause of the U.S. 
Constitution’s First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
“no religious tests,” “no preference,” and “free enjoyment of all religious sentiments” 
clauses of Mississippi’s Constitution.112 The Mississippi Supreme Court applied the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test113 and did not find applicable the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Goldman v. Weinberger, in part because Congress had overturned it 
two years earlier.114 Three months after issuing the McGlothin decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued Smith, eclipsing the McGlothin case and preempting another 
emerging garb case in Pennsylvania. 
Four months after the April 1990 decision of Smith, the Third Circuit issued a 
negative ruling against a Philadelphia public schoolteacher.115 In this case, decided in 
August 1990, Alima Delores Reardon was fired for wearing a hijab (Muslim headscarf) 
                                               
 
111 Mississippi v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879. 
112 Art. III §18 
113 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
114 For a detailed account of why and how it was overturned, see Dwight H. Sullivan, The Congressional 
Response to Goldman v. Weinberg, 121 MILITARY L. REV. (1988), pp. 125–152. 






and loose dress while teaching in the school district of Philadelphia. Earlier, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had held that the state’s anti-religious-garb 
statute violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment 
discrimination based on religion (see the “Related Statutory Developments” section later 
in this chapter for a complete discussion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). The Third 
Circuit reversed the lower court, holding the garb statute valid under Title VII because 
the school district could experience an undue hardship to accommodate Reardon’s 
religious expression. The Third Circuit reasoned that requiring the school board to violate 
a “reasonable” religious garb statute would make the school board vulnerable to a 
“substantial risk of criminal prosecution, fines, and expulsion from the [education] 
profession.”116 Although the court did not provide an explicit justification, I assume that 
its reason was that the anti-religious-garb statute threatens criminal penalties for 
administrators who do not comply with the law.117 The appellate judges further claimed 
that the school district would not satisfy its compelling state interest in allowing to wear 
her religious apparel, failing to uphold the “appearance of a secular public school 
system.”118 The court asserted that the “Garb Statute permissibly advanced a compelling 
interest in maintaining the appearance of religious neutrality in the classroom” and that 
                                               
 
116 Ibid., at 24. 
117 “Any public school director who after notice of any such violation fails to comply with the provisions of 
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction of the first offense, shall be sentenced to 
pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100), and on conviction of a second offense, the offending 
school director shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars and shall be deprived of 
his office as a public school director.” Pa. Stat. 24, § 11-1112. 









while, admittedly, the statute “was enacted with a putatively anti-Catholic motivation, the 
commonwealth was not practicing discrimination in enforcing the statute.”119   
It is worth mentioning in this literature review two federal district court cases in 
Pennsylvania. They are quite odd because they involve teachers’ religious garb, but the 
courts claimed that the cases are not about either religious garb or teachers. The first 
court held that a Muslim’s headscarf did not meet the definition of “religious garb”; 
therefore, a Muslim counselor was exempt from Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb law. 
The second court held that a teacher’s aide is not a teacher according to the state’s legal 
definition of a teacher; therefore, a Christian teaching assistant was permitted to wear a 
cross neckless while in a public classroom. I summarize these two peculiar cases here to 
document this history and to explain why I do not rely on them in my legal analysis in 
Chapter IV. 
In 1991, a year after Reardon’s Title VII case before the Third Circuit, the U.S. 
District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania used Title VII to rule in favor of Cynthia Moore, a 
Muslim teacher who was denied employment because she wore a two-toned green 
headscarf to an interview. She confirmed that she intended to wear—while teaching—
similar head coverings, like a turban, a crochet cap, or differently tied scarves.120 This 
case presents unique facts in comparison to the others. Moore’s employment was denied 
by a READS, a private company that, via a contract with the Philadelphia School 
                                               
 
119 United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990) at 35. 









District, provided “remedial education and diagnostic services” to students in private 
religious schools. Over seventy to seventy-five percent of the schools were Catholic, and 
the “remainder were affiliated with Jewish, Muslim, Lutheran, and Quaker”121 
organizations. Specifically, READS denied Moore employment as a third-grade 
counselor at two Catholic day schools, which is ironic considering the anti-Catholic 
origins of Pennsylvania’s garb law. In an unusual application of common law, the District 
Court rejected the precedent in the Third Circuit’s ruling against Reardon and instead 
rested its favorable ruling for Moore on a single word—many. The district court wrote, 
“In [Reardon], the Third Circuit stated in dicta that attire which may not clearly identify a 
teacher as an adherent of a particular religion is nevertheless ‘religious garb’ if it is apt to 
be perceived as religious by ‘many’ school children.”122 The word “many” originated 
from a footnote in a concurring (not the majority’s) opinion in Reardon by one judge on 
the Third Circuit. He quoted U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan explaining how, in 
Establishment Clause cases (not Title VII cases), “the inquiry into [endorsement] must be 
conducted with particular care when many [my emphasis] of the citizens perceiving the 
governmental message are children in their formative years . . .”123 The District Court 
used this quote to conclude that “Moore’s head coverings are not ‘religious garb’… 
because although worn for religious purposes they are not perceived as such.” READS 
failed, the district court said, “to produce any probative evidence that children, such as 
                                               
 
121 Ibid., EEOC v. READS (1991). 
122 Ibid., EEOC v. READS (1991). 









the third graders Moore applied to counsel, would perceive Moore’s garb to be religious” 
(even though Moore herself testified of two children in other contexts inquiring about the 
religious nature of her headscarf).124 The court stated that there was “no evidence that 
Moore’s attire [was] facially religious” (even though during the interview she herself 
identified as religious and admitted to wearing garb for religious reasons). In what seem 
to be two contradictory statements, the District Court on one hand held that a Muslim’s 
headscarf was not religious because “many” third grade children would not perceive it as 
such and on the other hand simultaneously ruled that READS was guilty of “religious 
discrimination” under Title VII. I am unclear how garb worn for religious purposes 
cannot be perceived as religious while at the same time serving as evidence of religious 
discrimination. The court also held that READS failed to provide any evidence of undue 
hardship “so as to relieve it of its duty to accommodate” Moore (a position I find 
reasonable). To illustrate what was at stake, the court ordered READS to issue Moore 
back pay and interest in the amount of $38,506. 
The fifth and most recent contemporary religious garb case comes from another 
equally peculiar ruling issued by another lower federal court in Pennsylvania. In Nichol v. 
Arin125 (W.D. Pa. 2003), a federal district court judge ruled that a teacher’s assistant was 
                                               
 
124 “On one occasion, a girl at an interfaith summer program told [Moore], ‘You remind me of a Jewish 
woman.’ To this, Moore ‘just smiled and didn't add anything else or say anything to her.’ On another 
occasion, Moore stated that a ‘young gentleman’ told her that she didn't have to dress as she did because he 
would protect her. Moore assumed that the remark was intended to reflect the boy's opinion concerning the 
dress requirements for Muslim women. Moore replied that she could take care of herself. On the final 
occasion, a child speculated that Moore covered her head, not for any religious purpose, but rather because 
she was bald.”  









not a “teacher” under the definition of Pennsylvania’s School Code;126 therefore, Brenda 
Nichol was not bound by Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb statute and could freely wear 
a cross necklace while assisting in the public classroom. The judge issued an extensive 
nonbinding opinion about the unconstitutionality of the statute, using judicial tests under 
the Free Exercise, Free Speech, Establishment, and Title VII provisions. I find it peculiar 
that the judge failed to mention the Free Exercise standards under Sherbert. He did not 
mention the judicial tests of general applicability, strict scrutiny, and the unique four-part 
substantial-burden standard as required under Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom 
Protection Act (RFPA), enacted a year earlier in 2002, because Nichol did not meet 
RFPA’s notice requirement.127 
I find the READS and Nichol court decisions to be uneven given the judges’ 
rejection of legal precedent and failure to apply longstanding judicial standards. I will not 
rely on these cases to conduct my analysis in Chapter IV. Instead, I will use legal 
research methods to conduct a fact-pattern synthesis of legitimate religious-garb cases 
that will force me to study the heart of the matter, rather than, as these courts did, 
circumvent the merits of this important and unanswered constitutional question. 
                                               
 
126 “‘Teacher’ shall include all professional employees and temporary professional employees, who devote 
fifty per centum (50%) of their time, or more, to teaching or other direct educational activities, such as 
classroom teachers, demonstration teachers, museum teachers, counsellors, librarians, school nurses, dental 
hygienists, home and school visitors, and other similar professional employees and temporary professional 
employees, certificated in accordance with the qualifications established by the State Board of Education.” 
24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 11-1141. 
127 District Judge Arthur J. Schwab’s justification: “The Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act of 
2002 has not been judicially interpreted and this Court is hesitant to sail the uncharted waters within its 
reach. In any event, as defendants contend, it does not appear that plaintiff provided proper notice to the 
agency imposing the alleged substantial burden on the free exercise of religion (i.e., to ARIN), as required 
by section 5(b) of that Act, 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. §2405, and defendants do not suggest that the Court should 
address this state statutory claim first, in order to avoid the First Amendment issues. Accordingly, the Court 
does not address plaintiff’s claim under Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act.” Nichol v. Arin, 







  In summary, in the last 123 years, there have been eleven cases directly related to 
bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb, nine of which were state supreme court 
decisions. Collectively, all of these cases were filed using thirty-two different causes of 
action (Table 1) derived from a variety of state and federal religious liberty protections. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that one state 
supreme court and one lower state appellate court took up the federal question of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Establishment Clause.128 The New Mexico Supreme Court (1951) relied 
on Everson129 to issue a negative ruling against Catholic teachers because of strong 
evidence of sectarian instruction and indoctrination, whereas the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals (1956) relied on Everson to issue a positive ruling for Catholic teachers because 
there was no evidence of sectarian teaching. One state supreme court, in Mississippi 
(1990), took up the federal question of the U.S. Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause and 
used Cantwell130 and the Sherbert standard of strict scrutiny to affirm an African Hebrew 
Israelite teacher’s petition to periodically wear an Ethiopian headdress. Three months 
later, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the controversial Smith decision, resulting in both 
                                               
 
128 Twenty years before the U.S. Supreme Court, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), articulated 
the three-pronged “Lemon Test” to test an Establishment Clause claim: the law must have (1) a secular 
purpose; (2) its primary effect is neither to advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it does not foster an 
excessive entanglement between government and religious institutions. 
129 The case that the U.S. Supreme Court used to incorporate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to the states. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
130 The case that the U.S. Supreme Court used to incorporate the Free Exercise Clause of the First 









the Mississippi Supreme Court’s favorable ruling’s being eclipsed and the Third Circuit’s 
negative ruling’s effectively being justified.  
Put simply, in this 123-year legal history, only one court, a state court, applied 
strict scrutiny to the question of public schoolteachers’ religious garb. No federal or state 
court since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Smith decision has ruled on the question of whether 
anti-religious-garb statutes are neutral laws of general applicability;131 nor has any federal 
or state court tested the legitimacy of Pennsylvania’s anti-religious garb ban under 
Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act. As a result, the question of the 
legality of public schoolteachers’ religious garb remains unresolved today. 
 One complicating factor in why it has taken so long to resolve this legal question 
has to do with the fact that midway into this 123-year-old saga, the U.S. Supreme Court 
incrementally incorporated the Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment to the 
states, the opening subject of the following brief literature review. 
Evolution of Free Exercise Standards 
I began this literature review by surveying the relevant case law regarding 
religious garb worn by public schoolteachers in the United States. Because my study 
narrowly focuses on Free Exercise jurisprudence, I use this next section to analyze the 
                                               
 
131 As discussed in IV. A. General Applicability, the Oregon Supreme Court did admit in 1986 that the 
state’s anti-religious-garb law “is not a general regulation, neutral toward religion on its face and in its 
policy, like the unemployment benefits standards in Smith v. Employment Division, 301 Or 209, 721 P2d 
445 (1986), and Black v. Employment Division, 301 Or 221, 721 P2d 451 (1986).” Cooper v. Eugene Sch. 









development of two sets of judicial tests: (1) the Sherbert test, which applied strict 
scrutiny to Free Exercise cases132 by requiring that the government narrowly tailor 
regulations that burden one’s free exercise of religion by using the least restrictive means 
possible to further a compelling governmental interest; and (2) the Smith standard, also 
known as the general applicability test, which requires that government regulations must 
be “neutral and generally applicable”133 and not target religious practices.134 I close this 
section with an analysis of how the federal and state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 
sought to restore the strict scrutiny standards as applied in Sherbert, which further 
explains why my secondary research question focuses on the Pennsylvania Religious 
Freedom Protection Act (RFPA) of 2002. I focus my study in these ways because no 
federal or state court has ever tested the constitutionality of Pennsylvania and Nebraska’s 
bans on teachers’ religious garb with the strict scrutiny standard under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment135 or the Pennsylvania RFPA. 
                                               
 
132 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
133 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
134 In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously held that the City of Hialeah violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when 
banning the religious practice of animal sacrifice, when the city permitted the killing of animals for other 
purposes, such as food production. 
135 For example, in 1936, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution “merely restricts the power of Congress, and is not restrictive of the states.” Gerhardt v. Heid, 
66 N.D. 44 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1936). In Cooper v. Eugene School District Ore. Sup. Ct. 1986, the U.S. Sup. Ct. 
denied Cooper’s appeal for “lack of a substantial federal question,” according to the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals. “The Supreme Court dismissed Cooper’s appeal for want of a substantial federal question.” 









Origins and Evolution of Free Exercise Standards 
 In order to proceed with an analysis of federal and state law governing public 
schoolteachers’ religious garb in Pennsylvania and Nebraska, I will first examine the 
origins and evolution of strict scrutiny—the highest standard of judicial review.  
Currently, courts apply strict scrutiny in Free Exercise cases when the 
government fails the general applicability test under Smith by “target[ing] religious 
conduct for distinctive treatment.”136 Any “law burdening religious practice that is not 
neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To 
satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must 
advance ‘interests of the highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those 
interests.”137 As further analyzed in Chapter IV—Presentation and Analysis of Findings, 
Pennsylvania and Nebraska’s religious garb laws target religious conduct, therefore, must 
meet the strict scrutiny standard under both the federal Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection 
Act of 2002. 
As I will demonstrate in this section, the U.S. Supreme Court first applied strict 
scrutiny to Free Exercise claims in the landmark case Sherbert v. Verner (1963),138 which 
is why I refer to the following three-part test as the Sherbert standard. Applied in 
contemporary Free Exercise cases, the Sherbert test begins with courts asking the 
                                               
 
136 See the unanimous decision, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 at 29 
(1993).  
137 Ibid., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, at 51. 









plaintiffs to demonstrate that (1) the regulation in question burdens their right to free 
exercise of religion, regardless of whether that burden was incidental or fundamental to 
their religion.139 If adequately demonstrated, the strict scrutiny test is triggered: The court 
turns to the state to determine whether there is a (2) sufficiently compelling government 
interest to justify the burden.140 If not, the plaintiffs prevail.141 If so, the court then 
examines whether the state (3) narrowly tailored its regulation, meaning whether the 
government’s ends were achieved in the least restrictive means possible. If the court 
finds the interests to be compelling and narrowly tailored, then the state prevails. 
Courts and legal scholars use the terms “narrowly tailor” and “least restrictive 
means” interchangeably.142 To illustrate this point, Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr. 
explains that “The first element of the narrow tailoring requirement insists that 
infringements of protected rights must be necessary in order to be justified.143 The 
Supreme court sometimes expresses essentially the same demand when it says that the 
government’s chosen means must be the “the least restrictive alternative” that would 
                                               
 
139 Ibid., at 4-6. 
140 The compelling government interest prong, when asked in isolation from the other prongs of the 
Sherbert standard, is known as the rational-basis test—the least stringent form of judicial review. The 
rational-basis test originated in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
141 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
142 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (“The term ‘narrowly tailored,’ so 
frequently used in our cases, has acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have 
indicated, the term may be used to require consideration of whether lawful alternative and less restrictive 
means could have been used.”); and Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 4 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 
1326 (2006-2007). 









achieve its goal.”144 With these justifications in mind, I will use the terms “narrowly 
tailor” and “least restrictive means” as synonyms in this study. 
 The purpose of this section is twofold: to, first, illustrate how the Sherbert 
standard evolved and, second, to foreshadow how this judicial test became the 
scaffolding for my primary research question about the constitutionality of anti-religious-
garb statutes in Pennsylvania and Nebraska. 
Origins of the strict scrutiny test. The term strict scrutiny originated in state 
courts145 in the nineteenth century. The U.S. Supreme Court used this trend to plant the 
seeds of strict scrutiny in the federal system in the early twentieth century in what would 
become the “most celebrated footnote in constitutional law.”146  
Justice Harlan F. Stone, in writing for the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. 
Carolene Products (1938),147 required that lawmakers have a “rational basis” for 
introducing economic legislation—the rational basis test being the lowest level of 
judicial review. Justice Stone then used “Footnote Four” to explain that the court may 
need a “more exacting judicial scrutiny” when laws burden protected classes of 
minorities, whether religious, ethnic, or racial. The footnote reads as follows (I italicize 
phrases that are relevant to this study): 
                                               
 
144 Ibid., Fallon. See also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending 
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422. (1996). 
145 Booher v. Worril, 57 Ga. 235, 238 (1876); Paddock v. Pulsifer, 23 P. 1049, 1051 (Kan. 1890); 
Altschuler v. Coburn, 38 Neb. 881, 889 (1894); Greer v. Altoona Warehouse Co., 20 So. 2d 513, 514-15 
(Ala. 1945); Gish v. Unruhan, 165 P.2d 417 (Kan. 1946).  
146 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revised, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982).  









There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten 
amendments,148 which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth.149 It is unnecessary to consider now 
whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can 
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation is to 
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of 
legislation…. Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter 
into the review of statutes directed at particular religious,150 national,151 
or racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry.152 
 
 Building upon this footnote, the U.S. Supreme Court began to develop judicial 
tests that would help incorporate the guarantees in the Bill of Rights to state laws. This 
explains why Footnote Four “symbolizes the end of one era of constitutional 
jurisprudence and the dawning of another.”153 
From rational basis to strict scrutiny. In Carolene Products the court applied 
the rational basis standard—a less stringent standard than strict scrutiny—to economic 
                                               
 
148 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” [of religion]. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
149 The Fourteenth Amendment proclaims that “No State shall… deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
150 Justice Stone cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously held that Oregon could not force parents to enroll students in public schools only, thus 
upholding the constitutionality of private religiously-affiliated schools. 
151 Justice Stone also cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) in which the U.S. Supreme Court found 
unconstitutional a statute that restricted foreign-language education. This particular case involved fourth 
graders reading the bible in German at the Zion Parochial School, a one-room schoolhouse. 
152 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), Footnote 4. 









legislation. The rational basis test required that a law must further any legitimate 
government interest as long as that interest is deemed reasonable to the court.154 In search 
of another judicial inquiry to adjudicate laws regarding the fundamental rights of racial 
minorities, the U.S. Supreme Court first used the exact phrase “strict scrutiny” in 1942 in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma.155 In this landmark case, the high court found unconstitutional a 
“three strikes” law that justified the sterilization of African Americans. Two years later, 
the U.S. Supreme Court fully articulated and applied the strict scrutiny standard in 
Korematsu v. United States,156 in which the high court found constitutional the 
internment of Japanese Americans. 
These cases served as the legal foundation for the U.S. Supreme Court to spend 
the next several decades to fortify the strict scrutiny standards for cases involving racial 
minorities. This meant that states were required to demonstrate a “compelling 
government interest” to justify infringing on a racial minority’s fundamental 
constitutional rights. If deemed compelling, justices would ask whether the regulation 
had a “least restrictive alternative”—meaning a “narrowly tailored” law that requires “no 
more activity (or less) than is necessary to advance those compelling ends.”157 By the 
mid-twentieth century, strict scrutiny became the judicial standard used by the courts to 
dismantle laws that discriminated against minorities based on race.158 
                                               
 
154 Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
155 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
156 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
157 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 800, 793–871 (2006). 







Extending strict scrutiny to religion. Under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, the U.S. Supreme Court began to apply the strict scrutiny standard to Free 
Exercise cases in the 1960s. As we will see in the following discussion, the primary 
difference between the race and religion cases was the Court’s addition of a new 
question: Is the plaintiff’s religion burdened? It is important to note, however, that “we 
need a frank recognition that a compelling interest test for exemption cases neither has 
been, nor should be, as stringent as the test is in other contexts,”159 such as race. With this 
caveat, the history the application of strict scrutiny to religion shows how burden prong 
became the first part of what I reference throughout this study as the Sherbert standard 
(1963)—a judicial test used to overturn Braunfeld v. Brown (1953).160 
In writing for a 5-4 majority in Braunfeld, Chief Justice Warren found that 
Abraham Braunfeld, an Orthodox Jew who wanted to keep his business open on Sundays 
and close on Saturdays for the Jewish Sabbath, experienced merely an “incidental” 
burden on his religion.161 Therefore, the court held that Mr. Braunfeld failed to 
demonstrate the necessary level of burden—fundamental or direct—to show that 
Pennsylvania’s blue law violated his Free Exercise rights. Chief Justice Warren asserted 
that the state had a compelling purpose for “providing for the general welfare by 
                                               
 
159 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Volume 1, Free Exercise and Fairness (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 215.  
160 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1960). 
161 For another discussion of “incidental burdens,” see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). In this case, “Justice Brennan’s opinion… shifts from ‘centrality’ to 
‘substantial threat’ without a sense that the two inquires might vary in consequence.” Kent Greenawalt, 
Religion and the Constitution: Volume 1, Free Exercise and Fairness (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 









establishing a day of rest,” despite the laws “originally enacted for religious purposes.”162 
Warren said that the state had the authority to “regulate conduct by enacting a general 
law” to “advance the State’s secular goals” except when “the State may accomplish its 
purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.”163 Seeing no less burdensome 
alternative, the high court upheld Pennsylvania’s blue laws, which required Jewish 
merchants to close their businesses on Sundays. 
 The Sherbert standard. Three years later, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned 
itself in the landmark case, Sherbert v. Verner,164 which granted an accommodation for 
an employee who did not work on Saturdays for religious reasons. This dramatic change 
was a result of two factors: First, in this short period of time, Chief Justice Warren and 
justices Black and Clark changed their views on what constituted a “burden” to religion 
under the strict scrutiny test. No longer did a plaintiff need to prove that the burden was 
fundamental or direct; the court was satisfied if the burden was incidental or indirect.165 
Second, President Kennedy replaced retiring judge Felix Frankfurter (who ruled against 
Abraham Braunfeld) with Justice Goldberg who joined the plurality in Sherbert. This 
worked in favor of the three dissenters in Braunfeld who remained on the court—justices 
Douglas and Stewart and, the most passionate dissenter, Justice Brennan.  
In writing for the new 7-to-3 majority, Justice Brennan used his dissent in 
Braunfeld as the legal framework for Sherbert. He began with an explanation of why the 
                                               
 
162 Braunfeld at 602-603, citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) at 437-440. 
163 Braunfeld at 607. This phrasing echoes the least restrictive means prong of the strict scrutiny standard.  
164 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) at 4-6. 









U.S. Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny—the most rigorous standard of judicial 
review—to Free Exercise cases. “The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly 
closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs.”166 In making a 
distinction between religious beliefs and actions, he clarified that the U.S. Supreme Court 
“rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to government regulation of certain 
overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles,” explaining that “even when the 
action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, [religiously-motivated actions are] 
not totally free from legislative restrictions” (e.g., “human sacrifices”).167 Justice Brennan 
reaffirmed the high court’s long standing view that religious conduct can and should be 
regulated by the state if it posed a “threat to public safety, peace or order.”168 
Justice Brennan then relied on NAACP v. Button,169 the first case in which the 
U.S. applied the strict scrutiny standard to the First Amendment170 protection of freedom 
of association to pose a legal question about the First Amendment protection of free 
                                               
 
166 Brennan cites Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), in which the U.S. Supreme Court first 
incorporated the Free Exercise Clause to state laws through the Fourteenth Amendment. He also cites 
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), in which the U.S. Supreme Court found unconstitutional state 
constitutions that required religious tests for office.   
167 Ibid., Braunfeld at 603. Justice Brennan relies upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s first Free Exercise case, 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, court held that, “Laws are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may 
with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship; 
would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to 
prevent a sacrifice?. . . To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior 
to the law of the land, and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government 
could exist only in name under such circumstances.” 
168 Ibid., Justice Brennan cites Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
197 U.S. 11 (1905); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); and Cleveland v. United States, 329 
U.S. 14 (1946). 
169 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
170 There are five freedoms in the First Amendment: religion, speech, press, petition, and assembly. 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 






exercise of religion: Can “any incidental burden on the free exercise of [an] appellant’s 
religion… be justified by a ‘compelling state interest in regulation of a subject within the 
State’s constitutional power to regulate’”? 
To contextualize this question, it is important to note the facts in the Sherbert 
case. The state of South Carolina denied unemployment benefits to Adeil Sherbert after 
she was fired for refusing to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day for Seventh-day 
Adventists. Justice Brennan began by determining the degree of burden placed on Mrs. 
Sherbert: “We turn first to the question of whether the disqualification for benefits 
imposes any burden [emphasis added] on the free exercise of appellant’s religion. We 
think it is clear that it does.” 
In starting with this question, Justice Brennan set the order of the strict scrutiny 
test for Free Exercise cases: first, determine whether a government regulation places any 
burden on a person’s religious beliefs or actions. He classified Mrs. Sherbert’s burden as 
indirect and incidental because the state is not singling out her religion for regulation and 
ruled that even an indirect burden is substantive. He explained: “Governmental 
imposition of such a choice [between religion and work] puts the same kind of burden on 
the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday 
worship” (a fine being an example of a direct or fundamental burden, according to Justice 
Brennan). The court held that a person’s burden can be either indirect/incidental or 
direct/fundamental in order to proceed with a Free Exercise claim.171  
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The Sherbert case laid the foundation for three decades of constitutionally 
protected religious exemptions. In summarizing these developments, and foreshadowing 
what would come, Eugene Volokh writes: 
In Braunfeld (1961) the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to suggest that the 
Free Exercise Clause might sometimes constitutionally mandate 
exemptions. And in Sherbert (1963), the Court expressly adopted the 
constitutional exemption model, under which sincere religious objectors 
had a presumptive constitutional right to an exemption. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder (1972) reaffirmed this, and the period from 1963 to 1990 is often 
labeled the Sherbert/Yoder era of Free Exercise Clause law.172 
 
The Yoder exemption. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972),173 the Court unanimously 
held that the state could not compel Amish and Mennonite parents to send their children 
to school through the age of 16, as doing so would violate their right to freely practice 
their religions. The Court reached this conclusion by determining that the Amish parents 
had a “sincere and longstanding religious belief,”174 then began to apply the Sherbert test. 
First, the Yoder court held that Wisconsin’s compulsory-education law “unduly 
burdened” the free exercise of religion of Amish and Mennonite families and threatened 
their way of life. Second, the Court held that the state’s interest in school attendance until 
the age of 16 was not compelling, given the vocational and peaceful nature of the 
religions and the families’ willingness to enroll their children in all but two of the 
required years. In validating this claim, the Court indirectly recognized the third part of 
the Sherbert test, implying that they had evidence of a least restrictive alternative. 
                                               
 
172 Eugene Volokh, “Some Background on Religious Exemption Law.” The Volokh Conspiracy, June 12, 
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173 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
174 For analysis of the conflicts that arise from legally defining religion, see Nathan C. Walker, “A Legal 
Approach to Questions about Religious Diversity” in Chad Meister, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Religious 






Having failed the compelling interest question, the U.S. Supreme Court justices did not 
need to, nor did they, explicitly explain whether the state narrowly tailored that particular 
law. The Court did, however, make explicit that the strict scrutiny standard prevails: 
“…only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can 
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”175 
This decision was significant because Yoder reaffirmed the application of the 
Sherbert test, which is why “the period from 1963 to 1990 is often labeled the 
Sherbert/Yoder era of Free Exercise Clause law.”176 
The Yoder affirmation of the Sherbert standard decisions solidified the use of the 
strict scrutiny test involving not simply religious beliefs, but religious actions—a 
distinction that is at the heart of all Free Exercise cases. Put simply, the government is 
permitted to regulate religiously motivated conduct if it can pass the Sherbert test, but it 
cannot in any circumstance regulate belief.177  
This contrast between beliefs and actions originated from the first Free Exercise 
case in U.S. history, Reynolds v. United States (1879).178 In upholding the Morril Anti-
Bigamy Act, which was signed into law by President Abraham Lincoln in 1862, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the criminal prosecution of polygamists in the federal territory of 
                                               
 
175 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). This was again affirmed in Thomas v. Review Board of 
Indiana, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (the state “may justify an inroad on religious liberty only by showing that it is 
the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest”). 
176 Eugene Volokh, “Some Background on Religious Exemption Law.” The Volokh Conspiracy, June 12, 
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Utah because, “Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot 
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”179 The 
Reynolds court drew upon the words of Thomas Jefferson: “The legislative powers of the 
government reach actions only, and not opinions.”180 Regulation of religious conduct, the 
Court held, can be constitutionally justified; however, the Sherbert and Yoder courts 
clarified that in regulating religious actions, the state must meet the strict scrutiny 
standard and demonstrate a compelling government interest and pursue this interest 
through the least restrictive means possible.  
Specific to this study, the wearing of religious garb in public classrooms by public 
employees is, therefore, a form of religiously motivated conduct that can be regulated, 
but only after passing the strictest of scrutiny—a test that no court in the 123-year saga of 
anti-religious-garb laws have ever applied. 
It is important to note that this case law makes explicit that religious 
accommodations are not automatic; the request for an exemption must go through the 
process of meeting strict scrutiny. We know this to be the case because, two decades after 
Sherbert, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Thornton v. Caldor (1985),181 found 
unconstitutional a Connecticut law that gave employees an “absolute right” not to work 
on their chosen Sabbath without taking into consideration the “convenience or interests of 
the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.”182 The Court 
rejected the idea that religiously motivated action is an “absolute right.” In some 
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instances, the state may be justified to regulate religion, which is why the Constitution 
restrains the government’s regulatory power by requiring the state to pass the strict 
scrutiny test as upheld in Sherbert. 
The Thornton court clarified that, just as laws cannot target religion for 
government restrictions, the state cannot single out one religion or all religions for special 
privileges. This means that religious exemptions are not automatic—they must meet the 
highest standard of judicial review. In helping to make meaning of the scope of religious 
exemption cases, Professor Douglas Laycock writes,  
[N]othing in these [accommodation] cases support any version of the 
claim that regulatory exemptions are facially, generally, or usually invalid. 
To the contrary, in two of the cases limiting the reach of exemptions, large 
majorities made a point of reaffirming the constitutionality of legislation 
exempting religious practices from burdensome regulation—eight justices 
in Texas Monthly v. Bullock183 and nine justices in . . . Kiryas.184 Every 
Justice said it again in Employment Division v. Smith,185 the case that 
limited free exercise claims to exemptions.186 
 
I now turn to the Smith decision to explain how the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990 
fundamentally altered the religious liberty jurisprudence in the United States, leading 
Congress and state legislatures to embed the Sherbert standard in religious freedom 
statutes that inform this study. 
The general applicability test in Smith. In a 6–3 decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith187 (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court used the legal standard of “neutral 
                                               
 
183 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
184 Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), which limited a school district’s ability to create 
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and general applicability” to affirm laws that prohibited illegal drug use, even though the 
laws were used to terminate the employment of Native American teachers who used 
peyote for sacramental purposes. In speaking for the majority in Smith, Justice Scalia 
made clear that the compelling government interest standard is “used in the context of, 
for example, racial discrimination and free speech.” Furthermore, “To make an 
individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his 
religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is ‘compelling,’ would permit him by 
virtue of his beliefs to become a law unto himself, contradicting both constitutional 
tradition and common sense.”188 
 Justice Scalia argued that by applying the Sherbert test, justices would need to 
determine the “centrality of religious beliefs,” which was not practical or appropriate 
given “society’s diversity of religious beliefs.”189 As a result, the Sherbert standard, as 
applied to neutral and generally applicable laws, was therefore (temporarily)190 replaced 
with the new Smith standard.191 Specific to this study, the Smith decision made explicit 
that the longstanding strict scrutiny standard used in Free Exercise cases was overturned, 
unless—as I emphasize throughout this study—the law in question explicitly targeted 
religion for government regulation.192 Justice Scalia wrote: 
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It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), 
that a State would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it 
sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for 
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display 
[emphasis added]. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to 
ban the casting of “statues that are to be used for worship purposes,” or to 
prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.193 
 
Laws that target state employees’ religious garb are not neutral or generally 
applicable, I argue in Chapter IV. An analogous scenario of general neutrality would be 
for a public school to enact a generic dress code for all teachers, such as mandating a 
particular uniform. As I illustrate in Chapter IV, the general neutrality test can be used to 
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the garb laws in two ways. First, the 1895 
legislatures of Pennsylvania and Nebraska did not enact a general neutral dress code 
statute; rather, the legislatures fixated on religious dress, marks, emblems, and insignia. 
These statutes, by design, were neither neutral to religion nor a universally applicable 
dress code applied to all public schoolteachers. To counter this effect, policymakers may 
develop an impartial standard of professional attire in public schools by requiring 
teachers to wear uniforms, as do workers in hospitals, stores, and restaurants.194 If no 
such attempt were made to enact neutral regulations, teachers who wear religious garb 
could argue that the Smith standard of generally applicable laws does not apply. If so, the 
accommodation standards in Sherbert would most likely be used in a Free Exercise case 
regarding public teachers’ religious garb. This argument is strengthened by the concerted 
efforts that federal and state legislative bodies have made to overturn Smith, which held 
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that there is no burden on the Free Exercise of religion if a law is “neutral” and 
“generally applicable.” 
It is important to note that after the introduction of the general applicability 
standard in Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court later clarified that federal statutes that are 
“neutral and generally applicable” must also meet strict scrutiny.195 As I explain in this 
next section, local actors followed suit and began to incorporate the Sherbert standard to 
state laws.196 
 
Related Federal Statutory Developments 
  Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In response to the Smith ruling, Congress 
overwhelmingly passed the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). In its 
declaration of purpose, it found that “laws neutral toward religion may burden religious 
exercise . . . and governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without 
compelling justification.”197 If that was not explicit enough, Congress continued:  
[I]n Employment Division v. Smith . . . the Supreme Court virtually 
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on 
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and the 
compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a 
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workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and 
competing prior governmental interests. 
 
Congress therefore concluded that the purpose of the RFRA was “to restore the 
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert and Yoder, and to guarantee its 
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and to 
provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened 
by government.”198 
 Four years later, the Supreme Court invalidated the reach of RFRA in City of 
Boerne v. Flores.199 The Court found Congress to have overstepped the separation of 
powers outlined in section five of the Fourteenth Amendment by applying federal 
regulations to state/local ordinances.  
 In 2000, Congress passed a less stringent version of the RFRA named the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),200 which forbids the 
government to impose a substantial burden on religious exercise unless the government 
demonstrates that the imposition furthers a compelling governmental interest through the 
least restrictive means possible. In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court applied RLUIPA’s 
strict scrutiny standard when granting a prisoner the right to grow a one-half inch long 
beard in accordance with his religious practices as a Salafi Muslim.201 This was the first 
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time in U.S. history that a Muslim won a free exercise of religion case before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  
 Similar to its integration of the strict scrutiny standard in RLUIPA, Congress also 
included, in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, that the federal government, not 
state government or all government, “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”202 Regulations of 
religious expression could be permitted if the burden is justified by the “furtherance of a 
compelling government interest” through a narrowly tailored policy that achieves the 
interest in the least restrictive means possible.  
 Although the federal RFRA no longer applies to state governments, state level 
statutes resembling RFRA have continued to flourish—to date, twenty states have 
enacted RFRAs, although 31 states have some form of strict scrutiny provision in either 
authoritative case law or state constitutional clauses.203 For instance, in 2002, the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the Religious Freedom Protection Act, formally 
titled, “An Act protecting the free exercise of religion; and prescribing the conditions 
under which government may substantially burden a person's free exercise of religion.”204 
Similar to language used in the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, this 
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Pennsylvania statute represents the twenty states that have successfully reinstated the 
Sherbert standard. 
 By 2006, the Supreme Court issued two unanimous decisions in Cutter205 and 
Gonzales,206 which affirmed the constitutionality of the RLUIPA and RFRA, 
respectively. In reflecting upon the decision to uphold the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “We had ‘no cause to believe’ 
that the compelling interest test ‘would not be applied in an appropriately balanced way’ 
to specific claims for exemptions as they arose.”207 He went on to acknowledge 
Congress’s intent to apply the compelling interest test to ensure that the courts will strike 
a “sensible balance between religious liberty and competing prior governmental 
interests.”208 He went so far as to connect religious diversity to racial diversity, saying, 
“The Court has noted that ‘[c]ontext matters’ in applying the compelling interest test, 
Grutter v. Bollinger,209 and has emphasized that the fundamental purpose of strict 
scrutiny is to take ‘relevant differences’ into account.”210 
The most recent affirmation of the federal RFRA came before the court in 2014 in 
the controversial split decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.211 Historically, religious 
liberty protections were granted to religious organizations, religious individuals, and even 
conscientious objectors who did not affiliate with a religion. In Hobby Lobby, the Court 
expanded the legal definition of “religion” to include a new type of “person”: closely- 
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held, for-profit corporations. Owners of Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood 
Specialties objected to the federal requirement that employment-based health care plans 
must cover FDA-approved contraceptive services. The owners argued that the 
contraception mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act violated their 
religious liberty because, as owners who had built their business on Biblical principles, 
they objected to subsidizing particular forms of contraception that they found immoral. 
Previously, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that Conestoga Wood Specialties 
were not legally protected “persons” under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993; whereas, the Tenth Circuit held that Hobby Lobby Stores was protected under 
RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In agreeing with the Tenth 
Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the purpose of extending rights to corporations 
is to protect the rights of people associated with the corporation, including shareholders, 
officers, and employees.” In writing for the 5–4 majority, Justice Alito stated, “Protecting 
the free-exercise rights of closely held corporations thus protects the religious liberty of 
the humans who own and control them.” He rejected the idea that the plaintiffs were 
disqualified from religious liberty protections simply because they earned money from 
their business. Justice Alito argued: “Any suggestion that for-profit corporations are 
incapable of exercising religion because their purpose is simply to make money flies in 
the face of modern corporate law.” He explained that for-profit corporations “exercise 
religion” just as much as non-profit organizations. As a result of this landmark decision, 
the legal definition of exercising religion was, for the first time in U.S. history, expanded 






It is worth noting that Hobby Lobby, which was filed under the federal RFRA, 
does not have direct relevance to the question of the constitutionality of state anti-
religious-garb laws. Hobby Lobby is a case about a federal statute’s relationship to a 
federal executive regulation that sought to mandate that owners of closely held 
corporations provide health insurance that includes contraceptive services. The federal 
RFRA does not apply to state laws, as ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in City of 
Boerne.212 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Another recent case worth noting, 
which also does not have substantive authority over state bans on religious garb, is EEOC 
v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.213 (which came before the U.S. Supreme Court in 
2015). In seeking to uphold the clothing store’s “look policy” that required a “preppy 
look of the Ivy League,” a district manager directed an interviewer to lower a job 
applicant’s rating on the “appearance and sense of style” category because she wore a 
hijab (a Muslim headscarf) to the interview. As a result, the applicant was not offered 
employment. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed her case under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits religion-based discrimination in 
employment, in both the public and private business.214 The U.S. Supreme Court did not 
rule on the merits of the case—whether Abercrombie & Fitch Stores was motivated by 
discriminatory intent (disparate treatment) or that the denial of the applicant’s 
employment had a disproportionate adverse effect (disparate impact). Rather, the Court 
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ruled that the burden was on the employer to notify the applicant of their dress policy and 
ask if they need an accommodation. 
As a result, this became a “notice” case rather than one about religious-based 
discrimination in employment. It, therefore, had little impact on the age-old question of 
exemptions for employees who wear religious garb. For instance, the Abercrombie case 
had no impact on the one Title VII case related to this research project—the case of Mrs. 
Reardon, whose employment was terminated after working 12 years in Philadelphia’s 
public schools because, after converting to Islam, she started wearing a hijab while 
teaching.215 As previously mentioned, Reardon’s August 1990 case before the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals was an indirect casualty of Smith, which was issued four months 
earlier in April 1990. In other words, the Smith decision, which determined Native 
American’s use of peyote to be a crime, set the stage for the Third Circuit to rule in a 
Title VII case that a Philadelphia school district was justified in terminating the 
employment of a teacher who wore a Muslim headscarf and loose dress while teaching.  
Increased Reliance on State Religion Clauses 
In the two decades since the U.S. Supreme Court issued Smith in 1990, lower 
courts trying to reconcile these distinctions have attempted to interpret the legal standards 
surrounding this constitutional controversy. According to Christine M. Durham, Chief 
Justice of the Utah Supreme Court:  
                                               
 









Almost immediately after Smith, several state courts began to discard their 
history of reliance on federal precedent and turn to the language of their 
state constitutions in religious liberty cases. [As of 2004] at least ten state 
supreme court cases have used a heightened scrutiny standard in their state 
constitutional analysis, either reaffirming that the Sherbert standard 
reflects the proper standard under their own religion clauses, or applying 
those religion clauses without considering federal precedent at all.216  
 
Durham clarified that issues of religious liberty could be resolved solely on state 
constitutional grounds, which is interesting, given the long history of anti-religious-garb 
cases in state courts. State courts would have to maintain a minimum standard as 
guaranteed by the federal constitutions, but the states could, and currently do, understand 
their own constitutions as able to grant additional religious freedoms.217 Said another 
way, the religion clauses of state constitutions have been used to expand religious 
liberties; as compared to being used to challenge or limit the authority of the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
State religious freedom statutes brought similar expansions, as illustrated in the 
Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act. 
Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act 
The Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002 (RFPA) prohibits a 
state agency, such as a public school, from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s free 
exercise of religion, including any burden which results from a rule of general 
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applicability.” The Pennsylvania RFPA allows the following exceptions: “An agency 
may substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion if the agency proves, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the burden… [furthers] a compelling interest of the 
agency [and uses] the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling interest.”  
 When challenging laws and government actions that are facially neutral toward 
religion, as well as laws and governmental actions intended to interfere with religious 
exercise, a person must demonstrate that his or her practice or observance of religion—as 
defined under Section 3 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania—is substantially 
burdened as measured in Pennsylvania’s unique four-part test.   
Pennsylvania’s Four-Part Substantial Burden Test 
The four-part “substantial burden” test is used to assess:  
an agency action which does any of the following: (1) Significantly 
constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by a person’s 
sincerely held religious beliefs; (2) Significantly curtails a person’s ability 
to express adherence to the person’s religious faith; (3) Denies a person a 
reasonable opportunity to engage in activities which are fundamental to 
the person’s religion; (4) Compels conduct or expression which violates a 
specific tenet of a person’s religious faith. 
 
Pennsylvania’s RFPA not only restrains the state in these particular ways but also 
requires plaintiffs to demonstrate “with clear and convincing evidence” that their 
religious beliefs are “sincere” and that their actions are either “fundamental” to their 
religious beliefs or mandated by a “specific tenet” of their religion. 
It is important to stress that, to date, there have been no judicial interpretations of 
the RFPA statute. In 2006, for instance, a federal district court ruled that, “the RFPA of 






or federal, and its applicability and effect are this case is a matter of first impression.218 In 
reviewing the appeal of this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled in 
2008 that homeschooling parents failed to demonstrate under both the federal Smith and 
Sherbert standards how their belief that “education is religion” prevents Pennsylvania 
from issuing reporting requirements for parents who homeschool their children.219 The 
Third Circuit also held that the parents’ claim under the state RFPA required an 
“interpretation of a state statute on which there is no Pennsylvania precedent.”220 The 
Court stated that because the parent’s “RFPA claim raises a novel and potentially 
complex issue of State law, we will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
Parents’ pendant state law claim.”221 The Third Circuit court cited an earlier case in 
which they found that “where the underlying issue of state law is a question of first 
impression [emphasis added] with important implications for public education in 
Pennsylvania, factors weighing in favor of state court adjudication certainly 
predominate.”222 As a result, there has not yet been a court, federal or state, that has 
interpreted Pennsylvania’s RFPA. 
Without judicial interpretations to use in my analysis of the RPFA’s four-part 
substantial burden test, I will do what the court instructs and “consider the plain meaning 
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of the statute” and “absent ambiguity, [use] the plain meaning of the statute controls.”223 
Said another way, I will employ in my study a “plain meaning” legal method to interpret 
the four-part substantial burden test in RFPA.224 (See Chapter III – Methodology for my 
discussion of the “plain meaning rule.”225) 
Relationship Between RFPA and Pennsylvania Constitution 
Pennsylvania’s RFPA begins with a “Definitions” section that narrowly defines 
religious exercise as the “practice or observance of religion under section 3 of Article I of 
the Constitution of Pennsylvania.”226 As a result, state courts are required to use state 
court interpretations of the Pennsylvania Constitution to define religious exercise—
distinct from relying on the federal constitution. 
I understand there to be three reasons for this stipulation. First, as noted earlier, 
the state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) were designed to reinstate the 
strict scrutiny standard in state laws. This occurred at a time when an increased number 
of state courts relied more on their own state constitutions to expand religious liberty 
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protections. Put simply, state constitutions, as Justice Brennan explains, “flourish in the 
space above” the “federal floor of protection” guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.227 
Second, the unique religious freedom principles in Pennsylvania’s Constitution 
predate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.228 It was enacted on September 28, 
1776, fifteen years before the states ratified the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution.  
Justice Flaherty of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania emphasizes this point: 
“Pennsylvania, more than any other sovereignty in history, traces its origins directly to 
the principle that the fundamental right of conscience is inviolate.”229 He is referring to 
the fact that the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was inspired by the words and deeds 
of William Penn230 and co-authored by Benjamin Franklin.231 Both Penn and Franklin 
                                               
 
227 William J. Brennan, The Bill of rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of 
Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550 (1986). See also Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional 
Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275 (1993), 
which documents how state constitutions are “understood and invoked only in relation to the federal text 
and merely supplements the federal ‘floor’ of rights” (at 290). 
228 The Pennsylvania Constitution was enacted on Sept. 28, 1776; fifteen years later, on Dec. 15, 1791, the 
states ratified the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  
229 Justice Flaherty of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania clarified in Commonwealth v. Eubanks, 511 Pa. 
201, 206 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1986) cites “The Papers of William Penn, Vol. I (Dunn & Dunn, University of 
Pennsylvania Press), pp. 51-52, 90-93, 268, 280, 452, 511.” 
230 William Penn and William Mead (1670) “The Trial of William Penn and William Mead, at the Old 
Bailey, for a Tumultuous Assembly: 22 Charles II. A.D. 1670” from Howells’ State Trials, Vol. 6; Penn, 
William (1670) “The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience debated and defended by the Authority of 
Reason, Scripture, and Antiquity,” in The Select Works of William Penn in Five Volumes. Volume III. 
Third Edition. London: James Phillips; Sanford H. Cobb (1902) The Rise of Religious Liberty in America: 
A History, Chapter VII. The Free Colonies, §2 Pennsylvania (pp. 440-453); Edwin S. Gaustad and Mark A. 
Noll (2003) A Documentary History of Religion in America to 1877. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 3rd 
edition, pp. 80-82. 
231 Robert F. Williams, “The Influences of Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution on American 
Constitutionalism During the Founding Decade,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History & Biography, 
Vol. CXII, No. 1 (Jan. 1988): 25-48; Rosalind A. Branning, Pennsylvania Constitutional Development 
(Pittsburgh, 1960), 14; David Hawke, In the Midst of a Revolution (Philadelphia, 1961): 191-92; Gary S. 
Gildin, “Coda to William Penn's Overture: Safeguarding Non-Mainstream Religious Liberty Under the 







intellectually influenced emerging constitutional framers, such as James Madison, a 
contributing author to the U.S. Constitution (1786) and primary author of the federal Bill 
of Rights (1791). 
This history helps explain why the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 included a 
unique set of religious freedom protections, which were at the time and remain today 
unlike any other state or federal law. I understand this uniqueness factor to be the third 
reason that Pennsylvania’s RFPA of 2002 grounds its authority in the state’s longstanding 
commitment to religious liberty. 
The Pennsylvania Constitution begins with a proclamation: “We, the people of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, grateful to Almighty God for the blessings of civil and 
religious liberty, and humbly invoking His guidance, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution.” The constitution opens with Article I, Declaration of Rights, which 
dedicates Section 3 to “Religious Freedom.” The italicized and numbered text correspond 
to the causes of action that are previously mentioned in Table 1.  
That the general, great and essential principles of liberty and free 
government may be recognized and unalterably established, we declare 
that … all men have a natural and indefeasible (1) right to worship 
Almighty God according to the (2) dictates of their own consciences; no 
man can of right be (3) compelled to attend, erect or support any place of 
worship or to (4) maintain any ministry against his consent; no human 
authority can, in any case whatever, (5) control or interfere with the (2) 
rights of conscience, and (6) no preference shall ever be given by law to 
any religious establishments or modes of worship.232 
 
In essence, the Religious Freedom section of the Pennsylvania Constitution 
articulates principles that both protect the people and restrain the state. People have the 
                                               
 






Right to Worship because one’s practice of religion is an innate, unwavering right. They 
also have the Right of Conscience, as emphasized twice in Article I, § 3: first, a person 
has the right to worship according to the dictates of his or her own conscience and, 
second, that no human authority, no government, can restrain or impede a person’s right 
of conscience. 
The Pennsylvania Constitution articulates three religious freedom principles that 
restrain the state. The No Preference Principle prohibits the state from privileging one 
religious establishment or “mode of worship” over another. The No Compulsion principle 
prohibits the state from compelling a person to attend or erect any place of worship. And 
the No Maintenance or the No Aid to Religion principle prohibits the state from 
compelling a person to “maintain” or finance any place of worship or ministry.233   
I rely on two cases that came before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to 
understand the Religion Clauses of the Pennsylvania Constitution in relationship to the 
question of whether the state can prevent a public schoolteacher from wearing religious 
garb while teaching. In Chapter II – Literature Review, I analyze the 1894 case Hyson v. 
Gallitzin,234 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the no preference (section 
3) and the no religious test for office (section 4) clauses of the Pennsylvania Constitution 
to permit Catholic nuns to continue to wear habits while teaching at a public school. In 
reaction to this case, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted its anti-religious-garb 
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law in 1895. An entirely new set of justices joined the state’s supreme court and 
overturned Hyson in Commonwealth v. Herr (1910),235 where they denied a Mennonite 
teacher the right to wear a bonnet while teaching in a public school. In Chapter IV – 
Presentations of Findings and Analysis, I examine the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the state constitution in relationship to the state’s anti-religious-garb law 
as ruled in the conflicting Hyson and Herr cases. 
Although I am able to analyze the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 1894 and 1910 
interpretations of the state constitution in relationship to the state’s anti-religious-garb 
laws, I am not able to rely on contemporary decisions because no court has yet 
interpreted the relationship between the Religion Clauses of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, which predate the U.S. Bill of Rights,236 and the Pennsylvania Religious 
Freedom Protection Act of 2002 (RFPA). Therefore, without a legal framework by which 
to interpret this relationship,237 I will continue to use a “plain meaning” legal method238 
to interpret the “Definitions” section of RFPA that legally defines religious exercise as 
the “practice or observance of religion under section 3 of Article I of the Constitution of 
Pennsylvania.”239 In plain wording, I understand this to mean that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution affirms a person’s right to worship and conscience while also restraining 
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state agencies from interfering with these rights or privileging any particular religious 
group or any forms of worship. I further analyze the RFPA’s relationship to these clauses 
in Pennsylvania’s Constitution in Chapter II – Literature Review. 
To simplify, I will now summarize the components of my secondary research 
question in which I use one state law to examine another: the Pennsylvania Religious 
Freedom Protection Act of 2002 versus Pennsylvania’s 1895 anti-religious-garb statute. 
 As noted earlier, Pennsylvania’s RFPA requires that I apply the general 
applicability and strict scrutiny standards, similar to federal law; however, the 
Pennsylvania RFPA is unique in that it includes a four-part substantial burden test to 
examine state laws. This test prohibits a state agency from constraining conduct based on 
belief or religious tenets or curtailing a person’s expression of their religious identity, or 
denying someone reasonable opportunities to engage in religious activities. In 
demonstrating at least one of these burdens, a plaintiff must also show that either their 
beliefs are sincerely held, or that said religious activities are fundamental to their religion, 
or that the state’s regulation compels their conduct in such a way that it violates the tenets 
of their religion. 
RFPA also requires that I use the Religion Clauses in section 3 of Article I of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution to interpret the meaning of RFPA’s reference of any “practice 
or observance of religion.”240 Given the absence of judicial review of the relationship 
between Pennsylvania’s RFPA and its state constitution, I use a plain meaning legal 
method to interpret the state constitution’s Religion Clauses to protect a person’s right to 
                                               
 






worship and right of conscience. These clauses also prohibit state agencies from 
interfering with a person’s rights of conscience and require that the state not prefer any 
religions or forms of worship. 
According to the RFPA, these stipulations impacting both the state and plaintiffs 
are uniquely tied to the religious liberty principles outlined in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. 
Relevant RFPA Cases 
In returning to the discussion of the Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002, to 
date, there have been only three RFPA lawsuits relevant to the study of Pennsylvania’s 
anti-religious-garb law. In “the first case in Pennsylvania which alleges a violation of the 
RFPA,”241 the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia ruled in 2005 that a fire department 
substantially burdened a firefighter’s free exercise of religion when “suspending his job 
without pay for refusing to shave his beard.”242 Although the case law on auxiliary 
personnel is distinct from that of public schoolteachers, this case is helpful in that the 
court applied a “plain meaning” method to interpret RFPA because they lacked “guidance 
from prior precedents.” I will do the same in my analysis. 
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for Western Pennsylvania and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit acknowledged that not one state or federal court in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had interpreted RFPA, leading them to also use a plain 
                                               
 
241 DeVeaux v. City of Philadelphia, Docket #2005-3103, Control #021818 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. 2005), at 4. 









meaning rule clarifying that the statute before them “is a matter of first impression.”243 
This was stated in a case brought forward by parents who homeschool their children. 
Both courts ruled denied the parents claim that education is religion;244 therefore, the 
state could not regulate homeschools. The merits of this case have no direct relation to 
the question of regulating public schoolteachers’ religious garb; however, the courts’ 
articulation of the “historical and legislative background” of the RPFA245 and the courts’ 
application of the plain meaning rule have informed the methodology of this study. 
The only other relevant RFPA lawsuit worth mentioning is Webb v. City of 
Philadelphia.246 In this case, Officer Webb was fired for wearing a tight Muslim neck 
scarf while serving as a Philadelphia police officer.247 She failed to prevail under the 
employment/religious discrimination protections under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. As ruled by the U.S. District Court and affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, Officer Webb also “failed to meet the statutory notice requirements for 
the RFPA claim.”248 The court came to this decision by using a plain-reading 
methodology of the notice requirement.  
                                               
 
243 Combs v. Dubois, 540 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir. 2008); Combs v. Dubois, 468 F.Supp.2d 738 (W.D. Pa. 2006). 
244 “On appeal,” the parents claimed that state oversight of homeschooling programs “violated a ‘specific 
tenet’ of their religion that ‘education of their children, no merely religious education, is religion and is 
assigned by God to the jurisdiction of the family” (n273). 
245 Combs v. Dubois, 468 F.Supp.2d 738 (W.D. Pa. 2006). 
246 Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256 (3rd Cir. 2009); Web v. City of Philadelphia, U.S. Dist., No. 
05-5238 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
247 As of December 31, 2017, at least eight major police departments permit Muslims to wear a neck 
covering while on duty: Atlanta, Baltimore, Charlotte, Los Angeles, Memphis, New York, San Francisco, 
and Washington, DC.  









The RFPA requires that a person issue “written notice to the agency” at least 30 
days prior to bringing the action. The notice needs to explain that person’s “free exercise 
of religion has been or is about to be substantially burdened by an exercise of the 
agency’s governmental authority.” It must provide “a description of the act or refusal to 
act which has burdened or will burden the person’s free exercise of religion, and it must 
“describe the manner in which the exercise of the governmental authority burdens the 
person’s free exercise of religion.”249 
These three cases provide me with a methodological strategy by which to apply 
the “plain meaning” rule to analyze whether Pennsylvania’s 1894 anti-religious-garb law 
violates Pennsylvania’s 2002 RFPA. I will simply take at face value the language of the 
general neutrality and strict scrutiny standards as well as RFPA’s unique four-part 
substantial burden test.  
I also respect how this language rests upon a 242-year-old state constitution that 
rose from unique religious liberty contributions made by William Penn and Benjamin 
Franklin. In this study, however, I will not conduct a robust analysis of the state 
jurisprudence on the six religious liberty principles in the Pennsylvania Constitution; 
rather, I will narrowly use the Religious Freedom section of Article I of Pennsylvania’s 
Constitution to define “the practice or observance of religion,” as directed by the RFPA.  
                                               
 
249 The state excepts a person from this notice requirement if “the exercise of governmental authority which 
threatens to substantially burden the person’s free exercise of religion is imminent; the person was not 
informed and did not otherwise have knowledge of the exercise of the governmental authority in time to 
reasonably provide notice; the provision of the notice would delay an action to the extent that the action 
would be dismissed as untimely; or the claim or defense is asserted as a counterclaim in a pending 
proceeding.” P.L. 1701, No. 214, § 2405 b, c. In addition to the Webb case, teaching assistant Brenda 







In closing, I have come to see that Pennsylvania’s constitutional and statutory 
laws regarding religion are unique in several ways. First, the state constitution includes 
six distinct principles that protect the rights of the people while restraining the state. 
Second, the state’s Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002 affirms the general 
neutrality and strict scrutiny standards used in federal law, while issuing a four-part 
“substantial burden” test, which not only places restraints on state actions that may 
encumber religion but also places stipulations on how precisely a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that his or her religion is substantially burdened. Third, the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly enacted a law in 1895 that terminates the employment of any public 
schoolteacher for wearing “any dress, mark, emblem or insignia indicating the fact that 
such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order, sect or denomination.”250 
This law has criminal implications because the anti-religious-garb statute threatens 
criminal penalties for administrators who do not comply with the law.251 This particular 
anti-religious-garb law not only survived three court cases—one before the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in 1910 and two before federal courts in 1990 and 2003—but it was also 
replicated in twenty-two additional states, either through regulatory action, legislative 
statutes, or, in one case, a public referendum. 
                                               
 
250 Pa. Stat. 24, § 11-1112. 
251 “Any public school director who after notice of any such violation fails to comply with the provisions of 
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction of the first offense, shall be sentenced to 
pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100), and on conviction of a second offense, the offending 
school director shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars and shall be deprived of 






As a result, anti-religious-garb laws were challenged before eleven different 
courts, nine of which were state Supreme Courts. Collectively, these plaintiffs claimed 
thirty-two different causes of action. In only one case before the Mississippi Supreme 
Court did a plaintiff claim her Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution were violated. Although this teacher prevailed, three months later, the 
U.S. Supreme Court issued the landmark Smith decision, which fundamentally altered the 
federal religious liberty jurisprudence in the United States, leading Congress and state 
legislatures to enact the religious freedom statutes that inform this study. 
In particular, Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002 (RFPA) 
integrated the general applicability and strict scrutiny standards with state law and 
created a unique four-prong “substantial burden” test. I will use these as the basis for my 
analysis of whether Pennsylvania’s 1894 anti-religious-garb law is valid under state law. 
Synopsis 
I began this literature review with a survey of the legal scholarship on teachers’ 
religious garb, demonstrating that this is an important, unresolved legal matter. I drew 
upon commentaries found in both legal journals, casebooks, and official statements made 
by state agencies and elected officials. I also drew upon the literature in the fields of 
education, religion, and civil liberties, to further demonstrate that this is an important 
topic discussed by the education, religious and legal community. I then close with a 
summary of the news coverage about anti-religious-garb laws and cases, which illustrates 
how the interest of the general public. These bodies of literature helped prepared me to 






I proceeded to analyze the historical decisions issued by state courts regarding the 
perennial legal conflict of bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb, beginning in 
1894. I demonstrated that twenty-two states had some form of anti-religious garb 
regulation at some point in the last 123-years, through either state legislative actions or 
administrative directives. In all but one of the historical cases (1894 to 1956), Catholic 
nuns lost their jobs for wearing habits while teaching in public schools. The one 
exception was a Mennonite teacher who wore a bonnet. 
Of the four contemporary garb cases (1986 to 2002), two cases were brought 
forward by a Muslim and a Sikh teacher. They were denied remedies by the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court, respectively. An African Hebrew 
Israelite teacher won her case before the Mississippi Supreme Court; however, three 
months later, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the controversial Smith decision, which 
overturned this case and uprooted nearly thirty years of consensus about Free Exercise 
jurisprudence. Smith negatively, albeit indirectly, effected the outcome of all three of 
these contemporary garb cases. The only recent case that has a longstanding positive 
result was in a federal district court that held that a teacher’s aide did not meet a statutory 
definition of “teacher,” thus permitting the plaintiff to continue to wear her cross 
necklace in the public classroom. This decision reinforced the historic trend that the law 
privileged Protestant Christians. 
After reviewing this case law, I surveyed the evolution of various judicial tests 
under distinct causes of action: The Free Exercise clause in the U.S. Constitution; federal 
statutes, such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights 






began this review of judicial tests by showing the tortuous history of the Free Exercise 
standards, which, today means that the strict scrutiny standard must be applied when 
examining challenges to “neutral laws of general applicability.” This, however, only 
applies to federal laws, unless (1) a state law singles out religion for regulation, making 
the strict scrutiny standard still relevant; or (2) a state legislature or a state court has 
determined that strict scrutiny is applicable in that jurisdiction. To date, thirty-one states 
have some form of strict scrutiny standard, but not Nebraska, one of two states, along 
with Pennsylvania, that still have anti-religious-garb laws. For this reason, I find it 
necessary to do in this research project what no federal court has definitively determined 
in the last 123 years, and that is to test the constitutionality of state anti-religious-garb 
laws under the Free Exercise Clause. 
I then examined the provisions in the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection 
Act of 2002 (RFPA), which a state agency from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s 
free exercise of religion, including any burden which results from a rule of general 
applicability.” The state permits some level of burden on the condition that the agency 
meet the strict scrutiny standard by demonstrating a compelling government interest and 
“uses the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling interest.” I then survey how 
in order for plaintiffs to prevail they must demonstrate that that their practice or 
observance of religion—as defined under Section 3 of Article I of the Constitution of 
Pennsylvania—is substantially burdened as measured in Pennsylvania’s four-part test. 
This test to determine whether a person’s burden is substantial is a unique contribution to 
the study of religious liberty, especially in an era evolving legal standards and tectonic 






In the next chapter, I explain the systematic methods by which I use to test 
whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and Pennsylvania’s Religious 
Freedom Protection Act have the legal authority to end the perennial conflict of statutory 






III – METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In the following discussion of my research methodology, I use the literature on 
how to conduct legal research and engage in legal analysis to take five steps in designing 
my study. First, I synthesized judicial tests by cause of action. Second, I collected 
primary and secondary source documents, and then, third, I articulated legal research 
questions. Fourth, I set the parameters of the facts for my study. Finally, I conduct this 
legal analysis. I gained exposure to these methods by participating in legal training 
seminars and studying literature on legal research and the academic study of law.  
Training and Textbooks 
In preparation to develop and execute this research proposal, I received training in 
the academic study of law from attorneys on faculty at Teachers College Columbia 
University, with teaching and mentorship from my dissertation sponsors, Professors Jay 
Heubert, Esq. and Janice Robinson, Esq. and from Professor Kent Greenawalt at 
Columbia Law School.1 This specialized legal education prepared me to design and 
conduct this study. 
                                               
 
1 Dissertation advisement sessions with Professors Jay P. Heubert, Esq. and Janice S. Robinson, Esq. from 
2012–2018; literature review advisement session with Professor Kent Greenawalt 2013; “Research and 
Independent Study classes with Professor Jay P. Heubert, Esq. in the Spring 2011 and Autumn 2011 terms; 
“Education Equality: Role of Law” with Professor Jay P. Heubert in the Spring 2011 semester; “Topics in 









In addition, I also participated in a series of education sessions to learn how to 
conduct research on United States law with librarians and instructors at the Harvard Law 
School Library in Cambridge, Massachusetts;2 the Biddle Law Library at the University 
of Pennsylvania;3 and the Jenkins Law Library in Philadelphia4 along with online 
webcasts with faculty at LexisNexis.com.5 
Although international law is outside the scope of my proposal, I also learned how 
to find human-rights and religious-garb cases originating from other countries so that I 
could conduct a global literature review of legal restrictions on religious expression. This 
was made possible because of research sessions I had had with librarians at the Library of 
the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland,6 and the Arthur W. Diamond Law 
Library at Columbia Law School in New York City.7 
                                               
 
2 Lexis/ Westlaw 1L Intro to Research with instructor Kimberley Kenneally, Harvard Law School Library 
seminar, Sept. 11, 2012; One-on-one sessions with Meg Kribble, Research Librarian & Outreach 
Coordinator at the Harvard Law School Library. 
3 Correspondence and one-on-one conversations with Edwin J. Greenlee (PhD, JD), Associate Director for 
Public Services and Adjunct Professor of Law at the Biddle Law Library at the University of Pennsylvania, 
who also teaches Legal Research and Writing at UPenn and Drexel law schools.   
4 Effective Brief Writing, an approved Continuing Legal Education (CLE) course with instructor Theodore 
C. Forrence, Jenkins Law Library, Feb. 20, 2013; The ABC’s of Education Law, an approved CLE course 
with Sarah B. Dragotta, Jenkins Law Library, Mar. 6, 2013. Additional one-on-one sessions with Jenkins 
Law librarians included discussions about Jenkins Law Library publications: Research Services 
Pennsylvania Legal Research–Getting Started (2013); M. Sweeney Michelle Buhalo, Pennsylvania 
Legislative History–A How To Guide (2013); Michelle Buhalo, Pennsylvania Constitution (2013). 
5 On-Demand Learning tutorials and videos about using Lexis Advance. 
6 One-on-one sessions with librarians at the Library of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Switzerland, 
Mar. 10-14, 2014. 
7 One-on-one discussions with librarians at Columbia Law School regarding the following research guides: 
(1) Human Rights (European Human Rights System and the European Court of Human Rights by Dana 
Neacşu, Human Rights Research by Silke Sahl, Human Rights Research Guide by Ashihan Bulut, updated 
by Alice Izumo; (2) Organizations (European Union Legal Matters by Jennifer Wertikin, United Nations 
by Silke Sahl, and The International Court of Justice by Dana Neacşu); and (3) Foreign Law (Guides to 
Foreign Legal Research by Silke Sahl, Finding Foreign Legal Research on the Internet by Silke Sahl, and 









Together, these sessions exposed me to two distinct bodies of literature: first, the 
textbooks and journal articles about best practices for directing legal research projects 
and, second, publications about legal writing and analysis. For instance, in the first area, 
legal research, I discovered a broad consensus in law textbooks8 about what steps 
researchers can take to study the law (i.e., collecting statutes and cases, briefing cases, 
identifying appropriate sources of law). These textbooks came with a variety of 
recommendations about which tools to use (i.e., public and private law indices, online 
search tools) for which there was no consensus.9 
In the second body of literature, legal writing and analysis, Professors David 
Romantz and Kathleen Elliott Vinson suggest that researchers and lawyers begin by using 
methods of legal analysis to apply judicial tests to narrow legal questions.10 A subset of 
this literature focuses on scholarly writing related to the academic study of law.11 For 
                                               
 
8 Christina L. Kunz, Deborah A. Schmedemann, C. Peter Erlinder, Matthew P. Downs, Ann L. Bateson, 
The Process of Legal Research: Successful Strategies. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1989); 
Suzanne E. Rowe, Legal Research, Legal Writing, and Legal Analysis: Putting Law School into Practice, 
29 STETSON L. REV. 1193, pp. 2-12 (2000); Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing: Process, Analysis, and 
Organization, 4th ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2006), pp. 106–118; David S. Romantz and Kathleen 
Elliot Vinson, Legal Analysis: The Fundamental skill, 2nd ed. (North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 
2009), pp. 30–31; Michael D. Murray and Christy H. DeSanctis, Legal Research Methods: Legal Research 
and Writing. (New York, NY: Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press, 2009); Emily Finch and Stefan Fafinski, 
Legal Skills, Third Edition. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), chapters 1-7; and Amy E. 
Sloan, Basic Legal Research: Tools and Strategies. (Frederick, MD: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 
2012). 
9 For instance, Sloan urges students to evaluate search options (pp. 33-42) and to “research with citators” 
(pp. 143-172); Rowe distinguishes legal research in print and online; Finch and Fafinski distinguish 
“official” from “unofficial” publications; Kunz, et. al. emphasizes the using problem sets to teach legal 
research with educational scenarios about best and worst practices when using glossaries, legal periodicals, 
A.L.R. Annotations, case digests, Shepard’s Citations, statutes and constitutions, and so on (pp. 331-416). 
10 David S. Romantz and Kathleen Elliot Vinson, Legal Analysis: The Fundamental Skill, 2nd ed. (North 
Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2009), pp. 30–31. 
11 See Chapter 11 “Developing a Research Plan” in Amy E. Sloan, Basic Legal Research: Tools and 
Strategies. (Frederick, MD: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012); Chapter 1, section C “The Process of 









instance, Professor Eugene Volokh recommends that lawyers and non-lawyers who 
conduct academic legal research begin by choosing “(1) a claim that is (2) novel, (3) non-
obvious, (4) useful, (5) sound, and (6) seen by the reader to be novel, nonobvious, useful, 
and sound.”12 Volokh encourages academic legal researchers to first “get the big picture,” 
such as learning the structure of Free Exercise law, for instance; and then, second, to “get 
the details,” by reading treatise chapters on your narrow topic paying close attention to 
footnotes and statutory provisions; and then, third, to “find other works on the topic,” by 
conducting an extensive literature review using, for example, the Index to Legal 
Periodicals and the Legal Resource Index.13 
Together, these trainings sessions and textbooks equipped me to develop a five-
step methodological approach to design this legal research plan. I integrated the advice 
from my dissertation committee and drew on the literature on how to direct legal research 
projects to justify taking the following five steps. These steps serve as the scaffolding for 
the methodology I used in this research project. 
                                               
 
Law Review Notes, and Law Review Competition Papers. (New York, NY: Thomson West, 2000), pp. 11–
12; Katie R. Guest Pryal, Short Guide to Writing About Law. (Harlow, United Kingdom: Longman/Pearson 
Education, 2010); Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing law dissertations: An introduction and guide to 
the conduct of legal research. (Harlow, England: Pearson/Longman, 2007). Although Salter & Mason 
focus on research in the United Kingdom, the following sections are interesting in the context of research 
done on U.S. Law: “What is Research?” (pp. 5–6) and “What is a [Legal] ‘Dissertation’” and, most 
importantly, “Black-Letter Approaches to Doctoral Research” (pp. 44–99). 
12 Eugene Volokh, Academic legal writing: law review articles, student notes, seminar papers, and getting 
on law review. (New York, NY: Foundation Press, 2010). Volokh attributes this formulation to Carter, S. L. 
(1991) Academic Tenure and “White Male” Standards: Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 
2065, 2083. 







Step 1: Synthesize Judicial Tests by Cause of Action 
 Through my legal coursework, I was exposed to religious liberty claims brought 
forward under a variety of laws from the religious clauses in the federal and state 
constitutions and religious freedom protections in federal and state statutes. In doing so, I 
took the first step and created a rubric of the various tests that individual courts, at the 
federal and state levels, used to justify their decisions based on distinct causes of action. 
A cause of action is a law that a plaintiff can use to bring suit against another/others, also 
known as a statement of claim or complaint. It is a legal term referring to “the ground on 
which an action may be sustained” or a “right to bring a suit.”14 
Given that religious freedom is a fundamental constitutional right in the First 
Amendment15 these were the first causes of action for which I synthesized judicial tests. I 
then proceeded to use this step to examine the legitimacy of whether I could use in my 
research alternate causes of action, such as religion clauses in state constitutions, federal 
and state religious freedom restoration statutes, federal and state nondiscrimination-in-
employment laws. 
When studying new laws that do not have a case history in which judges interpret 
a statute, like in the case of the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2002, 
                                               
 
14 “What is Cause of Action?’ Black’s Law Dictionary, Online Legal Dictionary 2nd ed. Accessed at 
www.thelawdictionary.org/cause-of-action. 
15 “Congress shall not make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit the free exercise 









I use the Plain Meaning Rule16 to examine statute’s text: when examining a statute that 
has not yet been interpreted, I use “the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute” 
which “requires that words are given their ordinary meaning, technical terms are given 
their technical meaning, and local, cultural terms are recognized as applicable.”17 If a 
term has both an ordinary and a technical meaning, “a court will favor the technical 
meaning” (e.g., Appendix A. Glossary of Legal Terms and Chapter III – Step 4. Defining 
Teacher). In addressing the Plain Meaning Rule, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the 
meaning of the statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the 
act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it 
according to its terms.”18 
Step 2. Collect Primary and Secondary Source Documents 
After synthesizing judicial tests by causes of action and using the “plain meaning 
rule,” as needed, I was prepared to take the second step: collecting primary and secondary 
source documents. I began by collecting state-level statutes that banned teachers from 
wearing religious garb in the public classroom and then conducted a legislative history on 
those statutes. This included collecting legislative documents, such as reports and hearing 
briefings. I then created a timeline in relation to cases that challenged the statutes. 
                                               
 
16 David S. Romantz and Kathleen Elliot Vinson, Legal Analysis: The Fundamental skill (2nd ed.). (North 
Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2009), pp. 87-88. 
17 “Plain Meaning Rule,” U.S. LEGAL DICTIONARY, www.uslegal.com. 









I reviewed cases that challenged anti-religious-garb laws against teachers along 
with cases that challenged policies restricting the religious garb of students, public safety 
officers, and military personnel. I organized these cases according to causes of action 
under the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes and under state constitutions and state 
statutes.19 
To collect these source documents, I used online programs to research the statutes 
and cases, such as WestLaw, LexisNexis, Lexis Advance, Bloomberg and Thomas, the 
Library of Congress legislative website, and the websites of state legislatures. I also 
discovered additional sources in law libraries, such as US Reports.  
I used the Code of Federal Regulations to collect the legal language regarding 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination 
based on religion (a subject that ultimately fell outside the scope of my study). To 
understand how the Third Circuit Court of Appeals used Title VII to deny a public 
schoolteacher’s claim to wear religious garb while working in a public school, I visited 
the Third Circuit and combed through boxes of unpublished litigation documents and 
archival records. I used these two primary sources—the Code of Federal Regulations and 
the archives at the Third Circuit—to classify the legal rationales and outcomes of the only 
Title VII case involving public schoolteachers’ religious garb. 
                                               
 
19 Parenthetically, in doing this research, I discovered the 1912 executive order issued by President Taft 
regarding religious garb worn by Catholic nuns who taught in the federal Indian Schools. Although the 
scope of my study is about state public schools this primary document was an important finding. It had 
statutory authority for the jurisdiction of federal Indian schools and would not serve as an enforceable 
statute for state public schools; therefore, when later analyzing state cases, I used this document to be 
persuasive material but not mandatory law. Regardless, this finding led me to no longer assume that the 






I also briefed each case for my records using the IRAC method (issue, rule, 
analysis, conclusion). Each brief included the formal name of the case and date of the 
decision; a summary of the case history (lower court decisions, appeals, etc.); a summary 
of the facts; the legal issues/questions presented by the case that would elicit a “yes” or 
“no” answer; a one- or two-sentence summary of the holding; a brief analysis, which 
included the legal rules/standards used by the majority, along with a summary of its 
analysis/rationale, and if applicable, a summary of the dissenting opinions; and a 
summary of the outcome/conclusion of the case.  
I then used the Shepard’s citation system and Westlaw’s KeyCite to determine 
which statutes or cases had been overturned, reaffirmed, questioned, and cited by later 
cases. This was essential to understand which law was relevant to my study. I used this 
system to create custom tables, to illustrate the evolution of the case law, and to articulate 
which statutes and cases remained applicable.  
My sources were limited to the bills passed by state legislatures. Additional 
materials included administrative policies created by state boards of education and 
commentaries issued by state district attorneys. This included advisory opinions, no-
action letters, and regulatory decisions. I found that these documents were considered by 
some courts to be compelling statements, but they did not have the same authority as 
mandatory laws, such as statutes adopted by state legislatures or orders issued by state 
supreme courts or appellate courts. 
I also collected a number of secondary sources. I read peer-review articles on the 
subject of law, education, and religion and books sections and journal articles in trade 






(A.L.R.) on teachers’ religious garb, which gave a preliminary legal summary of the 
relevant cases that I cross-referenced with the literature. Together these gave me a broad 
understanding of how legal scholars framed the issue of regulating the religious 
expression of public schoolteachers.  
Collectively these sources allowed me to identify holes in the literature. I 
discovered missing information in research on this topic previously published in law 
review articles, law reports, legal digests, legal encyclopedias, and legal dictionaries. 
Some were substantive in nature and spoke to my topic, while others were outside the 
scope of my study. I also found some legal information to be absent in some court 
decisions, specifically when judges attempted to construct a chronological summary of 
bans on teachers’ religious garb. These findings suggested to me that this study could 
contribute to the literature. It also gave me the confidence to define the narrow scope of 
my research and to formally design this study based on specific judicial tests. 
Step 3. Articulate Narrow Legal Questions 
My primary legal question limits my study to testing the constitutionality of two 
contemporary state bans on teachers’ religious garb in Pennsylvania and Nebraska public 
schools. Generally, I ask whether these bans are consistent with federal law under the 
Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Precisely, I ask:   
1. Primary Research Question: Do the state bans on public schoolteachers’ 
religious garb in Pennsylvania and Nebraska violate the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the states via the Fourteenth 






a. Legal Standard A – Federal neutral and generally applicable test 
under Smith: Do plaintiffs prevail under Smith; meaning, are these 
state bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb neutral and 
generally applicable laws?20 
b. Legal Standard B – Federal strict scrutiny test under Sherbert: Do 
plaintiffs prevail under Sherbert; meaning, do anti-religious-garb 
statutes pass the three-part strict scrutiny test?21 
i. Do the statutes substantially burden public schoolteachers’ 
free exercise of religion? 
ii. Are these burdens justified by serving a compelling 
government interest? 
iii. If so, did the legislative bodies in Pennsylvania and 
Nebraska narrowly tailor the regulation by using the least 
restrictive means possible? 
2. Secondary Research Question: Does Pennsylvania’s 1894 state ban on 
public schoolteachers’ religious garb violate the Pennsylvania Religious 
Freedom Protection Act of 2002 (RFPA) as defined under the “practice or 
observance of religion” section 3 of Article I of the Constitution of 
Pennsylvania?22 
                                               
 
20 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
21 Introduced in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and expanded in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972). The strict scrutiny standard was affirmed in its application to federal laws in Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  
22 Section 2403. Definitions section of the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection act defines “Free 
Exercise of Religion,” not by using the “Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. CONST. 






a. Legal Standard A – General Applicability rule under RFPA: Do 
plaintiffs prevail under the General Applicability Rule clause of 
RFPA, which prevents an “agency from substantially burdening a 
person’s free exercise of religion, including any burden which 
results from a rule of general applicability?”  
b. Legal Standard B – Exceptions under RFPA: Do plaintiffs prevail 
under the Exceptions clause of RFPA; meaning, did the agency fail 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the substantial 
burden of a person’s free exercise of religion: 
i. Furthered a compelling interest of the agency 
ii. By the lease restrictive means of furthering the compelling 
interest? 
c. Legal Standard C – RFPA’s unique Substantial Burden test: Do 
plaintiffs prevail under RFPA’s four-part substantial burden test 
which forbids any agency action which does any of the following: 
i. Significantly constrains or inhibit conduct or expression 
mandated by a person’s sincerely held religious beliefs; 
ii. Significantly curtails a person’s ability to express 
adherence to the person’s religious faith; 
iii. Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to engage in 
activities which are fundamental to the person’s religion; 
iv. Compels conduct or expression which violates a specific 






In the first two chapters, I reviewed the origins and applications of these 
standards, determined their current legitimacy and relevancy, and surveyed the religious-
garb case law, all of which I will use in Chapter IV to conduct a legal analysis.  
Before doing so, I will now set the parameters of the facts, which I will detail 
more thoroughly than I did in the previous steps. I offer the following integrated 
discussion of the methods I used to find facts (the “how”) with a presentation of the 
results of those findings (to explain “what” facts I found). This sets the stage for my 
closing discussion in this chapter about the methodologies I used to conduct the legal 
analysis in Chapter IV – Presentation and Analysis of Findings. 
Step 4. Set Factual Parameters  
Having articulated my research questions, I took the fourth step in my five-part 
legal methodology to review the common fact patterns in the 123-year history of legal 
challenges involving public schoolteachers’ religious garb in the United States. I used 
these patterns to apply a legal research method involving setting the factual parameters; 
in other words, articulating the verifiable assumptions to be used in analyzing a 
hypothetical case. Similar to how a trial court reviews the “finding of facts,”23 I 
determined which precise information would allow me to most effectively answer my 
research questions and which information I would set aside. 
                                               
 
23 For definitions see Findings and Conclusions by the Court, FED. R. CIV. P. 52 and “Finding of Fact: This 
term applies to the conclusion reached by the court, arbitrators and is the determination of truth after 
consideration,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Online Legal Dictionary 2nd ed. Accessed at 
www.thelawdictionary.org/finding-of-fact. For a scholarly analysis of this legal method see George C. 






The fact patterns in this case law fell into various thematic-based factual 
parameters, which I translated into the following nine questions: (a) Of the various types 
of laws that address the public schoolteachers’ religious garb, which ones will I include 
in this study—the two contemporary states that ban religious garb and/or the two current 
states that encourage teachers to wear religious garb? (b) Who has standing to challenge 
these laws—a teacher or a religious organization or a taxpayer? (c) How is the teacher 
paid, and how may that relate to the question of taxpayers’ standing to file a related suit? 
(d) What is the nature of the employment in the public school and the required 
qualifications? (e) In what type of public school is the teacher employed—will I analyze 
the current state-run public schools and/or the historical examples of federal schools in 
federal territories? (f) Which type of educator is being employed in the public schools—
full-time employees, substitute, or assistant teachers? (g) What precisely does the state, 
school, or supervisor find objectionable about the teacher, and is this objection related to 
other job-performance issues? (h) What is the precise nature of the religious garb—what 
is it and what is it not? (i) And finally, is there any evidence of the teacher engaging in 
“religious instruction” in addition to the wearing of religious garb? By answering these 
questions, which emerged from the fact patterns in the literature, I was prepared to set the 
factual parameters of my study, which I justify here. 
State anti-garb statutes. As I illustrated in Chapter II – Literature, state actors 
regulated the religious garb of public schoolteachers in a variety of ways. This led me to 
ask which type of garb law I would study. Three state legislatures passed statutory bans: 
Nebraska (enacted in 1919 and repealed in 2017), Oregon (enacted in 1923 and repealed 






enacted an anti-religious-garb law through a public ballot initiative in 194824 (repealed by 
its legislature in 1999).25 An additional eighteen state superintendents reported in 1946 
(Table 2) that no employment was granted to public schoolteachers who wore religious 
garb. These types of regulations included school boards issuing a policy, superintendents 
or principals issuing a directive, or state attorneys-general issuing a commentary. This 
resulted in twenty-two states, by the end of World War II, banning public schoolteachers 
from wearing religious garb in the classroom either through state statutes, a public ballot 
initiative, or administrative regulations (Table 2). 
To determine which laws I would study, I turned to one of the prominent fact 
patterns in the case law: “In the absence of a statute or regulation,” state courts have 
routinely held that teachers “may wear their religious garb while teaching in public 
schools.”26 I determined that a study of public schoolteachers in states without a statutory 
ban on religious garb would not allow me to directly address my research questions, nor 
would that line of inquiry allow me to fill the gap in the literature; as detailed in Chapter 
II – Literature Review, a court has yet to conduct a comprehensive analysis of state 
statutory bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb under the post-Smith 
jurisprudence under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution or the Religious Freedom Protection Act of Pennsylvania. Given these fact 
                                               
 
24 Legislative Manual, Official Vote of North Dakota Primary Election, 1948; and Linda Grathwohl, “The 
North Dakota Anti-Garb Law: Constitutional Conflict and Religious Strive,” Great Plains Quarterly, 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1993). 
25 N.D. Bill No. 1034, introduced by the Education Services Committee, repealed N.D. Cent. Code § 15-47-
29; 15-47-30, Mar. 3, 1999. For rationale for the repeal, see North Dakota Legislative Management (1998) 
Minutes of the Educational Services Committee. Feb. 23-24, 1998. Bismarck, North Dakota, p. 8. 
26 Moore v. Board of Education, 4 Ohio Misc. 257 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1965); Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 
629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894); Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S. W. 2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App., 1956); Gerhardt v. Heid 66 
N.D. 44 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1936); Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1940); and New Haven v. 






patterns in the case law, I determined the primary subject of my study would be the two 
contemporary state statutes that ban public schoolteachers’ religious garb in Pennsylvania 
and Nebraska.  
I also decided not to address whether it is constitutional for state legislatures to 
encourage public schoolteachers to wear religious garb. As noted in Chapter II, education 
laws in Arkansas27 and Tennessee28 currently single out the voluntary wearing of 
religious garb by teachers in public schools for positive protections. These statutes call 
forth Establishment Clause questions about state advancement or endorsement of religion 
that fall outside the factual parameters of my analysis.  
Standing. Having determined the primary subject of my study—contemporary 
anti-religious-garb statutes in Pennsylvania and Nebraska—I then turned to the question 
of who has the legal authority to challenge these laws. The case law shows that a teacher 
who is refused employment, disciplined, or terminated for wearing religious garb in a 
public school has the legal standing to challenge an anti-religious garb regulation. This 
authority derives from the teacher, as the plaintiff in a case, meeting the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s three-part standing test29:  
                                               
 
27 “No person shall be prohibited from teaching in state institutions of higher learning for the reason that the 
person wears the clothing of any established and recognized religion while teaching.” The 2010 “Authority 
for teachers to wear religious clothing” statute, Arkansas Code Title 6, Education Subtitle 5, Postsecondary 
and Higher Education Generally Chapter 63, Employees of State Institutions Subchapter 1, General 
Provisions § 6-63-101. Acts 1973, No. 196, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 80-1261. 
28 The Tennessee School Employee Religious Liberty Act of 1999 allows school employees to voluntarily 
“wear religious garb or jewelry that does not disrupt the school environment.” It also states, in section 49-6-
9002(a)(4), “Neutrality to religion does not require hostility to religion. The establishment clause does not 
prohibit reasonable accommodation of religion, nor does the clause bar appropriate teaching about 
religion…” It goes on to permit school employees to voluntarily “read a religious book during non-
instructional time; quietly say grace before a meal; and meet with other school employees for prayer or 
scriptural study before or after school or during the employee’s lunch” (49-6-8004.b.1, 2, 4). 






First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 
“actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second, there 
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the 
independent action of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must 
be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be 
“redressed by a favorable decision.” 
 
The primary cases I will rely on to conduct my analysis involve public 
schoolteachers who meet these standing qualifications. This is an important parameter to 
set in order to distinguish between cases that involve plaintiffs using their status as 
taxpayers to challenge school districts who employ religious-garb-wearing teachers.30 In 
those Establishment Clause cases, the primary question was whether public funds can be 
used to advance religion, which is outside the scope of this examination. My research 
focuses narrowly on the Free Exercise protections of public schoolteachers under federal 
and state laws. 
Teachers are paid like all other teachers. In a similar line of thinking, I also 
determined that my study would rest on the fact that religious-garb-wearing teachers “are 
                                               
 
30 Outside the scope of this study, cases are classified as Establishment Clause cases because they center on 
the larger question of the use of public funds for religion. A Kentucky taxpayer, J.C. Rawlings, uses his 
standing as a taxpayer to challenge the decision of Superintendent Wendell P. Butler to hire religious-garb-
wearing teachers. Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S. W. 2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App., 1956). It is important to note that the 
U.S. Supreme Court no longer permits taxpayers to have standing to challenge the use of public funds for 
private religious schools. See Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011), 
which overturned the taxpayers’ standing as narrowly defined in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
Additional Establishment Clause cases in the religious-garb case law include: Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 
Iowa 691 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1918); State v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1932); Johnson v. Boyd, 217 
Ind. 348 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1940); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1941); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 
501 (N.M. Sup. Ct. 1951); Berghorn v. District No. 8, 364 Mo. 121 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1953); Moore v. Board of 









paid like all other teachers,”31 through direct payment from the school to the individual 
teacher. I make this explicit because there was a case32 in which the court received 
complaints about the salaries of garb-wearing nuns being paid to their Catholic order, not 
to the nuns directly.33 Again, such Establishment Clause questions are outside the scope 
of my study. 
State-employed, state-examined, state-certified teachers. The locus of my 
study is public schools, not private schools.34 This parameter allows me to define the 
nature of, and the required qualifications for, employment. Therefore, I assume in this 
study that the plaintiffs have successfully completed the necessary state-issued 
examinations and teacher certification required to be eligible for employment in a state-
funded public school. This is important to note because, in some of the historical cases 
                                               
 
31 “Sisters are paid like other teachers, and after providing for their living expenses, they contribute the 
balance of their compensation to the orders to which they belong. Their vow of poverty is not controlling 
from a legal angle. Many people are poverty stricken without taking such vows. The vow of obedience to 
ecclesiastical and secular authorities is not uncommon in the lives of people. No one can object to the vow 
of chastity.” Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S. W. 2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App., 1956). The Rawlings court stated, “The 
United States Supreme Court in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) wrote that labor is property 
and one has the right to dispose of property according to the will of the owner. The salaries paid these 
Sisters are theirs and they may do therewith as they choose.” 
32 The “earnings as teachers are paid to the sister in charge of the house where they are at the time 
residing.” Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 
Pa. 132 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910). 
33 I interpreted this to mean that the order provided the state with services, a situation like that of private 
education agencies that pay their employees after receiving a government contract.   
34 In Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1918), the Iowa Supreme Court denied public 
funding to a private religious school whose students were transferred from a recently closed public school 
and who, incidentally, employed teachers who wore religious garb. These fact patterns are distinct from a 









cited, teachers were previously serving private religious schools and then transferred to 
public schools or received their training and exams in religious settings.35  
The Indiana Supreme Court set similar boundaries when stating, “The fact that 
these teachers were recommended by various Catholic normal schools cannot be 
considered an important factor.”36 The court held, as I assume in my line of questioning, 
that the teachers were employed by or seeking employment in a public school. I also rest 
my analysis on the fact that the teachers “were chosen from persons regularly qualified 
and licensed to teach” under the laws of the state, making it “the duty of school trustees 
to investigate the character and fitness of teachers.”37 I found a similar agreement of facts 
in the 1936 decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court.38 These facts in the Indiana and 
North Dakota cases mirror the other major religious-garb cases (Table 1). As a result, I 
                                               
 
35 Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894). Judge Williams’ dissent in Hysong pointed out that 
“the sisters employed as teachers had regular certificates granted to them in their religious names by the 
county superintendent, after a private or special examination given them at the Mother House in 
Ebensburg.” Non-state examiners fall outside the scope of this study; therefore, this contemporary analysis 
rests on the assumption that the state is the one both examining and certifying the teachers. 
36 Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1940). 
37 Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1940). 
38 Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 44, 14 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1936). “Obviously the school in question here is not a 
‘sectarian school’ within the meaning of § 152 of the [North Dakota] constitution. It is not affiliated with 
any particular religious sect or denomination. It is not governed or managed, nor are its policies directed or 
controlled, by such sect or denomination. It is one of the public schools of North Dakota, operated under 
the supervision, direction and control of the public officers of the state, county and district who, under the 
constitution and laws of the state, are charged with the administration, management and government of 
such public schools. The courses of study therein are prescribed by public officers and employees whose 
duty it is under our laws to prescribe such courses. The teachers in the school have received the certificates 
authorizing them to teach in the public schools of North Dakota upon compliance with the laws of the state; 
and they are as much subject to the control and direction of the superintendent of the school in which they 
teach, and of the county superintendent of schools and the state superintendent of public instruction as are 









proceed to set the factual parameters of my study around state-employed, state-examined, 
and state-certified teachers. 
 State schools, not federal schools. Because I am conducting an analysis of the 
two contemporary anti-religious-garb statutes, I naturally focus on state-run schools that 
are governed and funded by Pennsylvania and Nebraska (Appendix B). The literature, 
however, reveals a nineteenth-century legal controversy involving the use of federal 
funds to employ religious-garb-wearing teachers in schools run by the federal 
government. Ironically, Thomas Jefferson—who famously advocated for the “separation 
of church and state”39—helped set these policies in motion. A brief review of this history 
is worth noting in order to explain how I came to set the factual parameters of my study. 
After purchasing the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803, President Jefferson 
continued George Washington’s initiative to educate Native Americans with federal 
funds. Education historian Lawrence Cremin characterized this contradiction: “In 
effect—and paradoxically, given the Jeffersonian penchant for secularism—the [federal] 
government ended up in patent partnership with several Christian denominations.”40 
During Thomas Jefferson’s administration, writes education historian James Fowler, “the 
majority of the federal monies went to Protestant missionaries… whom [Jefferson] 
otherwise distrusted.”41 The trend of using federal funds to hire missionaries to educate 
indigenous people continued through 1928. A notable change in strategy occurred after 
                                               
 
39 Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to the Baptists of Danbury, Connecticut, Jan. 1, 1802,” The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson. Vol. 35:1. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), 407-9. 
40 Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education: The National Experience 1783-1876. (Harper Colophon 
Books, 1980), 234-235. 
41 James W. Fraser, Between Church and State: Religion and Public Education in a Multicultural America. 






President Ulysses Grant took office in 1869. He replaced the “national removal strategy” 
with an assimilation plan called the “Quaker Policy,” inspired by the Religious Society of 
Friends’ assimilation of Indians in Pennsylvania who used public funds to hire Christian 
missionaries whose church boards would govern the federal education of Indians. In his 
second inaugural address, President Grant made explicit his intent: “to bring the 
aborigines of the country under the benign influences of education and civilization.” He 
said that it was either education “or war of extermination.” 42 A year later, President 
Grant installed the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions, whose nuns were contracted to 
convert Indians to Christianity while serving as teachers in federal schools––and who did 
so while wearing religious garb. In this same vein, the federal government established 
“Indian prison schools” designed “to teach the Indian prisoners European dress, the 
English language, and Christianity.”43 The objective was severe: to “kill the Indian but 
save the man.”44 
I briefly detail these legal trends not only to document this disturbing history45 but 
to explain why I make the distinction in my study between state-run public schools and 
federal-run public schools. Given my focus on the two contemporary anti-religious-garb 
                                               
 
42 Ulysses S. Grant, Second Inaugural Address, 4 Mar. 1873. 
43 See Pratt and Mather study in Fraser, p. 94. 
44 In 1892 Captain Richard H. Pratt said, “A great general has said that the only good Indian is a dead one, 
and that high sanction of his destruction has been an enormous factor in promoting Indian massacres. In a 
sense, I agree with the sentiment, but only in this: that all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill 
the Indian in him, and save the man. We are just now making a great pretence [sic] of anxiety to civilize the 
Indians.” Official proceedings of the annual meeting of the Conference of Boards of Public Charities: 1892, 
46–47. Reprinted in Francis Paul Prucha (1973) Americanizing the American Indians: Writings by the 
“Friends of the Indian” 1880–1900. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 260–271. 
45 David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School 
Experience, 1875–1928. Laurence, KS: University Press of Kansas, (1995). See also Quick Bear v. Leupp, 
210 U.S. 50 (1908), in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in a 9 – 0 decision the use of federal funds for 






statutes and the absence of federal schools today, I do not examine the constitutionality of 
the historical federally-run schools that employed religious-garb-wearing teachers. 
Defining teacher. A public school funded and governed by the state has authority 
over its teachers. I was surprised to learn the case law on religious garb reveals a lack of 
consistency in defining what constitutes a teacher. As a result, I had set the factual 
parameters that would determine a legal definition of “teacher.” In Mississippi, for 
instance, an assistant teacher won her case after being fired for occasionally wearing 
African headdresses.46 In Nebraska, the state Attorney General permitted student teachers 
to wear religious garb on the grounds that the statute “does not apply to those who are 
being trained” because they are not receiving compensation and are meeting students for 
only “short periods of time.”47 In Nebraska, a Catholic nun was denied employment as a 
substitute teacher because she sought to wear a habit while teaching in a public school.48 
Three cases in Pennsylvania are worth noting. First, a substitute teacher lost her case 
                                               
 
46 My emphasis in italics: “Claimant was employed four years as an assistant teacher with the Jackson 
Public Schools, Jackson, Mississippi, ending Mar. 17, 1987, when discharged for insubordination. She was 
discharged because she continued to wear head-wraps after numerous discussions with her advising that her 
attire was not considered appropriate professional dress for teachers and assistant teachers.” Mississippi v. 
McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879. 
47 Report of the Neb. Attorney General, Schools-Teachers-Wearing of Religious Garb, addressed to Hon. 
John M. Matzen, State Superintendent, Aug. 24, 1926. “I am of the opinion that the word “teacher” as used 
in the [anti-garb statute] applies only to those who hold certificates to teach in Nebraska and are employed 
to teach in some of the publics schools of the state. I do not think it applies to those who are merely being 
trained to teach in some one of the several state normal schools, and as an incident to said training, but 
without compensation are giving instruction (under the direct supervision of a member of the faculty of a 
state normal school) for short periods of time to pupils in a public school of the state.” Signed, GWA. 
48 Grant Shulte, “Nebraska targets ban on religious garb worn by teachers,” Associated Press, Jan. 17, 
2017; Michael Shively, “Legislative Bill Would Eliminate 100-Year-Old Religious Garb Law,” KWBE 









after being fired for wearing a Muslim hijab (headscarf) while substituting three times.49 
Second, an instructional assistant won her case after being fired for wearing a Protestant 
cross necklace solely because she did not meet the legal definition of “teacher” and 
therefore was not bound by the anti-garb law.50 And third, an auxiliary services counselor 
won her case after being denied employment by a state-funded private remedial education 
company that refused to hire her because she wore an Islamic headscarf.51 Given the 
diversity of these facts, I chose to base my legal analysis on Pennsylvania’s legal 
definition of “teacher” as found in the state’s education code: 
‘Teacher’ shall include all professional employees and temporary 
professional employees who devote fifty per centum (50%) of their time, 
or more, to teaching or other direct educational activities, such as 
classroom teachers, demonstration teachers, museum teachers, 
counsellors, librarians, school nurses, dental hygienists, home and school 
visitors, and other similar professional employees and temporary 
professional employees, certificated in accordance with the qualifications 
established by the State Board of Education.52 
                                               
 
49 My emphasis in italics: “Alima Delores Reardon is a devout Muslim with a religiously held conviction 
that Muslim women should, when in public, cover their entire body save face and hands. Since 1970, 
Reardon had from time to time worked as a substitute and full-time teacher in the Philadelphia School 
District, positions for which she held the necessary certificate and other qualifications. Reardon first 
embraced her religious conviction regarding dress in 1982, and pursuant to her belief ‘she wore while 
teaching . . . a head scarf which covered her head, neck, and bosom leaving her face visible and a long 
loose dress which covered her arms to her wrists.’ Reardon taught in this attire without incident until 1984. 
Towards the end of 1984, on three separate occasions Reardon reported to various schools for duty as a 
substitute teacher and was informed by the principals of those schools that, pursuant to state law, she could 
not teach in her religious clothing. These actions were taken in compliance with what is commonly referred 
to as Pennsylvania’s Garb Statute, enacted in 1895.” United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 
F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
50 In a peculiar ruling, a federal district court held that a teaching assistant does not meet the state’s 
definition of a teacher. See my earlier discussion in Chapter II – Literature Review about Nichol v. Arin, 
268 F.Supp 2d 536 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
51 In another peculiar ruling, the court held that, although the applicant was Muslim and wore headscarves 
for religious purposes, “many” children would not perceive her dress as “religious,” so it could not be 
classified as “religious garb.” See my earlier discussion in Chapter II – Literature Review about EEOC v. 
READS, Inc. 759 F.Supp. 1150 (U.S. Dist. Ct. of Pa. 1991). 










Satisfactory performance. Given that these teachers are under the “control and 
direction” of the state, I also decided to set another parameter: the plaintiff’s performance 
as a public teacher is “essentially satisfactory.”53 In doing so, I eliminate any question of 
whether religious garb is merely a pretext used by the supervisor to justify terminating a 
poorly performing teacher. It also removes any implication that a teacher is wearing 
religious garb merely as an act of insubordination, rather than as a sincere religious 
expression. 
The nature of religious garb. The act in question is the teachers’ wearing of 
religious garb in the public school—but what is “religious garb” exactly? I rely on the 
first anti-religious-garb law in the United States, enacted by the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly in 1895, to define religious garb as “any dress, mark, emblem or insignia 
indicating the fact that such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order, sect 
or denomination” (Appendix A).54A historic example of this is found in the first case on 
the matter: “The Sisters of St. Joseph, of the Roman Catholic Church, while teaching in 
said public schools, wear the garb, insignia, and emblems of their order.” 55 Moreover, 
“they are required to wear the garb of the order, and are not allowed to take it off ‘during 
the day, either on account of their work or the heat of the day.’”56 A contemporary 
                                               
 
53 “McGlothin’s work was essentially satisfactory.” Mississippi v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (Miss. Sup. 
Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879. 
54 Pennsylvania Statute 24, § 11-1112 (2017). This anti-religious-garb statute, enacted in 1895, was the first 
in the United States. It was reaffirmed in 1949 and 1982 and remains active today. 
55 Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132 
(Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910). 









example of religious garb is the case of Alima Delores Reardon, who was fired for 
wearing a hijab and loose dress while teaching in the school district of Philadelphia.57 I 
previously reference additional examples (Appendix C and the “Global Context” section 
of Chapter II – Literature) to illustrate that this legal question is far broader than merely 
the headdresses of Catholic nuns and Muslim women. 
No evidence of religious instruction. The fact patterns in the case law on 
religious garb can overlap with another set of cases about the use of public funds for 
religious instruction. This occurs when proponents of anti-religious garb question the 
motives of teachers who wear religious garb, suggesting that because of the exceptionally 
pious attitude indicated by their clothing, they are more likely than non-religious-garb-
wearing teachers to indoctrinate children. A related view is that such teachers do not need 
to engage in direct religious instruction because religious garb, by its nature, is a form of 
indirect religious instruction. This view implies that exposing children to the religious 
identity of a public official is just as suspect as forcing children to read from scriptures or 
to engage in worship or spiritual practices with or in front of students (For further 
discussion see IV. E. 9 Religious Garb Cannot Be Used for Religious Instruction). 
To create a clean line of inquiry, I use the fact patterns presented in various trial 
courts that found that there was no evidence of religious instruction or proselytization 
(Table 3). In separating out the question of religious instruction and religious garb, I 
focus on the legal merits of the state statute. I test the limits of the states’ authority to 
regulate the religious expression of schoolteachers. These are important questions that 
                                               
 






strike at the heart of the two most contemporary anti-religious-garb statutes in 








No Evidence of Religious Instruction  
1894 Pennsylvania: “[T]here was no sufficient evidence that [teachers] used the garb 
or insignia mentioned in such a manner as to attract particular attention to them or their 
signification, or endeavored to so use them as to impart sectarian or religious 
instruction.” Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894). 
1906 New York: No evidence was provided of Nora O’Connor and Elizabeth Dowd, 
Catholic nuns who wore habits, engaging in religious instruction while teaching in a 
public school. O’Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421 at 13 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1906). 
1908 Pennsylvania: No evidence was provided of Lillie Risser, a Mennonite religious-
garb-wearing teacher, engaging in religious instruction in a public school. 
Commonwealth v. Herr, Court of Quarter Sessions of Lancaster County, No. 26 at 
(Lancaster Mun. Ct. 1908). 
1936 North Dakota: “There is no claim and no evidence that any religious instruction 
was given, or that any religious exercises were conducted.” Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 
44 at 2 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1936). 
1940 Indiana: “Since the children in question were children of Catholic parents and 
the service was voluntary and not within the school hours we fail to see that this 
amounts to sectarian teaching…” Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1940). 
1956 Kentucky: No evidence provided of religious instruction. “The garb does not 
teach. It is the woman within who teaches.” Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 at 7 
(Ky. Ct. App., 1956). 
1986 Oregon: No evidence was provided of Janet Cooper, a turban-wearing Sikh 
teacher, engaging in religious instruction in her sixth and eighth grade classes. Cooper 
v. Eugene School District No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1986). 
1990 Mississippi: No evidence was provided of Debora McGlothin, who periodically 
wore an African Hebrew Israelite head-wrap, engaging in religious instruction. 
Mississippi v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1990). 
1990 Pennsylvania: “Ms. Reardon never attempted to convert any student to Islam.” 
United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5437 at 7 (E.D. 
Pa. 1989). 
2003 Pennsylvania: “There was no evidence introduced or offered that” an 
instructional assistant who wore a cross neckless “proselytized, preached or taught her 
religious beliefs to students… while teaching” her fourth, fifth, and sixth grade 







Overview of factual parameters. In summary, my study is bound by the 
following factual parameters: Teachers who have been refused employment, disciplined, 
or terminated for wearing religious garb while teaching in a public school have legal 
standing to challenge anti-religious garb regulations. The plaintiffs in my study are state-
employed, state-examined, and state-certificated educators who meet the definition of 
“teacher” under Pennsylvania’s education code. Their job performance is satisfactory, 
and they are paid like all other teachers. The religious expression in question is defined 
by Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb law and is not, in itself, evidence of direct or 
indirect religious instruction. 
Having set the factual parameters, I am prepared to take step five of my research 
methodology: conducting the legal analysis. 
Step 5. Conduct Legal Analysis 
My legal analysis in the next chapter relies on the legal method of “rule 
synthesis”58 that I conducted in the legal standards section of Chapter II, which serves as 
a composite of the authoritative summary of judicial tests used across similar cases. I 
prepared this “rule synthesis” in conjunction with preparing a “case synthesis”59 on the 
subject of bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb. I did so to employ best practices 
conducting a legal analysis. 
                                               
 
58 David S. Romantz and Kathleen Elliot Vinson, Legal Analysis: The Fundamental Skill, 2nd ed. (North 
Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2009), pp. 30–31; and Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing: Process, 
Analysis, and Organization, 4th ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2006), pp. 106–118. 






For example, in Chapter IV – Presentation and Analysis of Findings, I will use the 
deductive analysis and rule-based reasoning methods to concisely state and explain the 
rule and apply that law to the facts. Likewise, I used the analogical reasoning method 
when making distinctions between broad/persuasive arguments and ones that are 
narrow/authoritative. In examining these two forms of reasoning by analogy, I seek to 
construct a case synthesis that is based on similar jurisdictions addressing similar legal 
issues.60 
In addition to deciding which types of analogical reasoning methods I would 
employ, I also sought to identify logic fallacies—another common method for conducting 
legal analysis. Fallacies may include the straw man (making arguments that were not 
initially advanced); argument ad hominem (discrediting an argument based on who 
articulates it), sufficiency/necessity conditions (e.g., air may be necessary for life but is, 
alone, not sufficient to sustain life), slippery slope (an extreme hypothetical that 
discredits an initial position because of the fear of the hypothetical).61 In this vein, I seek 
to apply Volokh’s rubric for studying logic variants, such as looking for categorical 
assertions (i.e., “never,” “always”), false alternatives (i.e., unnecessary dualisms such as 
“Is pornography free speech or hate speech?”), criticisms that could apply to everything 
(i.e., “the rule of law has a chilling effect”), incomplete logic in metaphors (i.e., “laws do 
not literally chill speech”), and undefended assertions (i.e., “that law is troubling”).62 
In this final step, I applied these five methods for conducting a legal analysis. I 
began by conducting (a) rule and case syntheses. Then I prepared myself to use (b) 
                                               
 
60 Ibid., Romantz pp. 37–64. 
61 “Logic Games” and “Logic Reasoning” exercises, LSAT Courses, Kaplan Test Prep. 






deductive analysis and rule-based reasoning techniques in my forthcoming analysis. 
Next, I used (c) analogical reasoning strategies to distinguish broad and narrow 
comparisons in the law and finally, I (d) identified logic fallacies and logic variants that I 
can use to strengthen my upcoming legal analysis. 
Summary of Five-Step Legal Methods 
 In conclusion, my participation in training sessions about legal research methods 
and my review of related textbooks prepared me to use a five-step process to conduct my 
legal research and analysis. In Step 1, I began by synthesizing judicial tests, which 
equipped me to narrow my analysis to two legal causes of action under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment63 and under the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom 
Protection Act of 2002 (RFPA). This process gave me the framework to analyze how 
judges reached their previous conclusions, including by using the “plain meaning rule” to 
interpret RFPA which has not yet been substantively interpreted by any court. In taking 
Step 2, I collected primary and secondary documents to help me determine the historical 
fact patterns in the anti-religious-garb cases. In Step 3, I combined what I had learned in 
the first steps when articulating my legal research questions. In Step 4, I set the factual 
parameters of my study, which serve as the verifiable assumptions that I use to take Step 
5 in the next chapter—conducting a legal analysis. In this final step, I will use various 
                                               
 
63 Additional causes of action, which have their own unique set of judicial tests, include (1) alternate 
constitutional claims under the No Establishment and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the 
U.S. CONST.; (2) federal statutory claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (3) claims under 
state constitutions, such as NEB. CONST. no compulsion clause of art. I §16, the no sectarian instruction 
clause of art. VI §11 and PA. CONST. no compulsion clause of art. II and the no sectarian instruction clause 
of art. VII §18; along with (4) claims under state statutes, such as the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and Nebraska Fair Employment Act, the latter two 






legal methods to strengthen my analysis, such as deductive analysis, rule-based 
reasoning techniques, analogical reasoning strategies, and identifying logic fallacies. 
Together, these legal research methods and legal analysis techniques prepared me to 
construct my research design. 
In the next chapter, Presentation and Analysis of Findings, I will analyze the 
merits of plaintiff’s and defendant’s lines of arguments and the justice’s majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions. Then I will conduct a legal analysis of the two anti-
religious-garb statutes in Pennsylvania and Nebraska under the Free Exercise standards—
neutral and general applicability and strict scrutiny (substantial burden on religion, 
compelling state interests, and regulations that are narrowly tailored to have the least 
restrictive burden on religion). I will use my findings and analysis in a concluding 
discussion of the constitutionality of these two anti-religious-garb laws.  
Then I will examine whether Pennsylvania’s 1894 anti-religious-garb law violates 
Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002, which also applies the general 
applicability and strict scrutiny standards. I also use RFPA’s unique four-part 
“substantial burden” test to assess the nature of a plaintiff’s burden on their religion and 
to assess whether the state exercised restraint in the ways mandated in the test. 
In Chapter V—Conclusion, I will summarize the contributions that this project 
makes to the legal study of these two state bans on religious garb, and, more broadly, the 
study of legal restrictions on religious expression in the United States and around the 
globe. I will then discuss the implications that this research may have on my four primary 
audiences: (1) legislators, judges, and attorneys who examine bans on religious garb; (2) 






termination policies; (3) public schoolteachers and leaders of teachers’ unions who study 
the rights of civil and employment rights of educators; and (4) researchers in the fields of 
religion, law, and/or education who examine the nature of and legal protections for 
religious expression along with the intersection of religion and public life. Then I will 
acknowledge the limitations of this study and propose a series of recommendations for 








IV – PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
 
The forthcoming presentation and analysis of my findings rest upon the factual 
parameters that I set in Chapter III – Methodology. In doing so, my legal analysis is built 
upon the following five assumptions. First, the hypothetical plaintiffs in this study have 
legal standing to challenge the anti-religious-garb statutes because they were refused 
employment, disciplined, or terminated for wearing religious garb while teaching in a 
public school in Pennsylvania or Nebraska. Second, these plaintiffs were state-employed, 
state-examined, and state-certified educators who met the definition of “teacher” under 
the states’ education code. Third, the teachers’ job performance was satisfactory. Fourth, 
they were paid like all other public schoolteachers, unlike some cases were paid by an 
auxiliary agency. Finally, there is no evidence of religious instruction (Table 3); in other 
words, the expression in question is only the wearing of religious garb while teaching in a 
public school. 
Having set the factual parameters, I now use the following four judicial standards 
to conduct an analysis of federal and state law governing public schoolteachers’ religious 
garb in Pennsylvania and Nebraska under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection 






A. General Applicability: Are Pennsylvania and Nebraska’s bans on 
public schoolteachers’ religious garb neutral and generally applicable 
laws?1 
B. Burden: Do the statutes burden public schoolteachers’ free exercise of 
religion?2 
C. Compelling State Interest: Are these burdens justified by serving a 
compelling government interest?3 
D. Narrowly Tailored: Did the legislative bodies in Pennsylvania and 
Nebraska narrowly tailor the regulation by using the least restrictive 
means possible?4 
I dedicate the following sections of this chapter to answer these research questions.  
                                               
 
1 The Smith test requires that government regulations involving religion must be “neutral and generally 
applicable” and cannot “target religious conduct for distinctive treatment.” Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
2 As defined in the first of the three-part Sherbert test. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  
3 As defined in the second of the three-part Sherbert test, which defines “burden” as either incidental or 
fundamental, indirect or direct. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972). The Four-Part “Substantial Burden” Test in Pennsylvania’s RFPA explains that a state agency 
substantially burdens a person’s religion when the state’s action: “(1) Significantly constrains or inhibits 
conduct or expression mandated by a person’s sincerely held religious beliefs; (2) Significantly curtails a 
person’s ability to express adherence to the person’s religious faith; (3) Denies a person a reasonable 
opportunity to engage in activities which are fundamental to the person’s religion; (4) Compels conduct or 
expression which violates a specific tenet of a person’s religious faith.” 
4 As defined in the third of the three-part Sherbert test. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin 










In the field of religious liberty, federal narcotics legislation serves as a colorful 
example of “neutral and general applicable” laws. The criminal justice system is required 
to administer the government’s “no drugs” policy in an unprejudiced fashion. Yet, even 
facially neutral policies can burden one’s constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of 
religion, as explored in the Smith case brought forth by Native Americans who ingested 
peyote, a federally registered narcotic, for sacramental purposes.5   
In the context of this study, an analogous scenario of legal neutrality and general 
applicability would be for a state legislature or school board to enact a generic dress code 
for all teachers, such as mandating a distinct uniform.6 The policy would need to 
demonstrate an impartial standard of professional attire in public schools by requiring 
teachers to wear a fixed ensemble, as do workers in hospitals, stores, and restaurants.7 
The anti-religious-garb laws in Pennsylvania and Nebraska make no such attempt.  
I will demonstrate that the anti-religious-garb statutes are not neutral because they 
target religious conduct for government regulation, and they were born from religious 
animus toward the suspect minority of the day. As a result, the anti-religious-garb statutes 
                                               
 
5 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
6 As mandated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hysong (1894): “[T]he legislature may, by statute, 
enact that all teachers shall wear in the schoolroom a particular style of dress, and that none other shall be 
worn, and thereby secure the same uniformity of outward appearance as we now see in city police, railroad 
trainmen, and nurses of some of our large hospitals.” Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894) 
at 57. The Pennsylvania General Assembly did not fulfill this mandate (Appendix B). 
7 In Title VII cases, which fall outside the scope of this study, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that 
employee dress codes must accommodate religious garb. See EEOC Religious Garb and Grooming in the 









in Pennsylvania and Nebraska fail the general applicability test, thus triggering the strict 
scrutiny standards articulated in Sherbert and in Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom 
Protection Act.8 
Anti-Religious-Garb Laws Target Religious Conduct 
The 1895 General Assembly of Pennsylvania and the 1919 Nebraska Legislature 
did not enact a general neutral dress code statute; rather, the legislators in both states 
focused on religious dress, marks, emblems, and insignia. These statutes, by design, were 
neither neutral to religion nor a universally applicable dress code applied to all public 
schoolteachers. The statutes in question (Appendix B) make it unlawful for public 
schoolteachers to wear while performing their duties any “garb… dress, insignia, marks 
or emblems” (Pennsylvania’s language)9 or “dress, or garb” (Nebraska’s language)10 
“indicating the fact that such teacher is an adherent or member of any religious order, sect 
or denomination” (language used in both statutes). Put simply, the wearing of religious 
                                               
 
8 See Chapter II – Literature for a discussion of the evolution of this standard, as developed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) and clarified in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418 (2006), which clarified that federal statutes that are “neutral and generally applicable” must also 
meet strict scrutiny. Twenty-two states, including Pennsylvania, made the same requirement in their 
religious freedom restoration acts. See also Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003) at 327, in which Chief 
Justice Roberts connected religious diversity to racial diversity, saying that “context matters” and that the 
fundamental purpose of strict scrutiny is to take “relevant differences” into account. 
9 The Pennsylvania General Assembly first enacted Pennsylvania Statute 24, Religious Garb § 11-1112 in 
1895, in response to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s affirmation of Catholic nuns wearing habits while 
teaching in state public schools in Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894). The Pennsylvania 
General Assembly reenacted the statute in 1949 and 1982. Two proposed repeals of the laws failed to get 
out of committee in 2011 and 2012. Pennsylvania’s statute is the only anti-religious-garb law in the country 
that remains today. 
10 Neb. Code § 79-898 (2016) was first enacted in 1919 (c. 248, § 1, p. 1018) and reaffirmed in 1922, 1929, 









garb is the targeted practice that the state seeks to regulate. The Supreme Courts of 
Pennsylvania and Oregon agree. 
 In America’s first religious garb case, Hysong v. Gallitzin School District (1894), 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that “the legislature may, by statute, enact that all 
teachers shall wear in the schoolroom a particular style of dress, and that none other shall 
be worn, and thereby secure the same uniformity of outward appearance as we now see in 
city police, railroad trainmen, and nurses of some of our large hospitals.”11 In modern 
legal terms, the court issued a call for a “neutral law of general applicability”12 that did 
not single out religion for government regulation. 
 The General Assembly swiftly and decisively enacted the garb statute, which was 
challenged thirteen years later by a bonnet-wearing Mennonite teacher. In 
Commonwealth v. Herr (1908),13 the Court of Quarter Sessions of Lancaster County held 
that “… the legislature did not see fit to make any universal rule. It adopted no general 
style of dress; but it did attempt to exclude certain persons, who, on account of their 
religious sentiments, saw fit to adopt a plain garb, from holding employment under the 
commonwealth.”14 This decision made explicit that the anti-religious-garb statute 
                                               
 
11 Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894) at 57. 
12 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
13 Judge Landis’ opinion in Commonwealth v. Herr, Court of Quarter Sessions of Lancaster County, No. 26 
(1908).  









targeted religion for government regulation and did not create a, in contemporary terms, a 
neutral and generally applicable law.15  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, with a bench made up entirely of new justices 
than in Hysong (1894), reviewed the Mennonite case in Herr (1910).16 The court found 
that the question of the legislator’s authority to be obiter dictum, defined as “incidental 
expression,” would not be used as precedent. The court found the legislature’s reasons for 
targeting public schoolteachers religious garb to be “supported by sound principle.” I 
interpret this to mean that the court was implicitly admitting that the statute was not a 
“uniform style of dress.” They rather found that the legislature had, in contemporary legal 
terms, a rational basis for the regulation,17 thus excusing the previous Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s orders in Hysong.  
In Cooper (1986), the Oregon Supreme Court made a much more explicit 
admission:  
Oregon’s religious garb statute ‘is not a general regulation, neutral toward 
religion on its face and in its policy, like the unemployment benefits 
standards in Smith.18 The cases would be comparable if a school regulation 
prescribed how teachers should dress while on duty without taking 
account of religious considerations. Then we would have only an issue of 
statutory authority to make such a regulation,19 and an individual claim to 
                                               
 
15 As previously mandated in Hysong (1894) “[T]he legislature may, by statute, enact that all teachers shall 
wear in the schoolroom a particular style of dress, and that none other shall be worn, and thereby secure the 
same uniformity of outward appearance as we now see in city police, railroad trainmen, and nurses of some 
of our large hospitals.” Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894) at 57. 
16 Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910); Judge Rice’s opinion, Commonwealth v. Herr, 
39 Pa. Super. 454 (1909). 
17 The rational basis standard is two degrees lower than that of the compelling interest standard in the 
Sherbert test (see Chapter II – Literature Review for a complete discussion). 
18 Smith v. Employment Division, 301 Or 209, 721 P2d 445 (1986), and Black v. Employment Division, 301 
Or 221, 721 P2d 451 (1986). 









exemption on religious grounds.’20 Oregon’s anti-religious-garb statute21 
‘is not neutral toward religion. On the contrary, the religious significance 
of the teacher’s dress is the specific target of this law. The law singles out 
a teacher’s religious dress because it is religious and to the extent that its 
religious significance is apparent when the wearer is engaged in 
teaching.’22 
 
These decisions in Pennsylvania and Oregon courts illustrate the general 
understanding that these anti-religious-garb laws targeted religion for government 
regulation and, therefore, do not meet the Smith standard of general applicability. 
Additional evidence for this failed test include the fact that the courts did not question 
that these laws were born from anti-Catholic bias. 
Anti-Religious-Garb Laws Originated from Anti-Catholic Bias 
Professor Douglas Laycock explained that anti-religious-garb statutes targeting 
teachers in public schools in the United States “were enacted in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries to prevent Catholic nuns from teaching public schools.” In a 
speech given in 2010, Laycock asserted that “[s]cholars and activists in the field now 
generally view them as an embarrassing relic of anti-Catholicism.”23 
                                               
 
20 The Oregon Supreme Court offered the following citations: “Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S., 106 S Ct 
1310, 89 L Ed 2d 478 (1986) (military regulation prohibiting headgear indoors applied to Jewish 
servicemen's yarmulkes); Menora v. Illinois, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982) (rule forbidding [students to 
wear] headwear while playing basketball applied to yarmulkes).” 
21 Oregon HB 3686 (2010) amended ORS 659A.033 and repealed the two-part anti-religious-garb law: 
ORS 342.650 and 342.655. N. 
22 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 at 19 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1986), app. dismissed, 480 U.S. 
942 (1987). 
23 Douglas Laycock, “Conference Introduction: American Religious Liberty, French Laicite, and the Veil.” 









The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with this narrow point. The court stated that 
the Oregon’s anti-religious-garb law of 1923 “dates from the period of anti-Catholic 
intolerance that also gave us the initiative measure against private schools struck down in 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925).”24 Contemporary legislators, in repealing Oregon’s 
anti-religious-garb law in 2010, stated that it was “originally enacted for [the] KKK to 
keep Catholics out of public schools.”25  
Both Oregon and Indiana’s anti-religious-garb bills were proposed by leaders who 
were open members of the Ku Klux Klan (Oregon’s 1923 bill became law and Indiana’s 
1925 bill did not).26 The anti-Catholic origins of these such bills helped persuade 
contemporary Oregon legislators to repeal its state statute in 2010. Seven years later, the 
Nebraska legislature used similar arguments when repealing its anti-religious-garb law in 
2017. They recognized that the law, first enacted in 1919, originated from political 
“pressure from the Ku Klux Klan amid a national wave of anti-Catholic sentiment.”27 
                                               
 
24 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 at 26 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1986), app. dismissed, 480 U.S. 
942 (1987), citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). For related analysis, see David B. 
Tyack (1968) “The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case,” The American Historical 
Review, The University of Chicago Press, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Oct., 1968), pp. 74–98; and Paula Abrams (2003) 
“The Little Red Schoolhouse: Pierce, State Monopoly of Education and the Politics of Intolerance,” 20 
Const. Comment. 61, Spring 2003. 
25 “Three states still prohibit religious clothing for teachers,” Associated Press, Sept. 5, 2009. 
26 Kaspar K. Kubli, a known Klansman, was “elected speaker of the House by the Republican majority for 
the 1923 session,” writes William G. Robbins in “The Rural-Urban Interface: A Tendency toward 
Conformity,” The Oregon History Project, Oregon Historical Society, 2002. See also Eckard Toy, “Ku 
Klux Klan,” The Oregon Encyclopedia, Oregon Historical Society, Sept. 15, 2017. In Indianapolis, Indiana, 
“By a vote of 64 to 27 the Indiana House accepted a minority report,” which included an anti-religious-garb 
law, as reported in “Ku Klux Bill Passes.” Afro-American, Feb. 14, 1925. 










The social context of these anti-Catholic sentiments are worth noting. The 
nation’s first census in 1790 reported that seventy-five percent of the population 
consisted of White, Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASP).28 Vincent Parrillo noted, “If we 
include all the people living in what was the United States in 1790 – African, European, 
and Native American – we find that about forty percent were not Anglo Americans.”29 
However, it was the WASP political majority that made up that seventy-five percent and 
used their power to pass discriminatory laws against the Irish and Germans, who were 
primarily responsible for bringing Catholicism to the new republic founded on principles 
of religious freedom. Political groups like the Supreme Order of the Star Spangled 
Banner began to organize violent hate campaigns against “alien riffraff”30 by “raiding 
Irish and German homes, churches, schools, and businesses.” Professor Parrillo noted 
that “arson, vandalism, beatings and murders occurred throughout the 1850s, with 
virtually every large northeastern city experiencing major disturbances. Organizing as the 
American Party, they elected seventy-five congressmen in 1854. By the next year they 
had elected six governors and many local officials.”31 
In the context of this political mobilization, Catholics began to self-segregate. For 
instance, the Gallitzin Borough in south-central Pennsylvania named itself after Prince 
Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin, “a Russian émigré who converted to Roman Catholicism 
                                               
 
28 The remaining distinguishable ethnicities included the Dutch, French, German, Irish, and Swedish, and in 
smaller numbers, Belgian, Danish, Flemish, Italian, Norwegian, Polish, and Swiss. 
29 Vincen N. Parillo, Diversity in America, 3rd Edition, SAGE Publications (2008). 
30 David M. Kennedy, Lizabeth Cohen, Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant, Volume I: A History of 
the American People: To 1877, 14th revised ed. (Cengage Learning, 2009), p. 314. 









and became a missionary in the Pennsylvania frontier in the 1790s. One hundred years 
later, the Roman Catholic community that he founded, and the public school it operated, 
became the center of a legal controversy”—the nation’s first religious garb case.32 By the 
1890s, all but fifty of the four to five hundred voters in the borough identified as 
Catholics and elected only Catholics to their public school board.33 Eight teachers were 
appointed at the time, all of whom were Catholic, and six of whom were habit-wearing 
nuns in the order of St. Joseph.  
In response to this highly unpopular ruling in favor of the nuns, the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly enacted the 1895 religious garb statute. From the House floor, Mr. 
Seyfert painted the bill as “the most vicious, atrocious, outrageous, and un-American 
measure ever offered.”34 Seyfert said the bill was “aimed at the great Roman Catholic 
Church in this State, and declared that, although he is not a member of the Catholic 
Church, he is in favor of the fullest liberty. He reasoned, ‘Many of the best citizens of the 
country are Protestants, who wear a peculiar garb. There are only twenty-five Catholic 
teachers in Lancaster country, and their religion is not indicated by their garb, but there 
are Mennonites who wear in the schools a garb that distinguishes them from all others, as 
                                               
 
32 T. Jeremy Gunn, Neutrality, Expression, and Oppression: A Response to Professor Schachter. 23 J.L. & 
EDUC. 391 (1994), p. 394. 
33 Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132 
(Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910). 
34 “Religious Garb in Public Schools: Discussion in the Pennsylvania House of a Bill to Regulate the Attire 









also do the German Baptists. The bill is a blow at these people and [the bill] should be 
killed.’”35 Despite Seyfert’s impassioned dissent, the bill was adopted 191 to 38. 
In 1990, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in reviewing this history, accepted 
“for the sake of argument the district court’s finding of fact that ‘anti-Catholicism was a 
significant factor’ in the passage of [Pennsylvania’s anti-religious garb] statute.” 36 The 
Third Circuit countered that finding with the view that “the statute bans all religious attire 
and is being enforced by the Commonwealth in a non-discriminatory manner with respect 
to the Muslim teachers [in 1990] as well as Catholics” in 1895 and for Mennonites in 
1910. Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that “it is irrelevant whether a portion of 
those who voted for the statute in 1895 were motivated by a desire to bar Catholic 
habit[s] from the classroom.” The court used the legislature’s reenactment of the garb 
statute to claim that “the parties in this case tendered no evidence, and the district court 
made no finding, regarding the circumstances surrounding the reenactment of the statute 
in 1949” [and 1982].37 
Although the evidence of hostility toward Catholics in 1895 was not persuasive to 
the Third Circuit in 1990 given their challenge in wake of the Smith decision, the district 
court’s finding that “anti-Catholicism was a significant factor” in the passage of 
Pennsylvania’s statute is very much relevant to this study. This precise legal finding 
points to the fact that the legislators did target religion with this statute, further 
                                               
 
35 Ibid. 
36 United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
37 United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990) at 36. It was also reenacted 









demonstrating that the anti-religious-garb law is not and has never attempted to be a 
neutral and generally applicable regulation. The Third Circuit may have concluded the 
same, had they applied the Smith standard of general applicability, a controversial case 
that was handed down four months before the Reardon case was issued.38 
Anti-Religious-Garb Laws Fail the General Applicability Test  
In summary, I find that the anti-garb statutes in Pennsylvania and Nebraska fail 
the general applicability test. The statutes target religious practice for government 
regulation and therefore are not “facially neutral.” It is undisputed that the laws 
originated from lawmakers’ anti-Catholic bias, further demonstrating that the legislatures 
were acting upon religious animosity.39 The fact remains: in the 123-year-old history only 
religious minorities have been impacted, proving that anti-religious-garb statutes are 
discriminatory in design as well as effect.40  
                                               
 
38 There are obvious reasons for this, which I discuss in Chapter II – Literature Review. The Smith decision 
was a highly disruptive ruling that challenged three decades of consensus about the use of the Sherbert 
standard in Free Exercise Cases.  
39 The question of “religious animosity” in political rhetoric, as evidence of politicians’ legal motivations, 
has recently received newfound attention. On February 15, 2018, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
arguably the most conservative circuit court in the country, ruled that President Trump’s third proposed 
travel ban is unconstitutional and a form of “religious animosity.” The Court held that the President’s 
attempts to restrict travel for people from eight countries, six of which are predominantly Muslim, would 
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court explained that 
“to the objective observer [President Trump’s] Proclamation continues to exhibit a primarily religious anti-
Muslim objective.” The court stated that there is “undisputed evidence that the President of the United 
States has openly and often expressed his desire to ban [Muslims] from entering the United States.” The 
court held that the President’s directive “strikes at the basic notion that the government may not act based 
on religious animosity.” International Refugee Assistant Project v. Trump, 857 F. 3d 554 (4th Cir. 2018). 
40 This particular argument is analogous to the disparate treatment and disparate impact standards used in 
workplace discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although line of inquiry is 
outside the scope of my study, it is important to note that Reardon was a Title VII case. But again, in the 
wake of Smith, the Third Circuit accepted the disparate treatment/intent argument, conceding that the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly acted upon anti-Catholic bias in 1895 but rejected the argument that it had 









Having failed the general neutrality test under Smith, the statutes in question 
(Appendix B) a companion test is triggered: the statutes must meet strict scrutiny, as 
applied in Sherbert and in the Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act. The 
U.S. Supreme Court set into motion this multi-layered judicial review in Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Kennedy 
explained that “a law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances 
legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will 
survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”41  
Having demonstrated that the anti-religious-garb laws in question are not “facially 
neutral” but rather “intend to interfere with religious exercise,”42 I now examine the ways 
in which public schoolteachers’ “free exercise of religion has been or is about to be 
substantially burdened by an exercise of the [school’s] governmental authority.”43 Then I 
will examine whether the states have compelling interests to justify such a burden and, if 
so, whether the statutes are narrowly tailored so as achieve those interests in the least 
restrictive means possible. 
                                               
 
Reardon decision (in which the Third Circuit justified the termination of a Muslim to wear a hijab while 
working in a Philadelphia public school) and Smith issued four months earlier (in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled against the accommodation requests by Native Americans). As previously discussed in Chapter 
II – Literature Review, after the quake of Smith, Congress and the Courts weighed in on reorganizing the 
religious liberty standards. This process brought new understanding to both Title VII and Free Exercise 
cases, which I discuss in the “Related Federal Statutory Developments” section of Chapter II – Evolution of 
Free Exercise Standards. 
41 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
42 Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002, 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. §2404, section 2(1). 









Substantial Burden Test 
There are two sides to my application of the substantial burden test. The first is 
the use of the Sherbert test, which explains that the government’s “burden” on religion 
cannot be incidental or fundamental, indirect or direct.44 I will use this federal standard in 
my analysis of both Nebraska’s and Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb laws. I will also 
apply to Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb statute the four-part substantial burden found 
in the state’s Religious Freedom Protection Act (RFPA). The section explains that a state 
agency, such as a public school, substantially burdens a person’s religion when the state’s 
action:  
• Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by 
a person’s sincerely held religious beliefs;  
• Significantly curtails a person’s ability to express adherence to the 
person’s religious faith;  
• Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities which 
are fundamental to the person’s religion;  
• Compels conduct or expression which violates a specific tenet of 
a person’s religious faith. 
I will use these federal and state standards to demonstrate seven ways the anti-
religious-garb laws substantially burden religion by asking whether the statutes (1) 
burden licensed teachers through legal penalties; (2) burden school directors for failing to 
                                               
 
44 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a complete 
discussion on this topic, see Mark Strasser, Free Exercise and Substantial Burden under Federal Law, 94 






comply; (3) burden women disproportionately; (4) burden religious minorities 
disproportionately; (5) burden specific religions over other religions, due to visibility, 
size, and frequency of wear; (6) burden religion over non-religion; and (7) burden school 
districts by contributing to religious segregation. 
 My analysis demonstrates that there is broad consensus in the case law and 
literature that the government regulation of teachers’ religious garb creates a substantial 
burden on religion, thus failing the Sherbert and RFPA burden standards. This triggers 
the next prong of Sherbert standards, which I will discuss in the following section—the 
compelling interest test is used to determine whether such burdens are justified and, if so, 
whether they are narrowly tailored in the least restrictive means possible to achieve those 
ends. In totality, these questions allow me to examine whether the anti-religious-garb 
laws will survive the strictest of judicial scrutiny. 
Effects of Anti-Religious-Garb Statutes 
Burden teachers with legal penalties. Janet Cooper, a Sikh teacher, was 
terminated for wearing a turban while teaching in an Oregon public school. Cooper 
moved to New Mexico after the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the decision to revoke her 
teaching certificate, as per Oregon’s anti-religious-garb statute45 (a law the legislature 
rescinded in 2010). The burden placed on her was so severe that it caused her to leave the 
state. I imagine that Cooper relocated to avoid both the civic stigma of having been found 
guilty of criminal activity and professional stigma for having her teaching license 
revoked. Having invested years in meeting Oregon’s licensing requirements, she faced 
                                               
 






the burden of relocation to continue her vocation as an educator somewhere that would 
not deny a fundamental part of her identity. Cooper experienced a financial burden from 
losing her employment as well as financial and personal hardships due to uprooting her 
family.  
The Pennsylvania and Nebraska statutes are distinct from Oregon’s. Rather than 
revoke a teacher’s license, Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb law has a two-part penalty: 
(1) upon the first offense, the religious garb-wearing teacher will be “suspended [from] 
employment in such school for the term of one year, and in case of a second offense by 
the same teacher (2) it shall be the duty of said school board to permanently disqualify 
such teacher from teaching in said school.”46 Nebraska, on the other hand, has a seesaw 
penalty: the said teacher will either (1) be “deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and fined in 
any sum not exceeding one hundred ($100) dollars and bear ‘the cost of prosecution,’ or 
(2) shall be committed to the county jail for a period not exceeding thirty days or both.”47 
The Nebraska statute, which was repealed in 2017, makes no mention of suspension from 
employment or having one’s teaching license revoked, although it is easy to imagine a 
teacher never finding work again in a Nebraska public school due to completing jail time 
for violating state law. Whether the penalty is a fine, suspension, disqualification, 
revocation of a teaching license, or jail sentence, it is clear that religious garb-wearing 
teachers are substantially burdened by criminal penalties. 
                                               
 
46 Ibid., RFPA. 









The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the characterization that revoking a teaching 
certificate under the anti-religious-garb law was a penalty by stating the following:  
It is not a penalty. It is not a withdrawal of a privilege by reason of 
hostility to a religious or political belief, as when some states disqualified 
Communists from driving or practicing pharmacy or from living in public 
housing.48 It is a disqualification from teaching in public schools based 
on one’s doing so in a manner incompatible with that function. We doubt 
that the First Amendment draws a line between a law that disqualifies a 
public schoolteacher by compelling her discharge and another law that 
disqualifies her by revoking her certificate to teach in the public schools. 
[The statute] does not forbid requalifying for a certificate, “if the teacher 
agrees to comply with the anti-religious-garb law.”49 
 
The language in Oregon’s statute was distinct, whereas, Pennsylvania and 
Nebraska legislatures explicitly used the term “penalty” in the language of their anti-
religious-garb statutes (Appendix B). This makes it clear that failing to abide by the 
statute is a criminal charge, with distinct penalties that supersede any qualifications for 
employment. (Making non-religion a requirement for employment is also a concerning 
argument that I will discuss later). The criminal penalties in Pennsylvania’s and 
Nebraska’s statutes demonstrate that the burden placed on religious garb-wearing 
teachers is substantial.   
Burden school directors with fines and professional harm. The penalties for 
school directors who fail to implement the statute are equally burdensome.50 In Nebraska, 
                                               
 
48 The Oregon Supreme Court cites Thomas Irwin Emerson, Emerson & Haber, Political and Civil Rights 
in the United States (New York, NY: Dennis & Company), 547-552 (2nd ed 1958). 
49 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 at 45 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1986), app. dismissed, 480 U.S. 
942 (1987). 
50 This could quite possibly violate their Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment—a legal 
cause of action that is outside the scope of my study. The Due Process argument was affirmed in 
Commonwealth v. Herr, Court of Quarter Sessions of Lancaster County, No. 26 (1908), issued by Judge 
Landis, Aug. 15, 1908. Judge Landis stated that the statute “subjects the individual school director to 
punishment for the acts of his associates as a corporate entity, when in fact he may not be in any way 
responsible for them.” The Due Process argument was rejected in the appeals in Commonwealth v. Herr, 39 






a penalty by a board of directors or school board states that the school director “shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine not exceeding 
one hundred ($100) dollars and costs of prosecution.” The Pennsylvania statute includes 
the first two penalties mentioned above, but adds: 
In the case of a second conviction or the violation of the provisions of this 
act the offending director shall (be punished by [an additional] fine not 
exceeding one hundred dollars and shall be deprived of his or her office as 
a public-school director. A person thus twice convicted shall not be 
eligible to appointment or election as a director of any public school in 
this State within a period of five years from the date of his or her second 
conviction. 
 
These penalties create substantial burdens on school administrators, which not only 
threaten their professional reputation and financial wellbeing, but also their livelihood. 
 Burden women disproportionately. The anti-religious-garb statutes also 
disproportionately burden women in three ways. First, three-quarters of public 
schoolteachers in the United States are women.51 Second, most religious garb-wearing 
people in the United States are women.52 And third, as shown in this study, every single 
case in the 123-year history of public schoolteachers wearing religious garb involved 
                                               
 
51 “In 2011–12, some 76 percent of public schoolteachers were female,” U.S. Department of Education, 
National Center for Education Statistics. Digest of Education Statistics, 2015 (NCES 2016-014), 
Introduction and Chapter 2. 
52 As detailed earlier: Protestant Christians (cross necklaces and jewelry), Catholic nuns (habits), Muslims 
(hijabs), Mennonites (bonnets), African Hebrew Israelites (headdresses), Church of the Brethern (hair 
covering and long dress), Hindus (bindi/red dot), and other jewelry worn by Daoists (yin yang), Buddhists 
(dharma wheel pendant), Wiccans (pentacles), and so on. In the indigenous American, Jewish, and Sikh 
traditions, men are the ones who predominately wear religious garb, but women, too, in those religions may 
wear a similar “dress, mark, emblem or insignia,” such as the turban worn by Karta Kaur Khalsa (Janet 










women.53 These three overlapping factors prove that anti-religious-garb laws 
substantially burden women—a protected class of people.54 
 As explained in the Global Context section of Chapter II, countries with 
restrictions on religion have greater increases in social hostilities and violence.55 This 
disproportionately harms women who are not able to find jobs because of their religious 
dress, who wear religious symbols on the job, or who request days off for religious 
observance. These laws have a significant effect on the earning power of families, given 
that regulations on religious expression, such as the anti-religious-garb statutes in 
question, disproportionately harm women. 
As previously cited, the Pew Research Center found that thirty-nine countries 
have enacted laws or issued policies “limiting women’s ability to wear religious attire” in 
2012–2013,56 which is blatant gender discrimination. In 2012–2013, nearly half of the 
European Union’s countries (twenty-one of forty-five) had at least one report of women 
being harassed for wearing religious attire.57 
                                               
 
53 See Table 1 to note the gender of plaintiffs. Some cases mention religious-garb-wearing priests coming 
onto on school grounds as visitors but the fact patterns reveal these priests were not serving as teachers. 
Also the courts held unlawful under state constitutions the use of public funds to support these private 
religious schools. 
54 Pub. L. 88-352, SEC. 2000e-2., Sec. 703, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
55 Pew Research Center, Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High. (Washington, DC: Pew Research 
Center, Jan. 2014); Sandra Stencel and Brian J. Grim, “Headscarf Incident in Sudan Highlight a Global 
Trend,” (Pew Research Center, Sept. 18, 2013); and Brian J. Grim, “Religion, Law and Social Conflict in 
the 21st Century: Findings from Sociological Research,” OXFORD JOURNAL OF LAW AND RELIGION (2012), 
pp. 249–271. 
56 Alan Cooperman, Peter Henne, Dennis R. Quinn, Restrictions on Women’s Religious Attire: More 
countries restrict women’s ability to wear religious symbols or attire than require women to dress a certain 
way. (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Apr. 5, 2016). 
57 Some hostilities arise from those who view the wearing of Islamic dress as evidence of “oppression of 
women.” For instance, in Dahlab v. Switzerland, No. 42393/98 (15 Jan. 2001, the European Court of 









Turkey, where Muslims make up approximately 98% of the population,58 “was 
the first country [in the European Union]59 to ban hijab through a sweeping prohibition 
applicable to public schools, universities, and in the workplace for official employees.”60 
Under its secular constitution, by 2001, over 37,000 girls had been expelled from school, 
and over 24,000 female teachers had been fired for wearing the hijab, an Islamic 
headscarf.61 As discussed in Chapter II – Literature, in 2013, Turkey rescinded its ban on 
the hijab. These global trends of legal restrictions on religious expression illustrate the 
drastic impact that bans on religious dress can have on girls and women. 
In the United States, Muslim women disproportionately experienced high levels 
of religious-bias in the workplace. For instance, the federal Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission reports that since September 11, 2001, the “the EEOC saw a 
250% increase in the number of religion-based discrimination charges involving 
Muslims.”62 As a result of these trends, Muslims came to expect negative biases against 
                                               
 
irreconcilable with the state’s commitment to gender equality. Although there were no complaints from 
parents or students, the court affirmed the school’s ban on wearing Islamic garb.) 
58 Pew Research Center, Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of 
the World’s Muslim Population. (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Oct. 2009), p. 5 
59 Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe in 1949. In 1987, Turkey applied to join the 
European Union and signed the Customs Union agreement in 1995, resulting in full membership in 1999. 
Turkey’s “full member” status was negotiated in 2005 and then suspended in 2016 as a result of political 
unrest and over EU members’ concerns about the lack of rule of law and human rights abuses.  
60 Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical Influences on 
the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 441, p. 453. 
61 Faisal Kutty, Ousted Turkish M.P. Merver Kavakci Calls on Canada to Help Hijab-Wearing Muslim 
Women, WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2001, pp. 44, 113. 
62 EEOC, What You Should Know about the EEOC and Religious and National Origin Discrimination 
Involving the Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern and South Asian Communities. (Washington, DC: Equal 









them in the workplace.63 This has affected them not only professionally but 
psychologically. Social psychologists Sonia Ghumman and Linda Jackson conducted 
research on 219 American Muslims and found that religious-garb-wearing Muslim 
women experienced increased levels of “stereotype threat” when seeking employment.64 
Stereotype threat65 is a person’s experience in certain situations that they may display or 
be viewed as the negative stereotypes associated with their social group—in this case, 
Muslims as “terrorists” or “extremists.” In other words, “Being in a situation where one is 
underrepresented, and thus in the demographic minority, has been shown to be a factor 
leading to the experience of stereotype threat—the expectation that one will be judged or 
perceived on the basis of social identity group membership rather than actual 
performance and potential.”66 In Ghumman and Jackson find in their study that “Muslim 
women who wear the headscarf [hijab] had lower expectations of receiving a job offer 
than Muslim women who did not wear the hijab.”67 In the context of this study, the anti-
religious-garb statutes make explicit that they should not expect to receive a job as a 
public schoolteacher. The psychological experience of stereotype threat, which is 
validated by substantial evidence of widespread religious bias in the workplace, coupled 
                                               
 
63 Society of Human Resource Management, Religious Bias in the Workplace: An Employee Perspective. 
Alexandria, VA: Society of Human Resource Management.  
64 Sonia Ghumman and Linda Jackson, “Muslim Headscarf and Expectations of Obtaining Employment.” 
Journal of Organizational Behavior. 31 (2010): 4–23.  
65 This theory originated from Claud M. Steel and Joshua Aronson, “Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual 
Test Performance of African-Americans.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69 (1995), 797–
811; Claud M. Steel, “A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance.” 
American Psychologist, 52 (1997), 613–629; Claud M. Steel, Steven J. Spencer, Joshua Aronson, 
“Contending with group image: The Psychology of Stereotype and Social Identity Treat.” In M. P. Zanna, 
ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology Vol. 34. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 379–440. 
66 Caryn J. Block, Sandy M. Kock, Benjamin E. Liberman, Tarani J. Merriweather, and Loriann Roberson, 
“Contending with Stereotype Threat at Work: A Model of Long-Term Responses.” The Counseling 
Psychologist Vol. 39, No. 4 (2001): 570–600. 






with statutory evidence of the state targeting religion for regulation, results in a chilling 
effect for women, in particular, who wear religious garb and seek employment as 
teachers in public schools. The fact that seventy-six percent of teachers are women, that 
most garb-wearing people in the United States are women, and that every single case 
demonstrated in this study involved women demonstrate that the anti-religious-garb 
statutes create substantial burdens on women. 
 Burden religious minorities disproportionately. In the United States, the anti-
religious-garb laws have also disproportionately burdened religious minorities. In all but 
one of the cases presented, all the plaintiffs who challenged the anti-religious garb 
regulations were religious minorities—Catholics, Mennonites, Muslims, Sikhs, and 
African Hebrew Israelites. In the related military and police cases, religious garb 
regulations were challenged by Jews, Muslims, and Sikhs. In related student cases, the 
anti-religious garb policies were challenged by Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, and Native 
Americans.  
 This pattern reflects the legal trends in invidious discrimination in the U.S. 
judicial system. Since the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution were incorporated in the states in the 1940s, religious minorities have had 
high rates of involvement in the courts yet reaped a very small number of victories.68 In a 
landmark study, John Wybraniec and Roger Finke reveal that “Protestants seldom 
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appeared in the courts and their rate of favorable rulings towered over [that of] all other 
religious groups.”69 They found that mainline Protestants were “involved in 
approximately 4% of cases” and received favorable decisions 70% of the time—
specifically 65% for Free Exercise claims. Conversely, cases brought forth by Native 
Americans, Jews, and Catholics altogether accounted for 20% of Free Exercise cases, less 
of half of which were ruled in their favor (ranging from 40–47%). Wybraniec & Finke 
found that the trends continue to decline: Muslims make up less than 1% of the American 
population and filed 7% of the Free Exercise cases, of which only one third (33%) of 
these cases received a favorable court ruling. (Sikhs were not detailed in this study, 
although I wonder, given my exposure to their cases, if their returns would be similar to 
that of Muslims.) 
 In fact, to date, no Native American, Jew, or Sikh has won a Free Exercise claim 
before the U.S. Supreme Court. Muslims won their first cases in 2015, both of which 
were on statutory claims.70 The above data reveals that religious minorities do win some 
of their cases in lower cases, but it is important to document that the lack of approval 
from the highest court in the nation may be one reason why religious minorities have 
such a low return on their Free Exercise claims. 
 Specific to this study, the anti-religious-garb statutes disproportionately burden 
religious minorities, as demonstrated by the identities of those who brought forth their 
petitions. 
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70 Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. ___ (2015), filed under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
of 2000; EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 Sup. Ct. 2028 (2015), filed under the Title VII of 






 Burden particular religions over other religions. The statutes in question also 
substantially burden particular religions over others, regardless of their majority/minority 
status. To illustrate this point, I will examine three judicial tests that rise from the case 
law on religious garb: (1) the visibility standard, (2) size standard, (3) and frequency 
standard. In regards to size, it is important to note that Nebraska’s legal definition of 
religious garb71 is nearly an exact copy of Pennsylvania’s,72 except for the deletion of the 
terms “mark, emblem or insignia.” This suggests that Nebraska was concerned about 
larger expressions of garb when emphasized the ban on religious “dress.” This could 
indicate a legislative intent to burden particular religions over others, even more so than I 
document here through the lens of the visibility, size, and frequency standards. 
In his dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger—the case involving a military 
psychologist who was not permitted to wear his yarmulke (skullcap) while on duty—
Justice Brennan articulated the visibility standard:  
I am…perplexed by the related notion that for purposes of constitutional 
analysis religious faiths may be divided into two categories—those with 
visible dress and grooming requirements and those without. This dual 
category approach seems to incorporate an assumption that fairness, the 
First Amendment, and, perhaps, equal protection, require all faiths 
belonging to the same category to be treated alike, but permit a faith in 
one category to be treated differently from a faith belonging to the other 
category. The practical effect of this categorization is that, under the guise 
of neutrality and evenhandedness, majority religions are favored over 
                                               
 
71 “Any dress, or garb, [emphasis added] indicating the fact that such teacher is an adherent or member of 
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1112 (1895–2018). This anti-religious-garb statute was the first in the United States, enacted in 1895. It 









distinctive minority faiths. This dual category analysis is fundamentally 
flawed and leads to a result that the First Amendment was intended to 
prevent. Under the Constitution there is only one relevant category—all 
faiths. Burdens placed on the free exercise rights of members of one faith 
must be justified independently of burdens placed on the rights of 
members of another religion. It is not enough to say that Jews cannot wear 
yarmulkes simply because Rastafarians might not be able to wear 
dreadlocks.73 
 
In his own dissent in Goldman, Justice Blackmun applies the visibility standard: 
“In general, I see no constitutional difficulty in distinguishing between religious practices 
based on how difficult it would be to accommodate them…” He makes clear that 
“favoritism based on how unobtrusive a practice appears to the majority could create 
serious problems of equal protection and religious establishment, problems the Air Force 
clearly has a strong interest in avoiding by drawing an objective line at visibility [my 
emphasis]. The problem with this argument, it seems to me, is not doctrinal but 
empirical.” 
Similar to the empirical data presented in the Wybraniec & Finke report, the 
identities of the plaintiffs in the religious garb cases presented in this study demonstrate 
that government regulations of religious garb, whether in the military or public school, 
substantially burden distinctive religions because of their uniqueness. The judicial 
measurement should not be, as Justice Brennan advanced, whether the religious garb is 
more or less visible. Instead, the court, should take “‘relevant differences’ into 
account.”74 The “relevant differences” standard was advanced by Chief Justice Roberts in 
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a unanimous decision, which held that distinct identities, such as race and religion, may 
need to be considered to reach a balanced ruling. In my own words, colorblind policies 
can be just as blind to racial prejudices as no-religious-garb laws can be blind to religious 
inequalities.  
The legal landscape of regulating religious garb in the United States tells a 
distinctive and important story. Collectively, the cases reveal that the legislative and 
judicial branches of state governments, in effect, penalized the suspect minority of the 
time by applying equally problematic standards such as the size and frequency tests.  
 To illustrate, a concurring opinion is worth briefly noting in the Pennsylvania case 
regarding Mrs. Reardon, who was fired for wearing an Islamic headscarf while teaching 
in a Philadelphia public school. Judge Ackerman rejected the Third Circuit’s focus on 
Title VII; instead, he argued that the court should have used the Lemon test, an 
Establishment Clause standard, to demonstrate that accommodating large religious garb 
would become a form of state advancement and endorsement of religion because of the 
size of the Islamic headscarf.75 (The Establishment Clause standard is outside the scope 
                                               
 
connected the themes of religious diversity with racial diversity, saying, “The Court has noted that 
‘[c]ontext matters’ in applying the compelling interest test (Grutter v. Bollinger [539 U.S. 306 (2003) at 
327]) and has emphasized that the fundamental purpose of strict scrutiny is to take ‘relevant differences’ 
into account.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) pp. 9-10. 
75 “An argument could be made that [Oregon’s anti-religious garb] statute might be read to encompass 
religious symbols such as mezuzahs, crucifixes, or mini-Buddhas, etc., worn, for instance, on necklaces. 
However, a case involving small-sized religious articles is not before this panel. Were such case to come 
before this court, then, the court would consider that case's specifics in view of Lemon and come to a 
determination. The difference from the instant case to the next case may simply be one of degree and 
effect. The United States Supreme Court, through its crafting of the flexible test in Lemon has indicated that 
it, and the inferior courts, will deal with these factors, making distinctions where appropriate. The 









of the study, but it is important to document how courts from coast to coast fixate on the 
size of religious garb as a unique judicial standard.) 
 The Oregon Supreme Court, for instance, made a similar claim when saying that 
“‘religious dress’ must be judged from the perspective both of the wearer and of the 
observer…” The court agreed that it was permissible for a public schoolteacher to wear 
“common decorations” that a teacher “might draw from a religious heritage, such as a 
necklace with a small cross or Star of David.”76 While in the same breath of giving 
differential treatment to Jews and Christians, the court justified terminating and revoking 
the teaching license of a Sikh teacher because turbans are “uncommon” and larger than 
necklaces. Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Goldman serves as an adequate rebuttal:  
To allow noncombat personnel to wear yarmulkes but not turbans or 
dreadlocks because the latter seem more obtrusive—or, as Justice Brennan 
suggests, less “polished” and “professional,”—would be to discriminate in 
favor of this country’s more established, mainstream religions, the 
practices of which are more familiar to the average observer. Not only 
would conventional faiths receive special treatment under such an 
approach; they would receive special treatment precisely because they are 
conventional.77 
 
The application of visibility tests in religious garb cases are, by their nature, 
discriminatory toward particular religious groups. They are infused with assumptions 
about what is “common” or “conventional,” arguments that, at best, reek of implicit bias 
and, at worst, reinforce white supremacy and Christian nationalism. 
                                               
 
distinctions. Hence cases involving smaller-sized religious symbols do not affect my analysis here. Their 
propriety awaits another day.” 
76 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 at 41 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1986), app. dismissed, 480 U.S. 
942 (1987). 






In Mississippi, for example, Deborah McGlothin was discharged for 
insubordination for wearing an Africanist headdress during Black History month, during 
school skits relating to African culture. McGlothin said, “I’d dress on those particular 
days as just a program director of the particular skits. And also, I displayed the African 
folk lore and a number of things of that nature…” In protest of this expression, the 
principal issued a memorandum concerning her “inappropriate dress,”78 claiming, “All 
children need positive role models, but especially do elementary-aged children because of 
their very impressionable young minds. I am concerned that your appearance is giving 
them a distorted view of what is appropriate.”79 In this case, the argument was not about 
the size of her dress but more about the social etiquette of Southern culture, which the 
Mississippi Supreme Court found to be unconvincing and held that McGlothin had Free 
Exercise protections to wear religious garb while teaching.80 One of the distinct facts of 
the McGlothin case involved the frequency with which she wore her religious garb. 
Although it was only worn during the school’s celebration of Black History month, the 
principal found that to be enough to justify her termination. 
In contrast, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed it would permit, similar to 
permitting small jewelry, the wearing of religious garb, where “a teacher makes an 
occasional appearance in religious dress, for instance on her way to or from a seasonal 
                                               
 
78 For a similar line of argument see EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F. 3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016) in 
which the Eleventh Circuit ruled that dreadlocks were not protected by Title VII protections on race 
because “dreadlocks were not an immutable characteristic of black persons.” 
79 Mississippi v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879. 
80 As previously noted, three months later, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Smith, that ruled against Native 









ceremony.” The court held that “Only wearing religious dress as a regular or frequently 
repeated practice while teaching is grounds for disqualification.”81 Similarly, Nebraska’s 
attorney general permitted teachers-in-training to wear religious garb because they are in 
front of students for only “short periods of time.”82  
In Pennsylvania, however, Alima Reardon was a substitute teacher at the time her 
employment was terminated. The trial court found: 
Towards the end of 1984, on three separate occasions Reardon reported to 
various schools for duty as a substitute teacher and was informed by the 
principals of those schools that, pursuant to state law, she could not teach 
in her religious clothing.83 
 
These inconsistencies reveal the problematic nature of the frequency standard. 
The question of whether a substitute teacher can wear an Islamic headscarf while 
teaching three times in a public school, as compared to children seeing a student teacher 
wear an Islamic headscarf most days for an entire semester, is purely subjective and 
arbitrary. Equally troubling is the idea that religious garb is merely “grotesque vagaries in 
                                               
 
81 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 at 43 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1986), app. dismissed, 480 U.S. 
942 (1987). The Oregon Supreme Court equated a teachers’ expression with government establishment of 
religion when using this Establishment Clause analogy, “It is the same distinction as that between an 
occasional religious meeting, parade or brief display in a public park or building and the permanent 
erection of a religious symbol, as in Lowe v. City of Eugene [463 P.2d 360 (1969)].” 
82 Report of the Nebraska attorney general, “Schools-Teachers-Wearing of Religious Garb,” as addressed to 
Hon. John M. Matzen, state superintendent, Aug. 24, 1926. “I am of the opinion that the word ‘teacher’ as 
used in the [anti-religious-garb statute] applies only to those who hold certificates to teach in Nebraska and 
are employed to teach in some of the publics schools of the state. I do not think it applies to those who are 
merely being trained to teach in some one of the several state normal schools, and as an incident to said 
training, but without compensation are giving instruction (under the direct supervision of a member of the 
faculty of a state normal school) for short periods of time to pupils in a public school of the state.” Signed, 
GWA. 









costume”84 that can be taken on and off for the occasional “seasonal ceremony.” These 
comments reveal more about the observer than what the court is called to observe.  
For these reasons, the visibility, size, and frequency standards are highly 
problematic because the very nature of the question determines the result. The 
assumptions that lay behind these standards may be a symptom of a limitation in the legal 
system and in society at large: religious illiteracy. As I discuss in more detail in the final 
chapter, if the courts do not have measurable knowledge85 about what legally constitutes 
religion86 and how private acts of devotion manifest in public, then our public institutions 
will continue to perpetuate stereotypes about religious minorities, in particular, or 
misperceptions about religion in general. The visibility, size, and frequency standards are 
emblematic of these misperceptions, thus privileging some religious expressions over 
another. 
This leads me to demonstrate how the anti-religious-garb laws in Pennsylvania 
and Nebraska preference non-religion over religion. 
                                               
 
84 In a broader case about the use of public funding for private religious education, the Supreme Court of 
Iowa discussed the narrow question of teachers’ religious garb. In a 5–2 decision, the court found 
persuasive the rulings of O’Connor, stating “We united with the New York court in the view that the 
[dissenting] opinion by [Justice] Williams…” in Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894). See 
Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1918). 
85 For a discussion of the problems of religious illiteracy and the precise measurements of religious literacy 
see Diane L. Moore, Chair, et. al., “Guidelines for Teaching About Religion in K-12 Public Schools in the 
United States,” American Academy of Religion, Religion in the Schools Task Force, Apr. 2010. Diane L. 
Moore, Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Stephen Prothero, Religious Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know—
and Doesn’t, (New York: HarperOne, 2007); Benjamin P. Marcus, “Religious Literacy in American 
Education,” in Michael D. Waggoner and Nathan C. Walker, The Oxford Handbook of Religion and 
American Education (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2018). 
86 Peñalver, Eduardo, The Concept of Religion, YALE L J, Vol. 791, (1997) p. 107. Peñalver builds upon the 
writings of Kent Greenawalt in Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV 753 (1984) 









Burden religion over non-religion. It is widely understood that a public school 
cannot make either religion or non-religion a prerequisite for employment. Such attempts 
would violate the no-religious test principle found in the Pennsylvania,87 Nebraska, and 
United States constitutions.88 The question in this study is narrower: whether the teacher, 
in the line of his or her duties, can wear any “dress, mark, emblem, or insignia indicating 
the fact that such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order, sect or 
denomination.” 
The fact that the religion is the subject of the regulation—specifically, garb that 
denotes a teacher’s affiliation with any “order, sect or denomination”—makes the law 
particularly burdensome on religion. Even a generally applicable dress code that requires 
all teachers to wear a prescribed uniform would attempt to treat religion and non-religion 
equally but may have an effect that is, to some lesser degree, burdensome to religion.  
To illustrate this dilemma, I turn to the colorful language in the 1908 opinion of 
the district court judge. Although his opinion was overturned, 89 it is worth noting the 
rationales he provided for ruled in favor of the bonnet-wearing Mennonite teacher:   
…as the [Pennsylvania anti-religious garb] statute stands, a teacher may 
cover himself with partisan political badges, or herself with the white 
ribbons of crusading Prohibitionists, or wear the red ribbon of personal 
                                               
 
87 The Hysong court, in reinstating habit-wearing nuns to teach in the public classroom in 1894 held, “We 
cannot now, even if we wanted to, in view of our law, both fundamentally and statutory, go back a century 
or two to a darker age, and establish a religious test as a qualification for office.” Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 
Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894) at 52. 
88 The precise question of religious tests for office fall outside the scope of this study; however, it is 
important to note that five of the eleven major religious garb cases addressed this precise question (Table 1. 
Enumerating Causes of Action).  
89 Judge Landis’s decision in Commonwealth v. Herr, Court of Quarter Sessions of Lancaster County, No. 
26 (1908), Aug. 15, 1908. Overturned in Commonwealth v. Herr, 39 Pa. Super. 454 at 10–11 (1909) and 









liberty; he or she may dress as fop or flirt, or may masquerade as clown or 
coquette, may display badges of Free Masonry, Odd Fellowship or 
Knights of Pythias, or may “sport” the Elk's tooth or the Eagle's talons, in 
the class room, and this law will not touch them; but, if they wear the plain 
iron cross of the Episcopal Order of St. Andrew, the modest button of the 
Society of Philip and Andrew, or of the Epworth League, or of the Society 
of Christian Endeavor, they are disqualified as school teachers. If they don 
the plain skirt and the straight bonnet of the Mennonite, or wear the 
straight coat and shaven upper lip of the Dunkard or the buttonless garb of 
the Amish, they are to be banished into outer professional darkness, 
stripped of their office and their rights.90 
 
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not persuaded to strike down the 
legislature’s popular anti-religious-garb statute, Justice Landis’s opinion is helpful in 
answering the narrower question of whether the statute burdens religion over non-
religion. The answer, as Justice Landis illustrates, is simple. By targeting religion, the 
state burdens religion. By failing to create a neutral and generally applicable dress code 
that is universally applied, the state privileges non-religion over religion. Of course, the 
state may have a compelling interest for justifying such a burden, the subject of a later 
inquiry, but, nonetheless, the burden on religion over non-religion is substantial.  
Burden communities with religious segregation. The church-state battles of the 
twentieth century over the parents’ right to choose a child’s education,91 the public school 
                                               
 
90 Ibid. Judge Landis in Herr (1908). 
91 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also compulsory education case, Wisconsin v. 









curriculum,92 the flag salute,93 school-sponsored prayers,94 transportation,95 public aid for 
private religious schools,96 and religious groups’ access to public school facilities97 have 
one thing in common: the battles over religion and American public education have 
contributed to the rise of private religious schools in the United States.98 When religious 
people did not feel welcomed or wanted in public schools, they created their own private 
alternatives.99 
James W. Fraser, in Between Church and State (2016), 100 argues that the “failures 
of efforts to introduce more equal time for religiously inspired alternatives to the teaching 
of evolution” resulted in “a withdrawal on the part of some conservative religious people 
                                               
 
92 Teaching creationism, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); teaching evolution, Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); English-only instruction, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Scopes v. 
State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1927). 
93 West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Minersville v. Gobitis [sic, Gobitas], 310 U.S. 586 
(1940). 
94 Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
(1992). Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).  
95 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see also section on field trip services in Wolman v. 
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) 
96 Examples include vouchers, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); standing to challenge 
school vouchers, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011); remedial 
services, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); shared time programs, Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 
373 (1985); tax credits for school-related expense, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); textbooks, Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); textbooks, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); textbooks, 
Cochran v. Louisiana, 281 U.S. 370 (1930). 
97 Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches 
Union, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Westside Community v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
98 Charles J. Russo, Kate E. Soules, Adina Newman, Susan Douglas, “Private Religious Schools,” in 
Michael D. Waggoner and Nathan C. Walker, eds., The Oxford Handbook on Religion and American 
Education, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Milton Gaither, “Religion and Homeschooling,” in 
ibid., Waggoner and Walker. 
99 Ibid., Russo, et. al. and Gaither. 
100 James W. Fraser, Between Church and State: Religion and Public Education in a Multicultural America, 









from the public school.”101 This contributed, Fraser argues, to a rise of faith-based 
education in the forms of private schools and homeschooling. He tracks these 
developments into the late twentieth century, when many leaders of white Evangelical 
schools rejected “a new mixture of the forms of private schools and homeschooling. He 
tracks these developments into the late twentieth century, when many leaders of white 
Evangelical schools rejected “a new mixture of issues—changing sexual mores, school 
integration, and what seemed like antireligious [public] school policies.”102 These culture 
wars—embroiled in issues of religion, race, and sexuality—resulted in the conservative 
religious misperception that “God was kicked out of public schools”103 and the secular 
misperception that the academic study of religion is not welcome American education. 
These trends contributed to religious segregation in American education. For 
example, as previously explained, twenty-two states had anti-religious-garb laws by the 
end of World War II. This national trend sent a strong legal message to Catholic nuns, in 
particular, that they were not allowed in the de facto Protestant public-school system. 
One of the survival strategies that Catholics adopted was to create their own private 
schools. As a result, 3.6 million students are currently enrolled in Catholic-affiliated 
schools, which is 41% of all private school students.104 
                                               
 
101 Ibid., Fraser, p. 212. 
102 Ibid., Fraser, p. 173. 
103 Ibid., Fraser, p. 177. 
104 Characteristics of Private Schools in the United States: Results From the 2013-14 Private School 









Today, Muslim families are experiencing disproportionally high hostilities in 
public schools. In 2017, the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding reported the 
following: 
• More than two in five (42%) Muslims with children in K-12 school 
report bullying of their children because of their faith, compared with 
23% of Jews, 20% of Protestants, and 6% of Catholics.  
 
• A teacher or other school official is reported to have been [the 
aggressor] in one in four bullying incidents involving Muslims.105 
 
To illustrate the rise of “teacher-bullies,” Newsweek reported that in May 2017, “a 
Bronx substitute teacher in New York City ripped off a second-grade student’s hijab 
because the student was allegedly misbehaving. The teacher was later charged with a hate 
crime.”106 In detailing the national trend of teachers bullying Muslims students, 
Newsweek reported that a  
Virginia school district has placed a teacher on leave for removing a 
student’s hijab from her head. The student took to Twitter after the 
incident Wednesday saying that her hijab was “ripped off her head” by a 
teacher she appreciated and valued… An account that appears to belong to 
the student said she was talking with her friend when the teacher pulled 
off her hijab from behind. To her shock, he [the teacher] then said: “Oh, 
your hair is so pretty,” she said on Twitter.107 
 
In another incident, a public schoolteacher in Nashville, Tennessee filmed and 
later posted on social media a Muslim girl who “is seen trying to cover up her hair as 
                                               
 
105 Dalia Mogahed and Youssef Chouhoud, American Muslim Poll 2017: Muslims at the Crossroads, 
Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, (Washington, DC: ISPU, 2017). 
106 Beatrice Dupuy. “Muslim Students are Getting Their Hijabs Pulled Off by Teachers in Classrooms 
Across the Nation.” Newsweek, November 16, 2017. 









someone tries to pull off her hijab and play with her hair. A Snapchat video of the 
incident showed students touching the student’s hair with the caption ‘pretty hair.’” 
Newsweek reports that “[t]he teacher was later suspended without pay.”108 
These social hostilities109 in public classrooms—whether the aggressors are 
students or teachers—have politically contributed to the founding of nearly 300 new 
Islamic schools in the United States, which currently educate 40,000 students.110 Muslim 
teachers and families who have faced discrimination for wearing religious garb in public 
schools or for affiliating with Islam have had to self-segregate as a survival strategy—the 
precise tactic used by Catholics when they were considered the suspect minority of the 
day. Similar stories can be shared about other religious minorities such as Jews,111 
Mormons,112 Native Americans,113 and so on. 
                                               
 
108 Ibid., Newsweek (2017) 
109 The U.S. Department of Education’s Stop Bullying curriculum explicitly classifies religious minorities 
who wear garb as targets for bullying. “For example, Muslim girls who wear hijabs (head scarves), Sikh 
boys who wear patka or dastaar (turbans), and Jewish boys who wear yarmulkes report being targeted 
because of these visible symbols of their religions. These items are sometimes used as tools to bully 
Muslim, Sikh, and Jewish youth when they are forcefully removed by others. Several reports also indicate a 
rise in anti-Muslim and anti-Sikh bullying over the past decade that may have roots in a perceived 
association of their religious heritage and terrorism. When bullying based on religion is severe, pervasive, 
or persistent, the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division may be able to intervene under Title IV of 
the Civil Rights Act. Often religious harassment is not based on the religion itself but on shared ethnic 
characteristics. When harassment is based on shared ethnic characteristics, the Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights may be able to intervene under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.” Accessed at 
www.stopbullying.gov 
110 Characteristics of Private Schools in the United States: Results From the 2013-14 Private School 
Universe Survey, NCES 2016-243 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2016).  
111 Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
112 Western expansion and self-segregation in Utah was, in part, motivated by the hostilities Mormons 
faced in Missouri. For example, Governor Lilburn Boggs issued an executive order stating, “The Mormons 
must be treated as enemies, and must be exterminated or driven from the state if necessary for the public 
peace—their outrages are beyond all description,” Mo. Exec. Order No. 44, Oct. 27, 1838. 
113 The struggle between the strategies of self-segregation versus coerced integration is detailed in David 
Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875–









A compelling example of this point derives from the nation’s first anti-religious-
garb laws that were in response to a court ruling in favor of Catholic nuns who lived and 
taught in a minority-majority community. Hysong v. Gallitzin114 arose from the Protestant 
majority in the state of Pennsylvania who disapproved of Gallitzin Borough, a Catholic-
dominated community located in a rural area of the state between Pittsburg and 
Harrisburg. By the 1890s, all but 50 of the 400–500 voters in the borough identified as 
Catholics and elected only Catholics to their public school board. Eight teachers were 
appointed at the time, all of whom were Catholic and six of whom were habit-wearing 
nuns in the order of St. Joseph. Put simply, the teachers of the public school reflected the 
identities of those in the public at the time. The General Assembly of Pennsylvania 
disapproved of this practice and, in 1895, overwhelmingly enacted what is currently the 
nation’s only remaining anti-religious-garb statute.  
Twelve decades later, the Gallitzin area is now home to fourteen private Catholic 
schools that reside within twenty miles of one another.115 I do not have empirical 
evidence that the Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb statute directly created this effect, 
but it may be one of many factors. It is understandable that religious minorities who feel 
under attack may engage in institutional building so as to protect their way of life. These 
culture wars over public schools perpetuate the trend of creating religiously segregated 
communities. To be clear, there will always be a demand for faith-based schools, whether 
                                               
 
114 Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132 
(Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910). 
115 All Saints Catholic School, Altoona Central Catholic School, Bishop Carrol High School, Bishop 
Gilfoyle High School, Cathedral Elementary School, Great Commission Schools, Hollidaysburg Catholic 
School, Holy Name Elementary School, Mt. Carmel Elementary School, Sacred Heart School, St. 






there is evidence of invidious discrimination or not, but what this study reveals is that 
education laws that target religion for government regulation place a substantial, albeit 
indirect, burden on local communities because their schools become more and more 
religiously segregated. 
The larger question that I am asking with this line of thinking is simply, “What 
happens when the public school fails to serve the public?” I will reflect more on this in 
my closing statements in Chapter V – Conclusion.  
In the meantime, I will now summarize how the seven burdens that I have 
outlined here show that the anti-religious-garb laws fail both the substantial burden test 
under Sherbert and the substantial burden test under Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom 
Protection Act. 
Statutes Fail the Substantial Burden Test under Sherbert 
The burden test under the Sherbert standard is broad, in that it considers the 
weight of the government regulatory power to be indirect or incidental as well as direct or 
fundamental.116 In other words, the court seeks to spend little time determining the degree 
of harm and more time scrutinizing whether the state has compelling interests to justify 
such burdens and whether those justifications are narrowly tailored to achieve the least 
restrictive means possible. 
That said, the seven examples of burden that I examined demonstrate, without a 
doubt, that the anti-religious-garb laws in Pennsylvania and Nebraska burden religion 
                                               
 
116 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a complete 
discussion on this topic, see Mark Strasser, Free Exercise and Substantial Burden under Federal Law, 94 






substantially. The criminal, financial, and professional penalties are direct burdens on a 
teacher who wears religious garb while teaching in a public school. Nebraska’s statute is 
particularly harsh, threatening teachers with up to thirty days in jail. The Pennsylvania 
law adds additional burdens on school directors who fail to implement the statute, 
including banning them from serving as an administrator or elected school board member 
in any district in the state, for up to five years. These directed penalties serve as the first 
sets of evidence of substantial burden. 
The next cluster derives from a person’s identity. There are three ways that the 
anti-religious-garb statutes disproportionately burden women: seventy-six percent of the 
nation’s public schoolteachers are women, women are more likely than men to wear 
religious garb in the United States, every single case in the 123-year history of public 
schoolteachers wearing religious garb involved women (Table 1). These interlocking 
demographics demonstrate that these statutes indirectly burden women. 
These laws also indirectly burden another identity group: religious minorities. The 
wearing of religious garb in many of these communities can be fundamental to their 
identity. Throughout the country, scores of Catholic nuns were targeted by these laws for 
wearing habits while teaching in public schools. Their habits were fundamental identity 
markers representing their ordination vows and commitment to chastity. What was 
originally designed to target Catholics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
have been used in the late twentieth century to justify removing religious garb-wearing 
Muslim and Sikh teachers from public schools.   
Nebraska’s statute, which used Pennsylvania’s law as a blueprint, removed all 






expressions of one’s adherence to any “religious order, sect or denomination.” Instead, 
Nebraska used only the words “dress or garb,” suggesting, possibly, that they meant to 
focus on larger, more visible acts. Although this interpretation is speculative, there is 
plenty of evidence of courts fixating on the visibility, size, and frequency of wear, which 
immediately targets particular religions over others. These inquiries are fraught with bias 
and perpetuate stereotypes. 
The anti-religious-garb statutes not only burden religious minorities and particular 
religions over others, they also give preferential treatment to non-religion over religion. 
By failing to enact a universal dress code for all teachers and, instead, targeting religion 
for regulation, the state directly and substantially burdens religion over non-religion.  
In a less direct fashion, the statutes place a burden on the community to recover 
from the effects of a religiously segregated school district. As illustrated in Gallitzin 
Borough, although eighty- to ninety-percent of the rural community identified as 
Catholic, the state legislature removed all religious garb-wearing Catholics from teaching 
in its public schools. This reveals the larger problem of leaders in public schools not 
reflecting the communities they serve—a burden the whole community bears.  
For these seven reasons, the anti-garb laws in Pennsylvania and Nebraska fail the 
substantial burden test under Sherbert. 
Statutes Fail the Substantial Burden Test under RFPA 
Only one of the four types of substantial burden in the Religious Freedom 






judicial review under strict scrutiny.117 Pennsylvania’s current anti-religious-garb law 
violates all four.  
The statute (1) “significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expression 
mandated by a [teacher’s] sincerely held religious beliefs.” For example, the Mennonite’s 
plain dress and bonnets are virtuous expressions of devotion; Muslims’ head coverings 
represent modesty and discretion; Sikh turbans are expressions of equality and 
observance; the wearing of the Jewish yarmulke is an act of piety and reverence. These 
are just a few of the plethora of forms of “conduct or expression” of “sincerely held 
religious beliefs” that the anti-religious-garb law seeks to stifle. Furthermore, this is 
merely one side of the “conduct” discussion.  
The other reveals that that the state seeks to (2) “compel conduct or expression 
which violates a specific tenet118 of a [teacher’s] religious faith.” Requiring any of the 
teachers described here to remove their religious garb while teaching is an act of 
                                               
 
117 Combs v. Dubois, 540 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir. 2008); Combs v. Dubois, 468 F.Supp.2d 738 (W.D. Pa. 2006). 
118 It is important to note that, in the context of the Sherbert standard, a burden need not rest on scriptural or 
doctrinal authority. Take the Mississippi case for example: “We are told that there is no specific tenet of the 
African Hebrew Israelites mandating that women wear headdress. First Amendment protections, however, 
do not turn on whether the claimant’s conduct or form of expression has been mandated by doctrine or 
teaching of a particular religious organization or denomination, nor is it necessarily of concern that 
members of the particular faith may disagree with claimant’s interpretation of church dogma. Thomas v. 
Review Board of Indiana, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). What and all that may be required are that the belief have a 
religious grounding and that the individual express ‘sincerely held religious beliefs.’ Frazee, 489 U.S. at 
109 Sup. Ct. at 1517, 103 L.Ed.2d at 920. Mississippi v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1990) 
citing, “State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 286-87 (Minn.1989) (Statute requiring display of slow-
moving vehicle inapplicable to Amish defendants on grounds of violation of free exercise “although not all 
adherents regarded the display as violative of the Amish precepts.); Dupont v. Employment Division, 80 Or. 
App. 776 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (Unemployment benefits could not be denied to woman discharged after 
missing work to attend religious convention important to her personal well-being on basis it was a sincere 
religiously motivated action.); Key State Bank v. Adams, 138 Mich.App. 607, 360 N.W.2d 909 (1984) 
(Although bank had legitimate business reason for employees to work on Saturday, state could not 









compulsion. For a Muslim or Sikh person, for example, for the state to force his or her 
hair to be shown to people outside his or her family can be as vulnerable as state-
compelled public nudity. In these ways, the anti-religious-garb statutes (3) “denies a 
[teacher] a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities which are fundamental to the 
[teacher’s] religion.” 
In violation of RFPA, the statute directly (4) “curtails a person’s ability to express 
adherence119 to the [teacher’s] religious faith.” The targeted activity is not simply 
religious garb, but garb that, by its nature, “indicates the fact that such teacher is an 
adherent or member of any religious order, sect, or denomination.” This makes it even 
more explicit that the lawmakers, in wanting to prevent public school students from being 
exposed to their teachers’ religious identities, targeted the teachers’ religious garb.  
I will scrutinize the reasons why the legislatures in Pennsylvania and Nebraska 
enacted these statutes in the next section about compelling state interests. 
Compelling Interest Test 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  
~The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
                                               
 
119 In the Sherbert standard, the burden need not rest on membership or affiliation or attendance. The 
Mississippi Supreme Court stated, “It is no defense that McGlothin may not be a regular participant in the 
organized activities of a particular church, synagogue or other religious body, although there is such a 
group in Jackson House of Israel Hebrew Cultural Center. McGlothin testified, however, “I don’t meet with 
a group on a regular basis.” Frazee recognized a right to unemployment benefits by one who refused to 
work on Sunday, notwithstanding that claimant was not a member of any church congregation and did not 
attend worship services on Sunday.” Mississippi v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1990), cert. 






The First Amendment makes inseparable two principles for the one right to 
religious freedom: the principles of free exercise and no establishment of religion. The 
history of religious liberty in the United States reveals that officials at all levels of 
government have struggled to balance these legal touchstones. This struggle is reasonable 
given the profound challenge the Constitution presents to its leaders.  
The free exercise principle serves as a constitutional platform to uplift the 
fundamental and inalienable right to liberty of conscience for individuals and for groups, 
while the principle of no establishment shields this liberty from state interference. The 
Free Exercise Clause is an affirmation of a person’s right to religious freedom, and the 
Establishment Clause is a limitation on government’s power to regulate religion.  
A limitation of this study is my narrow focus on the free exercise standards used 
by federal courts and their statutory companions in Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom 
Protection Act. As a result, I dedicate this next section to examining the various 
arguments that states use to justify burdening public schoolteachers’ fundamental rights. 
What makes many of these positions compelling is the no establishment principle, best 
articulated in the landmark 1947 case Everson v. Board of Education. Although it was a 
5–4 decision, the justices unanimously agreed on this point: all states are required to 
uphold the federal government’s commitment to “separation of church and state.”120 They 
                                               
 
120 “The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor 
the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions 
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away 
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be 
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-









disagreed on what constituted “separation” when it came to the narrow question of public 
funds for transporting children to private religious schools.  
The states in this study rely on the “separation” doctrine to justify their regulation 
of religious garb worn by public schoolteachers. My analysis of their position may seem 
one-sided because my study is designed to apply one of the two principles of religious 
freedom: free exercise. A second study that relies on the Establishment Clause 
standards121 may or may not result in similar legal conclusions; however, this is a study I 
intend to conduct at a later time. 
With this caveat, I now use the free exercise principle to analyze the compelling 
interests that Pennsylvania and Nebraska have and may use to justify banning public 
schoolteachers’ religious garb. 
Justifications for Regulation 
The case law and literature reveal that the state can rely on six thematic arguments 
to justify regulating public schoolteachers’ religious garb: (1) It is compelling for the 
state to create a secular school culture; (2) it may sometimes be necessary for the state to 
prevent the school from using public funds to aid religion; (3) it may be important for the 
                                               
 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious 
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of 
religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and State.’” Everson v. Board 
of Education, 330 U.S. 1 at 15-16 (1947).  
121 For example, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the three-
pronged “Lemon Test” to test an Establishment Clause claim: (1) the law must have a secular purpose; (2) 
its primary effect is neither to advance nor inhibit religion [my emphasis]; and (3) it does not foster an 
excessive entanglement between government and religious institutions. See also the various Establishment 
principles in state constitutions, such as the no preference, the no compelled aid, the no aid to religious 
education, the no religious test for education, and the no aid to sectarian education (see Table 1. 






state to avoid the perception that the school approves of or favors religion; (4) the school 
may need to prepare for a “religious takeover”; (5) religious garb indoctrinates children 
held captive by compulsory education laws; (6) religious garb is an indirect form of 
religious instruction; (7) students, especially younger children, are highly impressionable 
and susceptible to religious persuasion by authority figures; and (8) forms of religious 
garb that cover the entire face could jeopardize school safety. Together, these serve as a 
list of the compelling state interests that governments and public officials have used to 
justify regulating religious garb. 
In this section, I will present the findings of these justifications, and in section E. 
Discussion of this chapter, I will analyze these positions and articulate my responses. I 
will close this chapter with a summary of my legal conclusions.   
Statutes create a secular school culture. In 1894, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, as previously described, initially ruled in favor of Catholic nuns who sought to 
wear habits while teaching in public schools.122 In a fateful line at the end of the ruling, 
the court affirmed the legislature’s authority to create a universal dress code to be applied 
to all teachers, which they did not create (see Chapter IV – General Applicability). The 
legislature swiftly passed the statute in question, which was affirmed by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in 1910123 by an entirely new bench.124 The justices used what we refer to 
                                               
 
122 Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132 
(Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910). 
123 Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910). 
124 For an explanation, see “Origins of Anti-Religious-Garb Laws & Cases: 1894 to 1910” in Chapter I – 









in modern terms as a rational basis test125 to justify the state’s interest in creating a 
secular school culture: 
As shown by the preamble of the act under consideration [Appendix B], 
the legislature deemed it “important that all appearances of sectarianism 
[my emphasis] should be avoided in the administration of the public 
schools of this commonwealth.” This was the ostensible object of the 
legislation, and we can discover no substantial ground for concluding that 
it was not the sole object which the legislature had in contemplation.126 
 
In Hysong, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the accusation that 
“sectarian control was exercised in [the plaintiffs’] management, and thereby these 
schools were transformed from public schools into sectarian schools.”127 The Herr court 
overturned Hysong on the grounds that the “system of common school education in this 
commonwealth is the creature of the state, and its perpetuity and freedom from sectarian 
control are guaranteed by [Pennsylvania’s] constitutional provisions.” The court held that 
the legislature, absent making “religious belief or church affiliation a test” for 
employment, does have the authority to “determine what regulations will promote the 
efficiency of the system and tend to the accomplishment of the object for which it was 
established.” The object was made explicit in the preamble of the anti-religious-garb 
statute: “all appearances of sectarianism should be avoided” (Appendix B). 
The historic justification of “avoiding sectarian influence” can sometimes be 
expressed with the contemporary phrase “religious neutrality.” The Oregon Supreme 
                                               
 
125 This test was originally developed three decades after Herr in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
304 U.S. 144 (1938). The rational basis test requires that a law must further any legitimate government 
interest as long as that interest is deemed reasonable to the court, Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 
106 (1949). 
126 Judge Rice opinion, Commonwealth v. Herr, 39 Pa. Super. 454 at 25 (1909), affirmed in Commonwealth 
v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910). 






Court, for example, relied on the provisions in its state constitution to conclude, “This is 
what makes the otherwise privileged display of a teacher’s religious commitment by her 
dress [Janet Cooper, a Sikh teacher who wore a white turban] incompatible with the 
atmosphere of religious neutrality [emphasis added] that [the Oregon anti-religious-garb 
law] aims to preserve ….”  
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also affirmed the use of the term “religious 
neutrality.” The Third Circuit found Oregon’s dismissal of Janet Cooper to be persuasive 
and proceeded to apply the standards under Title VII to justify the termination of Alima 
Delores Reardon, a hijab-wearing Muslim teacher. The Third Circuit cited the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s dismissal of the Oregon case “for want of a substantial federal 
question”—a surprising position given the U.S. Constitution’s authority over state 
laws.128 The Third Circuit interpreted the high court’s dismissal as “an indication that the 
U.S. Supreme Court ‘authoritatively established’ the goal of preservation of an 
atmosphere of religious neutrality [emphasis added] a compelling state interest [emphasis 
added].”129 
Together, the compelling interests of the state to create a secular school culture 
have come in the form of two arguments: the historic position, “avoiding sectarian 
influence,” and the contemporary justification of “religious neutrality.”  
Statutes prevent use of public funds to aid religion. A related claim asserts that 
the anti-religious-garb statutes prevent the school from using public funds to aid religion. 
These Establishment Clause arguments, which are outside the scope of my study, can 
                                               
 
128 The case that the U.S. Supreme Court used to incorporate the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to the states. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 






bleed into Free Exercise claims brought by those the statutes seek to target. Historically, 
these arguments center around the clergy status of Catholic nuns and their choice to 
dedicate their salaries to their religious orders. One complainant put it quite bluntly:  
With faces averted from the world they have renounced; wearing their 
peculiar robes which tell of their church, their order and their 
subordination to the guidance of their ecclesiastical superiors; using their 
religious names and addressed by the designation, “sister,”130 they direct 
the studies and the deportment of the children under their care, as 
ecclesiastical persons.131 
 
The Missouri Supreme Court, in building upon this same line of thinking, 
affirmed that Catholic nuns “by their oaths cease to exist as free citizens” and “cease to 
exist as individual economic units.”132 The district judge characterized the nuns as 
“instruments and agents of their religious orders,” not only because of their personal 
commitment to donate their earnings to the church but also because of their loyalty to the 
church. The judge found them, by the nature of their ordinations, unable to supervise 
because, “by the very nature of their obligations and of the control to which they submit 
themselves, the final and absolute control of the secular or sectarian existence and 
personal actions of the nuns is vested in the Church authorities.” The court claimed that, 
                                               
 
130 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had this to say about this concern: “It was the custom of the scholars 
attending schools taught by sisters to address them as ‘Sister,’ although there was no rule of the board or 
written or announced requirement by the directors or teachers that this should be done. The pupils, with 
very few exceptions, conformed to this custom and addressed them as ‘Sister.’ The same custom existed as 
to addressing Catholic priests as ‘Father,’ when they visited the schools; and the resident Catholic priests, 
as well as others who had formerly been located at Gallitzin, quite frequently visited the schools. We find 
no evidence that they conducted themselves in any manner different from any other person visiting the 
schools, either in the hearing of recitations or otherwise, nor that there was any difference observed in the 
treatment of them by the scholars from that accorded to any other visitor, the same custom being observed 
as to rising and saluting any other grown person who visited the schools; as, for instance, where a physician 
visited the schools, the scholars would rise and say, ‘Good-morning, Doctor;’ and as to any grown person 
not having a title, he would be addressed by his proper name when it was known.” Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 
Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894) at 17. 
131 Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894) at 63–64. 






in case of a dispute between the school and the nuns, the nuns, “by virtue of their oaths of 
obedience would be required to ignore the orders of the secular school authorities and 
obey the orders of the religious superior and Church Hierarchy.” The court held that the 
religious garb is evidence that “the character of their obligations” to the church 
“disqualified from teaching in any public school in the State of Missouri.” 
This concern about the use of public funds to hire religious garb-wearing teachers 
is an issue for the courts to examine not only under the Establishment Clause but also 
under the constitutional guarantee of no religious tests for office, both of which are 
inquiries outside the scope of this Free Exercise study.  
Statutes avoid the perception of favoring religion. Another common 
justification for regulating teachers’ religious garb is the view that “a rule against such 
religious dress is permissible to avoid the appearance of sectarian influence, favoritism, 
or official approval in the public school.”133 In building upon this position, the Oregon 
Supreme Court found that the state’s statute was enacted with no other objective than “to 
avoid giving children or their parents the impression that the school, through its teacher, 
approves and shares the religious commitment of one group and perhaps finds that of 
others less worthy.”134 
A related argument was offered by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
ruled that because Pennsylvania had rejected the claims of Catholic, Mennonite, and 
Muslim teachers, the state was enforcing the anti-religious-garb law in a “non-
discriminatory manner,” thus not approving or favoring any particular religion. 
                                               
 
133 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 at 27 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1986), app. dismissed, 480 U.S. 
942 (1987). 






Statutes avoid a religious takeover. Embedded in this way of thinking was the 
fear that some local districts, if left to their own devices, would have favored hiring 
religious garb-wearing teachers, resulting in a “religious takeover” of the public schools. 
Those who hold this view could point to these fact patterns in the case law.  
• In North Dakota, “during the term opening in September, 1935, there were 
six teachers employed in [the public] school; four of these teachers were 
nuns, members of the Sisterhood of St. Benedict.”135 “In 1945, the 
Attorney General of North Dakota reported that 20 school districts in 
eleven counties were employing 74 nuns and eight priests.”136  
 
• In Kentucky, Superintendent Wendell P. Butler hired 84 religious garb-
wearing [Catholic] teachers in public, tax-supported schools.137  
 
• In Indiana, critics noted, “All five members of the Board of the School 
Corporation are Catholics; since approximately 80% of the voting 
population in the area is Catholic, Catholic domination of the Board will 
presumably persist.”138  
 
• In Ohio, there were “five teachers of the total of twenty-five in these three 
schools who are non-Catholic (two at St. Peter’s and three at Sharpsburg), 
[and] six of the elementary school teachers in the Distinct are members of 
a religious order within the Roman Catholic Church, Sisters of the 
Precious Blood.”139 
 
At the time, many Protestant leaders in these states looked upon the minority-
majority communities with fear and suspicion. Likewise, a large majority of 
Pennsylvania legislators were deeply concerned about the Catholic majority in Gallitzin 
Borough just as similar concerns were legislated by elected officials in Oregon, who were 
                                               
 
135 Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 44 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1936). 
136 Alvin W. Johnson and Frank H. Yost, Separation of Church and State in the United States. (New York, 
NY: Greenwood Press, 1948), p. 123; “Schools—Teachers—Wearing Religious Garb,” Report of the 
Attorney General of North Dakota, Aug. 25, 1945, pp. 262–63.  
137 “Casey County, 2 Sisters; Marion County, 43 Sisters; Washington County, 9 Sisters; Nelson County, 13 
Sisters; Meade County, 14 Sisters; Grayson County, 3 Sisters.” Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S. W. 2d 801 (Ky. 
Ct. App., 1956) at 3.  
138 Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1940). 






also open members of the Ku Klux Klan (see Chapter IV – Anti-Religious-Garb Laws 
Originated from Anti-Catholic Bias). These serve as examples of how the Protestant 
majority responsible for governing the public schools and state legislatures used anti-
religious-garb statutes to “protect the children” from the religious “other”—Catholics.   
In a contemporary legal context, this concern is not articulated in terms of a 
“religious takeover” but in the worry that a high number of religious garb-wearing 
teachers may create a “pervasively sectarian” school. Take, for instance, the case of 
Grand Rapids v. Ball (1985), a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court overturned “Shared 
Time” programs that used public funds to offer secular classes to private school students. 
Justice Brennan, in writing for the five to four majority, stated, 
Given that 40 of the 41 schools in this case are thus “pervasively 
sectarian,” the challenged public school programs operating in the 
religious schools may impermissibly advance religion in three different 
ways. First, the teachers participating in the programs may become 
involved in intentionally or inadvertently inculcating particular religious 
tenets or beliefs. Second, the programs may provide a crucial symbolic 
link between government and religion, thereby enlisting—at least in the 
eyes of impressionable youngsters—the powers of government to the 
support of the religious denomination operating the school. Third, the 
programs may have the effect of directly promoting religion by 
impermissibly providing a subsidy to the primary religious mission of the 
institutions affected.140 
 
In building upon Ball, contemporary proponents of anti-religious-garb statutes 
articulate three degrees of possible violations that they wish to avoid by banning public 
schoolteachers’ religious garb. As previously mentioned, the statutes seek to create a 
secular culture and prevent the perception that there is a “symbolic link between 
                                               
 
140 Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); overturned in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 
509 U.S. 1 (1993). The overturning of Ball was further reinforced in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 






government and religion” because there can be no form of public subsidy of religion, 
regardless of degree of directness.  
Three additional concerns that build upon this fourth point are that the religious 
garb seen by students, day in and day out, may result in (5) religious indoctrination 
through intentional or inadvertent forms of (6) religious instruction, and the state has a 
compelling interest in protecting students, especially younger children,141 because they 
are (7) highly impressionable and susceptible to the persuasion of authority figures, 
especially their teachers. The next three sections are dedicated to further articulating the 
three justifications of indoctrination, instruction, and impression. 
Statutes prevent religious indoctrination. The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed 
multiple times that it is both reasonable and compelling for schools to exercise their 
constitutional duty to ensure that publicly “subsidized teachers do not inculcate 
religion.”142 Currently, there is wide consensus between civil liberties and religious 
groups that public schoolteachers should not indoctrinate students in any religion.143 
                                               
 
141 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); “There is substance to the contention that college students are 
less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination,” Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 at 
686 (1971); the Tilton court cites Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal 
Development, pt. II, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 574 (1968). 
142 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
143 Charles C. Haynes, A Teachers’ Guide to Religion in Public Schools. (Washington, DC: Religious 
Freedom Center of the Newseum Institute, 2017). This statement was endorsed by the American 
Association of School Administrators, American Federation of Teachers, American Jewish Committee, 
American Jewish Congress, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, Baptist Joint 
Committee on Public Affairs, Christian Educators Association International, Christian Legal Society, 
Council on Islamic Education, National Association of Elementary School Principals, National Association 
of Evangelicals, National Association of Secondary School Principals, National Council of Churches of 
Christ in the U.S.A., National Council for the Social Studies, National Education Association, National 
PTA, National School Boards Association, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and Union of 









Some proponents of anti-religious-garb laws have argued that public schoolteachers 
violate this legal and political consensus when wearing religious garb because religious 
garb itself indoctrinates its observers. This position rests on the view that religious garb is 
a circuitous form of proselytization. 
In this line of thinking, it is worth noting a related Free Speech case, Downing v. 
West Haven.144 Classified as a case regarding a teacher’s admitted proselytization, 
Downing involved not the wearing of religious garb (Appendix A and Appendix C) but a 
public schoolteacher wearing clothing with a printed religious message. In 2001, a federal 
district court in Connecticut affirmed a school’s decision to terminate the employment of 
a public schoolteacher who wore a T-shirt that said, “Jesus 2000—J2K.” The teacher had 
expressed the theological belief that people needed to be saved by Christ before the 
anticipated apocalypse at the turn of the millennium. The U.S. District court affirmed the 
school’s response as “objectively reasonable in light of interest in avoiding an 
Establishment Clause violation.”145 The court cited rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to affirm a public school’s authority to “direct 
teachers to refrain from expression of religious viewpoints in the classroom and like 
settings; indeed, schools have a constitutional duty to make certain that subsidized 
teachers do not inculcate religion.”146  
                                               
 
144 Downing v. West Haven, 162 F.Supp 2d 19 (U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Conn. 2001). 
145 Ibid., Downing (2001). 
146 Ibid., Downing, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) and Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 









Compare Downing (August 2001) to a Free Speech case handed down by the U.S. 
Supreme Court two months earlier: Good News Club v. Milford Central School (June 
2001).147 In Good News Club, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in a 6–3 decision, that a 
public school operates as a “limited public forum” and therefore cannot engage in 
“viewpoint discrimination.” This means that the public school cannot prevent a private 
Evangelical Christian organization from engaging in religious speech on the school’s 
campus during non-school hours to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. 
Admittedly, Good News Club is not about a teacher’s religious expression during 
the school day but about a community group gaining access to a “limited public forum” 
during non-school hours. Downing, however, is a case about the proselytizing message 
expressed during school by a teacher in her limited role as government official. Although 
the Free Speech inquiry that arises from Downing and Good News is outside the scope of 
this study, it is important to concern ourselves with the time and place restrictions placed 
on public schoolteachers’ speech with special attention to the intended and unintended 
outcomes of the speech and the degree of religious inculcation or proselytization by an 
agent of the state.  
This inquiry raises constitutional concerns that lie beyond Free Speech. For 
instance, would permitting a Muslim to wear a hijab while teaching in a public school 
that previously fired an Evangelical Christian for wearing a T-shirt with the words “Jesus 
2000—J2K” result in that school privileging or even endorsing Islam? In this scenario, 
would not a reasonable student perceive the state as being hostile to Evangelical 
                                               
 






Christians and favorable to Muslims? Could not Evangelical Christians, in this 
hypothetical situation, bring Establishment and Equal Protection claims, arguing that the 
state favors some religious expressions over others? These are worthy legal questions 
best addressed in future studies focusing on the constitutional protections of Free Speech, 
No Establishment, and Equal Protection—all of which are beyond the narrow scope of 
this study about the Free Exercise rights of teachers who wear religious garb (see 
Appendix C for examples and see discussion in Chapter IV – Statutes Avoid the 
Perception of Favoring Religion). 
Regardless of their form, proponents of the anti-religious-garb statutes argue that 
a public schoolteacher’s religious garb may intentionally or inadvertently become a form 
of religious instruction, which the state has a compelling interest to prevent. 
Statutes prevent religious instruction. The state’s concern about indoctrination 
is closely related to the second characterization of religious garb as a form of religious 
instruction. At best, the garb is a benign form of instruction, in that it simply instructs 
observers to know the wearer’s religious identity—“That’s Ms. Reardon,” a student may 
say, “and because she wears a hijab, I know she’s a Muslim.” At worst, a parent may say, 
“That’s Ms. Reardon and because she wears a hijab, I suspect she’s propagandizing 
Islam in my child’s classroom.” Said another way, religious garb may be characterized as 
a form of indirect instruction or a faith-formation pedagogy designed to tacitly alter a 
student’s religious identity—“That’s Ms. Reardon,” a parent may suspect, “and because 
she wears a hijab, I suspect she is quietly teaching my child to convert to Islam,” an echo 






These scenes are not mere hyperbole, as the contemporary and historical record 
proves. In 2011, after a Pennsylvania lawmaker introduced a bill to repeal the state’s anti-
religious-garb law, a mother and resident of York, Pennsylvania entered her state 
representative’s office and asked, “Are you the one who wants terrorists teaching our 
children?”148 She expressed concerns about “Muslims wearing turbans in public 
schools,”149 unaware that American Muslims do not wear turbans: ninety-nine percent of 
people in the United States who wear turbans are Sikh,150 Sikhism being the world’s 
fifth-largest religion and distinct from Islam. This particular mother believed that 
Pennsylvania’s anti-religious-garb statute would prevent terrorists (e.g., which she 
imagined as “turban-wearing Muslims”) from using the public classroom to instruct 
students to become “Islamists,” violent extremists.151 These views expressed at the turn 
of the twenty-first century harken back to fears expressed at turn of the twentieth century. 
For example, the widely distributed publication The Heathen Invasion (1911) 
characterized Hindus as people who would use yoga to instruct children to become 
                                               
 
148 My account of a conversation with a state representative in 2011.  
149 For a deeper understanding of the widespread misinformation about Muslims in America, see Wajahat 
Ali et al., Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America. (Washington, DC: Center for 
American Progress), Aug. 26, 2011. Accessed at 
www.americanprogress.org/issues/religion/reports/2011/08/26/10165/fear-inc. 
150The Sikh Coalition, “Who are the Sikhs? High School/Adult Presentation.” (New York: The Sikh 
Coalition, 2010), pp. 31, 38-39. 
151 Soner Cagaptay, “Muslims vs. Islamists: Islamism is not a form of the Muslim faith or an expression of 
Muslim piety; it is, rather, a political ideology that strives to derive legitimacy from Islam,” The 









violent: “Yoga is paving the way that leads to domestic infelicity and insanity and 
death.”152 
Not all legal justifications for wanting to prevent religious instruction are this 
extreme. But degrees of this concern are laced into the case law. In Zellers (1951), the 
New Mexico Supreme Court characterized the habit worn by Catholic nuns as follows: 
“Not only does the wearing of religious garb and insignia have a propagandizing effect 
for the church [emphasis added], but by its very nature it introduced sectarian religion 
into the school.”153 In Rawlings (1956), Judge Hogg said in his lone dissent, “The 
children who attend the public schools and their parents are, with rare exceptions, 
Protestants. But by the majority opinion these children and their parents are deprived of 
their constitutional right to be free from sectarian influence and indirect teachings 
[emphasis added] of the Catholic Church at public expense.”154 He understood the 
teachers’ religious garb to be an indication of the public employee’s membership in a 
religion, and as a result, it had a “sectarian influence” in the public classroom, a form of 
indirect religious instruction. In an earlier articulation of this view, the state’s high court 
in New York ruled in O’Connor v. Hendrick (1906) that although no church doctrine was 
being taught, the sectarian nature of the teachers’ garb was a form of instruction: 
                                               
 
152 Mabel Potter Daggett, “The Heathen Invasion,” Hampton Columbian Magazine, Vol. XXVII, No. 4, 
Oct. 1911. 
153 The court used this rationale to conclude that “if the Religious [emphasis added] are again employed as 
teachers in our public schools [emphasis added] they must not dress in religious garb or wear religious 
emblems while in the discharge of their duties as such teachers.” Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501 (N.M. Sup. 
Ct. 1951). 









There can be little doubt that the effect of the costume worn by these 
Sisters of St. Joseph at all times in the presence of their pupils would be to 
inspire respect if not sympathy [emphasis added] for the religious 
denomination to which they so manifestly belong. To this extent the 
influence was sectarian [emphasis added], even if it did not amount to the 
teaching of denominational doctrine.155 
 
The views expressed in Zellers, Rawlings, and O’Connor were informed by the 
words from the lone dissent of Judge Williams in the nation’s first religious-garb case, 
Hysong (1894). Judge Williams said that Catholic nuns “wear, and must wear, at all times 
a prescribed unchangeable ecclesiastical dress which was plainly intended to proclaim 
their non-secular and religious character, their particular church and order, and their 
separation from the world.”156 He explained that their religious identity is not in 
question.157 “It is the introduction into the schools as teachers of persons who are by their 
striking and distinctive ecclesiastical robes necessarily and constantly asserting their 
membership in a particular church, and in a religious order within that church, and the 
subjection of their lives to the direction and control of its officers,” Judge Williams said. 
He viewed the habits worn by Catholic nuns as an impermissible, albeit indirect, form of 
religious instruction. He thought their “striking and distinctive ecclesiastical robes” 
                                               
 
155 O’Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1906). 
156 Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132 
(Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910). 
157 Judge Williams said, “They come into the schools not as common school teachers, or as civilians, but as 
the representatives of a particular order in a particular church whose lives have been dedicated to religious 
work under the direction of that church. Now the point of the objection is not that their religion disqualifies 
them. It does not. Nor is it thought that church membership disqualifies them. It does not. It is not that 









would result in students constantly having to observe and thus be influenced by their 
teachers’ unfluctuating religious devotion. 
Whether the degree of concern is about indoctrination or instruction, both 
positions rest upon the view that students are highly impressionable.  
Statutes protect impressionable students. The U.S. Supreme Court “has been 
particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in 
elementary and secondary schools,” wrote Justice Brennan for the majority in Edward v. 
Aguillard (1987).158 The Court gives particular attention to younger students because 
differences in maturity “warrants a difference in constitutional results,” Justice Brennan 
wrote. For these reasons, the Court requires public schools to take great care in balancing 
the interests of the state, as limited by the Establishment Clause, with the freedoms of 
individuals, as guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  
Specific to the question of religious garb, several lower courts have made explicit 
that exposing children to teachers’ religious garb is a failure by the state to protect 
impressionable students. The concern is that children and young adults are easily 
                                               
 
158 Justice William J. Brennan for 7–2 majority, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). See annotated 
description of the following cases in the bibliography: Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 
(1963); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overturned in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Grand 
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Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 
(1983); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Westside Community 
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influenced because of their fledgling moral and intellectual capacities. Students, 
especially those enrolled in elementary school, may not yet have the ability to prevent an 
adult from unwanted religious expression.  
A historical perspective is worthy documenting. For instance, Judge Hogg, the 
dissenting voice in Rawlings (1956), stated, “Indeed, these good women are the Catholic 
Church in action in the most fertile field—the impressionable minds of the children.”159 
He continued by coupling the impressionability and sectarianism arguments: The habit-
wearing teachers “have a subtle influence upon the tender minds being taught . . . . In and 
of themselves they proclaim the Catholic Church… and silently promulgate 
sectarianism.”160 In further advocating that the state protect impressionable children, he 
characterized the teachers’ habits as being “at all times in the presence of their pupils” 
(frequency argument), and as a result would “inspire respect, if not sympathy, for the 
religious denomination to which [their teachers] so manifestly belong.”161 
Three decades later, the U.S. Supreme Court in Grand Rapids v. Ball (1985)162 
held that a “public employee who works on a religious school’s premises is presumed to 
inculcate religion in her work.”163 Early twentieth-century supporters of anti-religious-
garb laws used a similar rationale to argue that because “teacher nuns,” as they called 
them at the time, were ordained representatives of the Catholic Church, then a reasonable 
                                               
 
159 Judge Hogg’s dissent in Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S. W. 2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App., 1956) at 26. 
160 Ibid. Rawlings (1956). 
161 184 N.Y. 421, 77 N.E. 614. 
162 Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), which prevented the public schoolteachers from teaching 
students at private religious schools through a “Shared Time” supplemental program, was overturned in 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993). The overturning of Ball was further 
reinforced in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). For further analysis see IV. E. Discussion. 






student would not be able to distinguish between when the nuns were acting on behalf of 
the church and when they were acting on behalf of the state. Furthermore, proponents of 
anti-religious-garb statutes claim that Catholic nuns are not likely to be able to teach their 
subject in any other way than from a religious perspective. As a result, the teachers “may 
intentionally or inadvertently become involved in inculcating particular religious beliefs,” 
an activity the state must prevent in order to protect impressionable students, the Ball 
court stated. 
A similar line of thinking was embedded in the 1984 Equal Access Act, which 
required school administrators to give student-initiated clubs equal access to public 
schools because of their status as “limited open forums.”164 Congress was particularly 
concerned that teachers’ sponsorship, advisement, or participation in student religious 
clubs would constitute a state endorsement of religion. To ensure teachers were not 
joining with students in religious activities, Congress mandated that “employees or agents 
of the school or government are present at religious meetings only in a nonparticipatory 
capacity.”165 Congress also limited their legislative protections to secondary schools, 
implying that middle- and elementary-school students are too immature to engage in 
voluntary, student-initiated religious-clubs.166 
                                               
 
164 “‘A limited open forum exists whenever a public secondary school ‘grants an offering to or opportunity 
for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional 
time.’ 20 U.S. Code § 4071 (b).” As summarized in Westside Community v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).  
165 20 U.S. Code § 4071 (c)(3). 
166 However, in 2001 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Free Exercise grounds that religious groups were 
required to have equal access to elementary school facilities to host voluntary religious clubs Good News 









Given this long history of Congress, the Courts, and the public monitoring public 
schools for Establishment Clause violations, it is of particular concern teachers’ religious 
garb worn for a “captive” classroom creates a “symbolic connection” between religion 
and the state.167 These words were used in Reardon, the 1990 decision by the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which coupled the impressionability concern with the 
endorsement and favoritism arguments when ruling against a Muslim woman who wore a 
hijab while teaching in a Philadelphia public school:  
Since the wearing of such garb occurs in the intense and “captive” 
classroom atmosphere, [permitting the wearing of religious garb] would 
further enhance the “symbolic connection” between religion and the state. 
In view of a child’s delicate constitution and curiosity, the testimony by 
the defendants’ expert concerning the children’s possible [emphasis 
added]168 conclusion of endorsement, the fact that the students did indeed 
ask particular teachers about their garb (indicative of a child’s curiosity), 
and the atmosphere where the garb is worn, it is clear to [the court] that 
the sought-after accommodation would have the effect of the state 
appearing to endorse religion over nonreligion.169 
 
The question of children’s impressions of teachers’ religious garb was briefly 
mentioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark decision Abington School District 
v. Schempp (1963).170 The Court ruled, in an 8–1 decision, that state-mandated prayers 
and Bible readings in public schools were unconstitutional. In justifying this case, the 
                                               
 
167 In United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990) the Third Circuit cited 
these cases: See Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) at 390–91 (comparing McCollum v. Board of 
Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
168 The word “possible” is italicized to bring attention to an argument I make in Chapter IV; that is, in the 
context of this study, the impressionability claim is speculative. There are no known studies on students’ 
impressions of public schoolteachers’ religious garb. 
169 United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990). 









Schempp court asked its readers to compare states that permitted public schoolteachers 
with courts that did not.171 Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court singled out O’Connor 
(1909), issued by the New York Appeals Court, the highest court in the state, which 
joined the impressionability and frequency arguments: 
 … some state courts have enjoined the public schools from employing or 
accepting the services of members of religious orders even in the teaching 
of secular subjects. Over a half century ago, a New York court [in 1909] 
sustained a school board’s exclusion from the public schools of teachers 
wearing religious garb on similar grounds: “Then, all through the school 
hours, these teachers [frequency argument]… were before the children as 
object lessons of the order and church of which they were members. It is 
within our common observation that young children … are very 
susceptible to the influence of their teachers [impressionability argument] 
and of the kind of object lessons continually before them in schools 
conducted under these circumstances and with these surroundings” 
[emphasis added]. 
 
These judicial and legislative acts demonstrate that states have a legal 
responsibility—a compelling government interest—to take preventative measures to 
ensure that students are protected for the mere fact they are “impressionable and their 
attendance is involuntary.” 172 
                                               
 
171 The Schempp court also cites O’Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1906); 
Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1910); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949; and 
Berghorn v. Reorganized School District No. 8, 364 Mo. 121 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1953). The Schempp court also 
asks readers to compare those cases with the ruling of Texas Commissioner of Education. As noted in the 
Bibliography, the American Jewish Year Book reports that the Texas Supreme Court “upheld two lower-
court decisions rejecting the suit on the ground that plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative 
remedies.” In response, J. W. Edgar, Education Commissioner of Texas, described himself as “powerless to 
stop nuns from teaching in public schools in religious garb or a local school board from leasing church-
owned property for public-school use.” He said doing so would require “the force of court action or of 
statute.” In affirmation, “the state board upheld Commissioner Edgar’s decision by a vote of 14–1” on 
January 25, 1961. 









Champions of anti-religious-garb laws argue that this commitment to protect 
society’s most vulnerable is a government duty that extends beyond psychological 
protection to physical protection, too. 
 Statutes promote public safety in public schools. Another example of a 
compelling state interest used to justify anti-religious-garb laws is the contemporary 
argument that some forms of religious garb may be a threat to public safety. This is a 
position sometimes taken by public officials in Europe and, most recently, in Canada to 
justify regulating Muslim women’s dress173 (see Chapter I – Global Context). For 
example, public safety has become a predominant rationale used to target for government 
regulation the burqa, a loose garment that some Muslim women use to cover their entire 
bodies, and the niqab, a face veil that some Muslim women use to cover the nose and 
mouth but not the eyes.174 Some advocates of these bans concede that if all religious garb 
is not banned then at least the government should create a generally applicable law that 
prohibits all face coverings. 
                                               
 
173 “Global Context” section in Chapter II – Literature. Also see Alan Cooperman, Peter Henne, Dennis R. 
Quinn, Restrictions on Women’s Religious Attire: More Countries Restrict Women’s Ability to Wear 
Religious Symbols or Attire Than Require Women to Dress a Certain Way (Washington, DC: Pew Research 
Center, Apr. 5, 2016); Sahar F. Aziz, “The Muslim ‘Veil’ Post-9/11: Rethinking Women’s Rights and 
Leadership,” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding and the British Council, Policy Brief, Nov. 
2012; John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: 
Religion and Politics in the Muslim World (University of Michigan Press, 2008). 
174 Veronica Rocha, “What’s the Difference Between a Hijab, a Burka, a Chador and a Khimar?” Los 
Angeles Times, Aug. 10, 2017, video (0:00 – 0:55). Accessed at www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
muslim-woman-hijab-removed-settlement-20170810-story.html; H.A. Hellyer, “What’s in a Niqab?” 









In October 2017, the Canadian province of Québec did just that. The authors of 
the legislation framed “Bill 62” as a “religious neutrality” law,175 as compared to the 
critics who characterized it as a “burqa ban.”176 The law currently requires employees of 
all government agencies, specifically public schools, to have “one’s face uncovered when 
public services are provided [e.g., teachers] and received [e.g., students] so as to ensure 
quality communication between persons and allow their identity to be verified, and for 
security purposes.”177 The law mandates that all teachers and students in public schools 
must “exercise their functions with their face uncovered”178 to promote school safety. 
Supporters of this law worry that if the faces of teachers and students are fully veiled 
while they are on school grounds, then administrators, other educators and students, and 
parents may not recognize them behind the veil, possibly jeopardizing the community’s 
safety. This legal directive also applies to anyone elected to the National Assembly,179 
anyone employed by or any person using the government transit system,180 or anyone 
employed by or receiving government-sponsored health and social services.181 The law 
provides for some “accommodations on religious grounds,” such as for a student enrolled 
in a state-accredited school, as long as the “request does not compromise” the laws that 
                                               
 
175 Bill 62, “An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in particular, to provide a 
framework for requests for accommodation on religious grounds in certain bodies” (2017, chapter 19), 
introduced June 10, 2015, sponsored by Québec’s minister of justice, Stéphanie Vallée, and passed on Oct. 
18, 2017 by a 66 to 51 vote. Accessed at www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-
62-41-1.html. 
176 Liam Stack, “Burqa Bans: Which Countries Outlaw Face Coverings?” New York Times, Oct. 19, 2017.  
177 Bill 62, Ch. I §1.  
178 Id., Ch. III, Div. II, §10.  
179 Id., Ch. I, §2(9). 
180 Id., Ch. I, §2(6). 









mandate compulsory school attendance or the school’s mission, regulations, or ability to 
provide educational services.182 Put simply, the law targets a specific form of expression 
in public places throughout Québec.  
With a similar concern for public safety, in 2016, a school district in Québec came 
before the Supreme Court of Canada to justify why the administrators banned a Sikh 
student from wearing a kirpan, a religious object resembling a small dagger worn under 
the student’s clothes.183 The kirpan—one of the foundational tenants of the 5Ks of 
Sikhism184—is a subject that I will examine in Chapter IV – Discussion because of a 
similar case in the United States in 1995.185 In both cases, the courts ruled in favor of the 
Sikh students. 
Summary. Eight “compelling state interests” have been articulated by advocates 
of anti-religious-garb laws. The public school must (1) create and maintain a secular 
school culture; (2) prevent its taxpayer-supported budget from being used to aid teachers’ 
religious expression; (3) avoid the perception that the school advances, endorses, 
approves of, or favors religion; (4) ward off a possible “religious takeover”; (5) disallow 
all forms of religious indoctrination and (6) religious instruction of (7) highly 
impressionable children held captive by compulsory education laws; and, finally, (8) 
prioritize school safety. 
                                               
 
182 Id., Ch. III, Division III, §14. 
183 Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 1 S.C.R. 256 (Sup. Ct. Canada 2006). 
184 The Ninth Circuit defined the Five Ks as “kes” (long hair), “kangha” (comb), “kachch” (sacred 
underwear), “kara” (steel bracelet), and “kirpan” (ceremonial knife). Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 
(9th Cir. 1995). 






Chapter IV – Discussion uses a Free Exercise lens to examine the merits of these 
claims. Chapter IV – Narrowly Tailored Test provides a brief presentation of the final 
prong of the strict scrutiny test, asking whether the statutes in question (Appendix B) are 
narrowly tailored to achieve the least restrictive means possible to achieve the 
aforementioned compelling state interests. 
Narrowly Tailored Test 
Justification 
Having demonstrated that the above justifications of the states’ compelling 
interest, a court would proceed with the narrowly tailored test. I do so here and in the 
next section IV. E. Discussion as an exercise in answering my final research question.  
Statutes are limited, not absolute restrictions. The case law on this subject 
reveals a single justification for how states claim that anti-religious-garb statutes are 
already narrowly tailored. The government argues that there is no constitutional right to 
work in a public school; therefore, the restriction is not a violation of a person’s right to 
free exercise of religion in general, it is simply “properly limited” to the “teaching 
function.”186  
                                               
 
186 “We conclude that ORS 342.650 does not impose an impermissible requirement for teaching in the 
public schools if it is properly limited to actual incompatibility with the teaching function.”186 It went on to 
say, “The statute, of course, does not forbid the wearing of religious dress outright, but it does forbid doing 
so while teaching.” Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 at 38 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1986), app. 









The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1910 affirmed this position: “The anti-garb 
law does not prevent the teacher from practicing his or her religion during breaks or 
before or after school or during the evenings or weekends. The teacher is simply asked to 
respect the time-place restriction placed on public employees who are serving as agents 
of the state.”187 In taking this position even further, the Federal Administrative Court in 
Germany made the claim that the effect of a similar ban “was not excessive because 
Muslim teachers who wear the headscarf could still find employment in private 
schools.”188 
 The assumption made in these arguments is that a person’s religious identity can 
be shed from the workplace, or something that should be relegated to the private sphere. 
This line of thinking fails to acknowledge that this “limited restriction” is intended to 
specifically prevent public schoolteachers from indicating that they are a “member or 
adherent of any religious order, sect, or denomination.” Would the state also limit 
teachers’ speech in the same way—banning all teachers from telling students about their 
religious identity while engaging in the teaching function? That, too, would be a “limited 
restriction,” that would challenge teachers’ fundamental right to free speech. The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling of a landmark Free Speech case in Tinker serves as an obvious 
rebuttal: “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”189 
                                               
 
187 Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894) at 32. 
188 Erica Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European bans on the wearing of religious 
symbols in education. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), p. 167, citing Ludin v. Baden-Württenberg 
(Ludin III), Federal Administrative Court, Germany (BVerwGE), 24 June 2004, 2 C 450.03, 14. 
189 Justice Fortas, in writing for the majority in Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), included the 






 The fact of the matter is that Pennsylvania’s and Nebraska’s anti-garb laws are 
not in fact narrowly tailored and fail all parts of the Smith and Sherbert tests, as I further 
substantiate in the following discussion. 
Discussion 
The study of legal restrictions on public educators’ religious garb is a study of the 
struggle that public schools have to balance competing rights. It is a study in the interests 
of the state in relationship to the rights of the teacher, the parent, and the student. The 
backdrop, of course, is the fundamental purpose of public education, which is to better 
society—a society that has become more religiously diverse190 and more politically 
polarized.191 In this discussion, I respond to the arguments made earlier in this chapter 
that justify bans on religious garb. My analysis focuses on the legal rights of teachers and 
the legal limitations of the public schools they serve, as seen through the lenses of the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania’s 
Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002. 
The following eleven-point analysis substantiates my conclusion that 
Pennsylvania’s and Nebraska’s anti-religious-garb statutes are unconstitutional. The 
following points serve as a response to the states’ articulation of compelling interests (see 
Chapter IV). (1) The statutes provide no least restrictive alternative to the substantial 
                                               
 
190 See Chapter IV – Prepare Students to Self-Govern a Nation of Religious Minorities. 
191 Pew Research Center. The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider. (Washington, DC: 









burdens placed on religion. Safety is a compelling state interest, but any proposed 
regulation must be, at least, (2) rational and, at best, (3) narrowly tailored. (4) The 
reliance on pre-1963 decisions (Sherbert)192 to justify banning religious garb does not 
pass strict scrutiny today because of the courts’ previous application of the lowest 
standard of judicial review, rational basis. (5) The reliance on post-1990 court decisions 
(Smith)193 to justify the continuation of anti-religious-garb statutes is flawed because they 
were issued in a time of uncertainty over the plight of judicial standards under the Free 
Exercise Clause, which I call Smith’s shadow. (6) Courts have held that Establishment 
Clause questions about public funds being used to aid religion have “no bearing” on the 
question of Catholic nuns who serve as public schoolteachers donating their salaries to 
the Catholic church. (7) The statutes in question, and the cases used to support them, 
create a false dualism between sectarianism and secularism. (8) Public schoolteachers’ 
religious garb cannot be used to indoctrinate students and (9) cannot be used for religious 
instruction, but the academic study of religious garb can become a tool for cultivating 
students’ civic competency of religious literacy. (10) Yes, students of all ages are 
impressionable, but in what ways, for whom and to what degree? And finally, (11) could 
it be that the religious diversity in American requires that public schools prepare the next 
generation to self-govern a nation of religious minorities? 
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Examination of Findings 
Statutes provide no least restrictive alternative. Under Sherbert, it is not 
constitutionally permissible to conclude that a least restrictive alternative exists because 
a person can look for employment in companies that do not schedule work on their 
Sabbath.194 Similarly, a state that tells sectors of the public—religious-garb-wearing 
people—that they can find employment in private religious schools, not public schools,195 
does not constitute a least restrictive alternative under Sherbert. These suggestions do 
not resolve a constitutional problem. They are dismissive of both the person and the law, 
suggesting that religion can be simplistically regulated to the private sphere. America’s 
public schools have a unique constitutional obligation to model for the public—and 
especially for its students—how the law protects private acts of devotion in public places 
and how the constituting protects equally, religious liberty for people of all religions and 
of none.  
It is true that the question of teachers’ religious liberty rights as expressed in the 
narrow time/place of the public classroom is one of the more complicated case studies on 
the larger theme of legal restrictions on religious expression. However, First Amendment 
protections still apply to some degree.196 These degrees are best understood when 
                                               
 
194 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
195 For an example of this rationale, see the case of Ms. Lundin in Germany in Chapter II – Global Context. 
196 It is possible for the U.S. Supreme Court, however, to rule that public schoolteachers do not have the 
same constitutional protections as civilians. For instance, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
ruled and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that “the appropriate level of scrutiny of a military regulation 
that clashes with a constitutional right is neither strict scrutiny nor rational basis.” Goldman v. Secretary of 
Defense, 236 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 734 F.2d 1531 at 1535-1536 (1984); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 
503 (1986). As previously discussed in Chapter II, however, Congress overturned this decision when 
passing the 1988 National Defense Authorization Act, permitting accommodations of religious garb for 
military personnel. The question of the degree to which public schoolteachers’ religious garb may be 






requiring that, in the context of this study, Pennsylvania’s and Nebraska’s anti-religious-
garb statutes must pass all three prongs of strict scrutiny: The narrowly tailored test 
requires the state to be as accommodating as possible (which these statutes do not) when 
neutral and generally applicable laws (which these statutes are not) substantially burden 
religion (which these statutes do). 
A good-faith attempt to propose a least restrictive alternative would be to, at 
least, offer religious-garb-wearing teachers employment in the school’s administration or 
in the district’s headquarters or another non-teaching job. But the logic in this proposal is 
flawed. Would a school that offered non-teaching jobs to certified teachers who wore 
religious garb have to take a cut in salary, or ensure that they never work at the front 
counter where they could be seen by students or teachers? Could these religious-garb-
wearing non-teacher positions never drive a school bus or speak in front of a school 
assembly or coach an after-school program? What levels of authority would these 
professionals be able to reach? Would not a state that prevents teachers from wearing 
religious garb also penalize a religious-garb-wearing principal? A principal is position of 
authority that has even more influence over the school culture and even more power over 
impressionable students. Would not the same state also bar citizens from wearing 
religious garb while serving on the local school board to prevent the district as a whole 
from being perceived as endorsing religion? Would not the same state that bans public 
schoolteachers do the same for all government employees or for anyone using 
government services, as seen recently in Québec (see “Public Safety” section in Chapter 
IV). In the U.S. context, the answer is a resounding “no” because these regulations 






“Substantial Burden” section, Chapter IV. B.) and provide no least restrictive alternative 
that is truly feasible. The question presented in this study is narrower, but these lines of 
questions illustrate the slippery slope of regulating the religion of government employees. 
These questions illustrate that even proposals to offer teachers non-teaching positions can 
create more problems than they solve. Furthermore, school districts simply do not have 
the monetary or human resources to police public employees in this way, nor the 
resources to curtail the wave of lawsuits that would inevitably challenge the proposed 
regulations. 
Because these particular statutes in Pennsylvania and Nebraska do not provide a 
least restrictive alternative, nor indicate that a least restrictive alternative is feasible, the 
statutes fail the third prong of the strict scrutiny test. 
Safety regulations must be rational. As described in Chapter II – Global 
Context, countries around the world have used safety concerns to justify banning 
religious garb in public places. The most recent of these laws, enacted by the province of 
Québec in October 2017, prohibit the wearing of face coverings in not only public 
schools but in government agencies and the public transit system (see “Public Safety” 
section in Chapter IV – Compelling Interest Test). Some advocates of Pennsylvania’s 
statute feel the regulations relating to teachers’ religious garb similarly promote school 
safety. 
This is a peculiar position for several reasons. First, it assumes that criminals want 
to bring more attention to themselves by wearing something that very few people wear 
when it is in the criminal’s self-interest not to be noticed. Second, it implies that the 






criminals are prohibited from wearing religious garb (e.g. a face veil) to hide their 
criminal activity, then they will not use other disguises (e.g., winter scarf or ski mask). 
Fourth, in the context of school campuses, it assumes that no other form of face 
covering—a hoodie, scarf, football helmet, baseball catcher mask, medical mask, 
Halloween mask, welding mask, theater costume, and so on—could be used to achieve 
the same purpose. Fifth, the view that banning religious garb promotes school or public 
safety implies there is a verifiable, widespread problem of religious-garb-wearing 
criminals—or, in the context of this study, religious-garb-wearing criminals who are also 
teachers. There is, however, no evidence of such problem to solve.197  
There is, in fact, longstanding evidence of criminal activity—burglary, 
trespassing, property damage, kidnapping—that occurs every December in the United 
States. These criminals have one thing in common: they wear a Santa Claus costume. 
They cover their face with big white fake beards and their only recognizable feature is 
their eyes. Given the predictable nature of these annual crimes, should the United States 
ban fake beards, red coats, and fluffy hats in the name of security? There is, after all, a 
verified trend of criminal activity—unlike the accusations made today of Muslim women. 
                                               
 
197 In 1923, the Legislature of the federal Territory of Alaska passed a law prohibiting a person from 
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Denounce False Pretense in Soliciting Money for Associations or Organizations, Legislature of the 









“Banning Santa” would not be a serious policy position because people know how to 
differentiate between criminal behavior and the clothing that criminals wear. 
Since the 1860s, a type of religious-garb-wearing criminal has haunted the United 
States: members of the Ku Klux Klan, who, while murdering people, wore “glory 
suits”—tall white hats with small eyeholes in a face covering that matches the white, full-
bodied gown that is adorned with an embroidered insignia of a Christian cross.198 Similar 
examples of full-body religious garb include a tall pointy hat that drapes over the face 
and neck with holes for the eyes, as expressed by Christian fraternities that participate in 
the procession of the “Exaltación de la Santa Cruz.” 199 This religious garb, which is 
almost identical to the Klansman gown, is worn by Christians during Holy Week rituals 
in northern Spain. Should these “foreign” rituals occur in the United States, would the 
government ban Christians from wearing these full-body coverings in the name of public 
safety, even without evidence of any criminal activity?  
There is no evidence of the United States regulating Klansmen’s religious garb in 
its totality, even though there is undisputed evidence of decades of criminal activity. 
However, ten states and the District of Columbia have enacted anti-mask laws, most of 
which originated from mid-twentieth century criminal activity by the Ku Klux Klan.200 
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(These laws have recently been enforced in response to Occupy Movement protests.201) It 
is possible for public schools to use anti-mask laws to justify creating neutral, generally 
applicable dress codes that require that employees and students to show their faces at all 
times. Greater legitimacy would be given to such a proposal if there was evidence of 
crimes being committed by mask-wearing criminals and with consideration on how to 
implement anti-mask regulations in public schools.  
In 2017, Austria passed a “burqa ban” that penalized anyone who covers they 
face,202 which has proven difficult to administer. Police officers were pulling over 
bicyclists who used scarves or masks to cover their face on cold days. One officer “fined 
a man about $175 for wearing a shark costume for promotional purposes in Vienna’s city 
center.”203 The Washington Post reported that “[w]hereas opposition to the ban was 
previously most vocal within Muslim communities, the outrage has now spread far 
                                               
 
that also ruled that the anti-mask ordinance was “unconstitutionally overbroad because it may be used to 
stifle symbolic political expression which is protected by the First Amendment”); State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 
669 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1990) (Not protected by the First Amendment because wearing the KKK hood/mask was 
“the communication of a threat”); Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 406 S.E.2d 398 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (“The 
[KKK] robe and the hood may be such symbols, but the mask is not. . .. [the] mask adds nothing, save fear 
and intimidation, to the symbolic message expressed by the wearing of the robe and the hood.”); People v. 
Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. App. Term. 1968) (Man found guilty of anti-mask statute for wearing 
makeup, a woman’s wig, and women’s clothing while in public). 
201 Matthew Haag, “Is It Illegal to Wear Masks at a Protest? It Depends on the Place,” New York Times, 
April 25, 2017. 
202 Integration Law, Anti-Face Disguise Act (1586 dB); “Foreign Affairs Committee adopts integration 
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beyond.”204 One community leader stated that “[t]he absurdity of the recent incidents 
shows how useless this law really is.”205 
As implied in these proposals to “ban the burqa,” the public safety rationale can 
sometimes indicate irrational thinking that (1) perpetuates stereotypes206 that can (2) 
harm vulnerable minorities,207 and (3) encourage workplace discrimination,208 and (4) 
fuel social hostilities209 and (5) breed violence.210 The rule of law, at best, can mitigate 
conflicts and maintain peace and order. One way to achieve this in the contexts of 
religion and public education is to ensure that any proposed solution is narrowly tailored 
and designed to achieve the least restrictive means possible. This is a policy position that 
                                               
 
204 Ibid. Noack. 
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not only requires laws be reasonable in design but also requires that the proposed solution 
will effectively solve a verifiable problem. 
Safety regulations must be narrowly tailored. The carrying of ritual daggers by 
students in public schools has arisen as another example of a contemporary safety 
concern regarding some forms of religious garb. Recent cases involve Sikh students in 
Canada and the United States. 
A school board in the province of Québec, the same province that recently 
enacted the no-face-veil law, prohibited a student from wearing a metal kirpan, a small 
ritual dagger in a sheath worn under the student’s clothing. In 2006, the Supreme Court 
of Canada211 held that the school failed to meet the legal principle of proportionality—
the requirement that there must be a legitimate reason for a regulation. The problem was 
based on the characterization of the kirpan as a weapon when “over the 100 years since 
Sikhs have been attending schools in Canada, not a single violent incident related to the 
presence of kirpans in schools [had] been reported.”212 The Court also held that the 
school board’s interest in promoting the “highest degree of safety” was not 
proportionate, considering that the school allowed students to use scissors, pencils, and 
baseball bats. 
A similar case arose in central California in 1995, when three Sikh students wore 
their kirpans to school—the kirpan is one of the “Five Ks,” which are central tenets of 
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Sikhism.213 Livingston Union School District suspended the students from school for 
wearing the kirpan because of the school’s “total ban of all weapons.”214 The trial court 
described the kirpan as a ceremonial knife with a “curved, steel blade . . . worn in a 
sheath held to the body by a leather strap.” Specifically, the court stated that the “kirpans 
at issue here are roughly the size of an open Swiss Army knife, about 6–7 inches long 
with a blade of roughly 3½ inches.” The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Cheema 
v. Thompson215 that the suspension did not meet the strict scrutiny standard under the 
federal Religious Freedom Protection Act (which the U.S. Supreme Court later ruled in 
City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)216 was applicable only to federal laws, not to state or 
local laws such as one in Cheema). Mirroring the research questions in this study, the 
Ninth Circuit held that: a) yes, the school had a compelling interest in banning weapons; 
b) yes, the school’s ban on weapons was neutral and generally applicable; but c) the 
students’ religion was substantially burdened, triggering the narrowly tailored test. The 
court held that the school had failed to enact a least restrictive alternative—the subject of 
the previously section, Chapter IV – Narrowly Tailored Test. The court pointed to an 
example of a least restrictive alternative: “The record included the policies of two 
California school districts, which allowed kirpans so long as the blades were dulled, no 
more than 2½ inches, and securely riveted to their sheaths.”217 This policy ensured that 
the kirpan could not be used as a weapon. An alternative would be to permit the wearing 
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of a wooden or plastic kirpan, or a symbolic image of a kirpan to be displayed on a cloth 
print or medallion, or as a temporary henna tattoo. 
The Ninth Circuit’s kirpan decision describes an example of a no-weapons policy 
that is neutral and generally applicable (unlike the Canadian regulation discussed above 
that singled out kirpans for regulation) and advances a compelling state interest. But U.S. 
law requires that the school’s interest must also be narrowly tailored to achieve the least 
restrictive means possible, which the Livingston Union School District did not.   
Historic decisions made under the rational basis test. Many of the early 
religious-garb cases used what we now define as a rational basis test218 to reach their 
conclusions219—the most forgiving form of judicial review (see Chapter II – From 
Rational Basis to Strict Scrutiny). The contemporary Smith and Sherbert tests, however, 
require laws targeting religion for regulation to meet the strict scrutiny standard—the 
highest form of judicial review.220 Some states’ objectives are reasonable (e.g., wanting 
to create a culture free of religious coercion and indoctrination, which I discuss later), 
which explains why some courts upheld anti-religious-garb statutes using the rational 
                                               
 
218 The rational basis standard is two degrees lower than that of the compelling interest standard in the 
Sherbert test (see Chapter II – Literature Review). The rational basis test requires that a law must further 
any legitimate government interest deemed reasonable to the court. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 
106 (1949). 
219 For example, the Herr court (1910) found the Pennsylvania General Assembly’s reasons for targeting 
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previous Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s orders in Hysong. Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132 (Pa. Sup. 
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basis test. This study demonstrates that it is not likely that a court today would reach the 
same conclusion using the strict scrutiny test, as I further explain in this chapter. 
Contemporary decisions were caught in Smith’s shadow. The contemporary 
religious-garb decisions issued by the Third Circuit (an employment discrimination case 
filed under Title VII) and the Oregon Supreme Court (a case filed under the state 
constitution) bypassed the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause altogether. In doing 
so, these courts failed to examine the fundamental rights of Sikh and Muslim teachers 
under the Free Exercise standard of judicial review, strict scrutiny. This is somewhat 
understandable because these cases were decided in the shadow of Smith, a controversial 
religious liberty case that temporarily disrupted the longstanding consensus regarding 
Free Exercise doctrine. 
For sixteen years,221 federal legislative and judicial branches and many state 
courts and state legislatures acted under Smith’s shadow (see Chapter II – Evolution of 
Free Exercise Standards). Light was brought to the path through the checks-and-balance 
process. The result is the current agreement to apply both the Smith (general 
applicability) and the Sherbert (strict scrutiny) standards of judicial review to Free 
Exercise cases, as I do in this study. However, these tensions are not fully resolved, so the 
problem remains. One consequence of the conflicts that arose from Smith is that no court, 
to date, has yet examined state bans on religious garb under strict scrutiny, hence the 
need for this study. 
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One case that was uniquely caught in Smith’s shadow was Reardon, in which the 
Third Circuit mistakenly interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith to have 
“no bearing on cases concerning [religious garb] statutes.” In upholding the termination 
of a Muslim teacher for wearing a hijab while teaching in a public school, the Third 
Circuit wrote,  
the Smith decision is restricted to situations where government action is 
not specifically addressed to religious practice. Religious garb statutes are, 
of course, addressed to certain behavior purely because it is religious in 
nature. Accordingly, Smith has no bearing on cases concerning such 
statutes.222  
 
True, Smith is a case about general applicable laws that may burden religion (e.g., 
federal narcotic laws affecting Native Americans’ use of peyote for sacramental 
purposes).223 However, the Third Circuit’s characterization of Smith as having “no 
bearing” is peculiar because the Smith decision said the opposite. The Smith court 
affirmed the longstanding view that laws cannot explicitly target religion for government 
regulation.224 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Smith, stated, 
It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), 
that a State would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it 
sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for 
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display. 
It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of 
“statues that are to be used for worship purposes,” or to prohibit bowing 
down before a golden calf.225 
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The religious garb-statutes in question plainly “ban such acts … only when they 
are engaged in for religious reasons” and “only because of the religious belief that they 
display.” Consequently, it is correct to understand the Smith court to be affirming the 
longstanding use of the Sherbert standard when states target religion for regulation.226 
In another perplexing turn, the Third Circuit claimed that the U.S. Supreme Court 
dismissed Cooper (1986)227 “for want of a substantial federal question”—a surprising 
position given the U.S. Constitution’s authority over state laws.228 The Third Circuit 
interpreted the high court’s dismissal as “an indication that the U.S. Supreme Court 
‘authoritatively established’ the goal of preservation of an atmosphere of religious 
neutrality [emphasis added] and advancing a compelling state interest [emphasis 
added].”229 This is puzzling. How can a statute that specifically targets religious practices 
for government regulation, which the Smith court protects against, be considered neutral 
to religion? (For further discussion, see “Effects of Anti-Religious-Garb Statutes” in 
Chapter IV – Substantial Burden Test.) 
                                               
 
226 In reflecting upon the Smith decision, Chief Justice Roberts wrote in 2006, “We had ‘no cause to 
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546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
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A generous characterization of these contradictions is to say that the Third Circuit 
could not fully see the path forward while in the shadow of Smith. The lower court 
simply did not have the time to fully comprehend the impact of the high court’s landmark 
decision—a decision made four months earlier.230 This is especially understandable given 
that Smith shook the ground of three decades of consensus about the Free Exercise 
jurisprudence. 
Public salaries have “no bearing” on private donations. Claims made under 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the No Religious Test for Office 
provision of the U.S. Constitution are outside the scope of this study. However, the 
justification that anti-religious-garb statutes prevent public schools from using public 
funds to aid religion is a question that can also be examined through the lens of the Free 
Exercise Clause. As discussed in Chapter IV – Statues Prevent Use of Public Funds to 
Aid Religion, taxpayers claimed that public funds were indirectly being used to aid 
religion when Catholic nuns employed by public schools donated their salaries to their 
church. These historic cases are worth documenting in this study, aware that taxpayers 
have less authority to make such challenges today.231 
The Kentucky Appeals Court, for example, found in Rawlings (1956) that the 
“sole objection” to Catholic nuns teaching in public schools “is based upon the fact they 
wear their religious garb and emblems in the classrooms and donate their compensation 
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to their respective religious orders after the payment of their living expenses.”232 The 
Rawlings court rejected the Establishment argument on state constitutional grounds of 
Free Exercise of religion.233 The Rawlings court held: “salaries paid these Sisters are 
theirs and they may do therewith as they choose. … To deny such right of contribution 
would be a denial of religious liberty.”234 
The Rawlings decision reflects the thinking behind the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court decision in Hysong (1894): “The fact that these teachers contributed all their 
earnings…” had no “bearing on the question.” In restraining the powers of the state, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserted that “[it] is none of our business, nor that of these 
appellants, to inquire into this matter. American men and women, of sound mind and 
twenty-one years of age, can make such disposition of their surplus earnings as suits their 
own notions.”235 This point was not contradicted when the second Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court upheld the state’s anti-religious-garb law in 1910.236  
To further substantiate this point, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated in 1936, 
“the fact that the teachers contributed a material portion of their earnings to the religious 
order of which they are members is not violative of the constitution.” The court 
concluded, “To deny the right to make such contribution would in itself constitute a 
denial of that right of religious liberty which the constitution guarantees.”237  
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For these reasons, the questions of public funds being used to hire religious garb-
wearing teachers has no bearing on this Free Exercise analysis. 
Distinguishing secularism, sectarianism, and separatism. In response to the 
previously articulated view that anti-religious-garb statutes create a “secular school 
culture” and avoid the “perception of favoring religion” (see Chapter IV – Compelling 
Interest Test), I now reflect on the legal meaning of the terms secularism, sectarianism, 
and separatism.  
The legal question in this study is incorrectly framed when states conflate 
“secularism” with the constitutional guarantee of “separatism.” The French and Turkish 
constitutions are explicitly grounded in secular principles, which may explain why these 
countries have experienced a rise in social hostilities as a result of bans on Muslims’ 
religious garb (see Chapter II – Global Context).  
The U.S. Constitution is distinct because of its two-principles-for-one-right 
approach to religious liberty: it treats the free exercise and no establishment of religion 
principles as intersecting rights, best understood together as “freedom of religion,” as 
compared to a purely secularist approach, “freedom from religion.”238 As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has affirmed, “There is room for play in the joints productive of a 
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship 
and without interference.”239  
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This is distinct from an absolute secularist ban-religion-from-public-life approach. 
James Madison, the primary author of the First Amendment, warned his contemporaries 
of this effect: “Torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the 
secular arm, to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious 
opinion.”240 Religious coercion, therefore, has two sides: The state can force religion 
upon a person or force religion out of a person. Both are unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment’s two interlocking principles of free exercise and no establishment.  
The “play in the joints” reveals that the free exercise and separation principles 
were historically driven by religious actors and often for religious reasons. It is well 
known that the Framers of the Constitution were Christians, but it was the diversity of 
Christian manifestations represented in society and the violent history of religious 
establishments in the colonies that led the constitutional framers to disallow religious 
tests for office and choose not to create a national church. Four years later, the states 
ratified the First Amendment, which made explicit that the federal government could 
never establish a national religion. 
By 1819, after Alabama achieved statehood, 96 percent of states had 
disestablished their state religions.241 Massachusetts was the last holdout in 1833, 
                                               
 
240 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment [June 20, 1785]. (Boston: 
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solidifying the separation doctrine in all state and federal constitutions.242 This state-
driven trend was not a result of secularism or federal overreach. These were often a result 
of religious justifications for separatism articulated by a diversity of Christian leaders at 
the state level. Professor John Witte Jr. documented these trends. 
Witte’s research243 shows that a diversity of religious people often used religious 
reasons for justifying the separation of religion and state, with the primary intent to 
protect religion from government overreach. Specifically, he illustrated that over one 
hundred verses in the Bible justify separating religion and government (e.g., “render to 
Caesar the things that are Caesar’s”).244 Alexis de Tocqueville wrote about these effects 
in Democracy and America: 
My own religious affiliation brought me particularly into contact with 
Catholic priests with several of whom I soon established a certain 
closeness. To each of them I expressed my astonishment and revealed my 
doubts: my view was that all these men agreed with each other except over 
details; but they all attributed the peaceful influence exercised by religion 
over their country principally to the separation of Church and state. I 
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243 John Witte Jr. and Joel A. Nichols, “Appendix Two: State Constitutional Provisions on Religion (as of 
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from the Gentile world around them and to separate the Levites and other temple officials from the rest of 
the people. The Hebrew Bible also made much of building and rebuilding “fortified walls” to protect the 
city of Jerusalem from the outside world and to separate the temple and its priests from the commons and 
its people. … The New Testament commanded believers to “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s 
and to God the things that are God’s” and reminded them that “two swords” were enough to govern the 
world. Christians were warned that they should “be not conformed to this world” but remain “separate” 
from the world and its temptations, maintaining themselves in purity and piety. Echoing the Hebrew Bible, 
St. Paul spoke literally of a “wall of separation” (paries maceriae) between Christians and non-Christians 









assert confidently that, during my stay in America, I did not meet a single 
man, priest or layman, who did not agree about that.245 
 
There is consensus among scholars of American religion that the No Religious 
Test for Office, Free Exercise, and No Establishment clauses of the U.S. Constitution 
were born of compromises between members of rival Christian sects. In this vein, it is 
fair to characterize the first age of disestablishment246 (1776–1833) as an age in which the 
state was, in theory, prevented from privileging one particular Christian sect.  
In fact, this study illustrates that anti-religious-garb laws were intended to target 
Catholic nuns, thus privileging the Protestant Christians (as diverse as they were 
themselves) who dominated public schools at the time. Said another way, the argument 
that these statutes were designed to create a “secular” culture at the time of their 
enactments was code for maintaining Protestant schools. 
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Leading scholars in the field of religious liberty247 and the U.S. Supreme Court248 
have interpreted the use of “sectarianism” or “sects” as legal terms in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries as evidence of anti-Catholic bias. This historic context 
reveals that the Protestant-dominated legislatures may have assumed that the very 
presence of religious garb-wearing Catholics in Protestant-dominated public schools 
transformed the public school into a “sectarian” school (e.g., Catholic parochial school). 
In New York, for instance, in 1886, Protestant leaders of the public schools made 
particularly reference toward disallowing religious garb in the same of “sectarianism” 
and yet continued to advanced Protestant-based religious instruction in their public 
schools: 
In the public schools… [an] effort should be made to secure teachers 
having faith in God; that the [Protestant] Bible should be used in the 
schools; that everything sectarian, such as particular religious garb, 
should be avoided [emphasis added]; that a committee, to confer with 
                                               
 
247 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals admitted in 1990 that the Pennsylvania General Assembly of 1895 
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committees of other [Protestant] religious bodies, should be appointed to 
prepare a Book of Morals for the use of schools; and finally that 
[Protestant] ministers be exhorted to bring this whole subject before their 
people by means of sermons or lectures.249 [Emphasis added.] 
 
In this era of anti-sectarianism, the Pennsylvania General Assembly used the 
preamble of the nation’s first religious-garb statute to state that “all appearances of 
sectarianism should be avoided.”250 The 1910 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in 
Herr predates the contemporary legal frameworks that limit the extent to which a school 
can use the “secular culture” justification to regulate religion. The fear expressed by 
many leaders within the Protestant majority was that “the distinctive garbs, so exclusively 
peculiar to the Roman Catholic Church, create[d] a religious atmosphere in the 
schoolroom.”251 
Escaping “sectarianism” became a modern justification, although the meaning 
changed from being less an anti-Catholic approach to more of a freedom-from-religion 
strategy. For instance, in Widmar v. Vincent (1981),252 the U.S. Supreme Court used a 
Free Speech framework to explicitly address the limits of a state’s ability to avoid the 
“appearances of sectarianism” (a Free Speech argument that is outside the scope of my 
study but worth mentioning). In this case, the Court held that the University of Virginia 
was engaging in viewpoint discrimination by preventing a student from receiving $5,800 
in subsidies to fund a religious publication—subsidies offered to other student 
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publications.253 Similar legislative and judicial developments set limits as to what 
constituted a justifiable avoidance of the appearance of sectarianism. In the Equal Access 
Act of 2010,254 Congress made explicit that public schools are “limited open forums” that 
must provide student groups with equal access to school facilities, regardless of 
“religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at [the group’s] 
meetings.”255 This parallel set of legal developments suggest that that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has drawn a line to determine when a state is avoiding sectarianism as compared to 
engaging in viewpoint discrimination. 
These historic and contemporary developments reveal at least two legal 
guideposts: First, government avoidance of sectarianism can result in viewpoint 
discrimination, which is prohibited under the Free Speech Clause; second, government 
inhibiting of religion can result in substantial burdens to religion,256 which is prohibited 
under the Free Exercise Clause and the No Establishment Clause.257 As a result, it is not 
compelling to conclude that anti-religious-garb statutes are effective at creating a “secular 
school culture” and avoid the “perception of favoring religion.” Rather, the statutes target 
religion for government regulation, creating the perception that the states disfavor 
particular forms of religious expression. This may be permissible under secularist 
                                               
 
253 Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
254 The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–4073 (1984); affirmed in Westside Community v. Mergens, 
496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
255 See the U.S. Department of Education, Legal Guidelines Regarding the Equal Access Act and the 
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Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that state-sponsored student groups 
must uphold nondiscrimination laws. 
256 See Chapter IV – Substantial Burden Test. 
257 “The principal or primary effect of the statute must not advance nor inhibit religion,” as required under 
the Lemon test. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. Caveat: A complete analysis of anti-religious-garb laws 






constitutions, such as those of France and Turkey, that value the principle of “freedom 
from religion,” but they cannot be permissible under the U.S. Constitution, which uses a 
two-principles-for-one-right approach to guarantee “freedom of religion.” 
Having laid the foundation of understanding about the interlock between the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, I will now respond to three interrelated arguments in 
section Chapter IV – Compelling Interest Test. Proponents of banning public 
schoolteachers’ religious garb claim that the statutes in question prevent public 
schoolteachers from engaging in religious indoctrination and religious instruction 
because students are highly impressionable.  
Religious garb cannot be used to indoctrinate. It is undisputed that public 
schools and their employees may not subject students to religious indoctrination.258 The 
U.S. Supreme Court has played an important role in ensuring that public primary and 
secondary schools do not violate the Establishment Clause.259 The debate before us rests 
not on the question of whether this can occur, because it cannot; the question is whether 
                                               
 
258 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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512 U.S. 687 (1994); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
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Gobitas], 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overturned in West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Mitchell v. 
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Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Westside Community v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. 










religious garb, in itself, indoctrinates its observers. Before discussing the merits of this 
concern through the lens of Free Exercise protections, it is important to remember that 
this study rests on a series of factual parameters (see Step 4. Set Factual Parameters in 
Chapter III – Methodology), two of which are relevant to the indoctrination claim. 
First, legally speaking, religious garb is defined as a marker used by teachers to 
identify themselves as “members or adherents of any religious order, sect or 
denomination”260 (see Appendix A and Appendix C). This is recognizably different from 
legal bans on indoctrination. For instance, Pennsylvania Education Code §1505-E details 
specific forms of “prohibited instruction”—there can be no public-school activity that 
“instructs, proselytizes or indoctrinates students in a specific religious or political belief.” 
The fact that the state wrote two different laws suggests two distinct problems and two 
distinct solutions. Consequently, this study assumes that public schoolteachers’ religious 
indoctrination of students is impermissible and that the legal ban on religious garb is 
distinct from that of statutory and judicial prohibitions against indoctrination. 
Second, this study rests on another factual parameter—the long history of trial 
courts that found no evidence of indoctrination or proselytization by public 
schoolteachers who wore religious garb while teaching (Table 3). Consequently, the 
religious-garb cases outlined in this study are distinct from cases where there was 
evidence of indoctrination. The U.S. Supreme Court vigilantly and rightfully protects 
public school students from state-endorsed indoctrination.261 The question of religious 
                                               
 
260 Pennsylvania Statute 24, § 11–1112 (2018). First enacted in 1895. It was reaffirmed in 1949 and 1982 
and remains active today. 
261 See Chapter IV – Discussion §8 for examples of legal definitions of indoctrination, such as in Abington 
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in an 8–1 






indoctrination is resolved. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has yet to address the 
question of public schoolteachers’ religious garb, which is why there is a need to conduct 
this narrow study based on a distinct and unresolved legal question. 
Together, this study assumes these two factual parameters—legal bans of 
religious garb are distinct from legal bans on indoctrination, and trial courts in religious-
garb cases have found no evidence of religious indoctrination (Table 3). In constructing 
this methodology, this study creates a narrow line of inquiry into the nature of teachers’ 
religious garb to avoid confusing the settled case law on religious indoctrination and the 
unresolved question of the constitutionality of teachers’ religious garb. Consequently, the 
findings in this study demonstrate that religious garb and religious indoctrination are not 
synonyms and cannot be treated as such. Religious indoctrination in public schools is 
unequivocally out of the question. Any evidence of a public schoolteacher indoctrinating 
children, whether wearing religious garb or not, should not be tolerated. 
Still, proponents of anti-religious-garb statutes reject the facts presented by the 
trial courts that found no evidence of indoctrination (Table 3), claiming that religious 
garb by itself indoctrinates its observers. To conflate “the wearing of religious garb” with 
“an act of indoctrination” is contradictory for two reasons: first, as previously noted, it 
conflicts with the legal definition of religious garb in the statutes that are distinct from 
separate legal bans on religious indoctrination; second, it runs counter to the common 
definition of the word “indoctrination.” The New Oxford Dictionary defines 
indoctrination as “teach[ing] a person or group to accept a set of beliefs uncritically.”262 
                                               
 






To suggest that religious garb, by its very nature, indoctrinates the observer would 
suggest that the “dress, mark, emblem or insignia” used to indicate a teacher’s religious 
identity forces students to “accept a set of beliefs uncritically.” This is a cognitive error. 
Mere exposure to a teacher’s religious identity—through his or her garb—does not in 
itself convert school children to, coerce them into, or inculcate them with their teacher’s 
religion. The religious garb merely indicates that the teacher identifies with a particular 
religion. The wearing of religious garb is simply an identity statement made by the 
wearer; it is not a religious commandment directed at another or causing injury to another 
person. As Thomas Jefferson said, “The legitimate powers of government extend to such 
acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there 
are twenty gods, or no god [or to wear religious garb or not]. It neither picks my pocket 
nor breaks my leg.”263 A teacher’s religious garb neither indoctrinates a child nor causes 
them injury. 
A historical illustration of this concern is worth noting. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania rejected the argument that if students were to be taught by religious-garb-
wearing teachers, then the school would “produce continuous and continuing, and will 
continue to cause and produce, irreparable and irremediable injury and damage to [the 
children].”264 The “damage” referred to was not only the harm caused by children 
possibly turning away from the Protestant faith of their families but the perceived eternal 
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Carolina Press, 1955, 159. 









damage to children’s souls for claiming Catholicism.265 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
rejected the notion that religious garb had any such power to cause harm to its observers. 
In contemporary terms, the widely accepted legal definition of “indoctrination” is 
found in Schempp (1963).266 In this landmark decision, the U.S. Supreme Court found 
unconstitutional state statutes in Pennsylvania and Maryland. The state legislatures 
wrongly mandated students enrolled in public school to begin each day by reading aloud 
verses of the King James Bible (the Protestant version) and reciting the Lord’s Prayer (the 
Protestant version). This is the legal understanding of state-sponsored indoctrination. 
Public schoolteachers’ compulsion (via the state’s directive) of children to read aloud 
Protestant Bible verses and to recite Protestant prayers every day cannot be equated with 
a private expression of religious identity by a state employee: public schoolteachers 
merely express their religious affiliation through the wearing—for themselves—of 
religious dress, marks, emblems, or insignia. It would be considered indoctrination if, at 
the start of each day, the public schoolteacher required students to wear religious garb, 
thus using the authority of their position to pressure children to cloak themselves in, for 
instance, robes or headdresses or to adorn children with religious jewelry or symbols.  
The Schempp decision was a lesson about the dangers of state-compelled religious 
coercion; the religious garb statutes are about state legislatures targeting religion for 
government regulation and, in doing so, substantially burdening religion in seven distinct 
ways (see Chapter IV – Seven Effects of Anti-Religious-Garb Statutes). It is inaccurate to 
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claim that the state has a compelling state interest to prevent religious indoctrination 
through banning religious garb when there is no evidence of indoctrination (Table 3) and 
wearing religious garb does not meet the legal or common definition of indoctrination. 
The Schempp case was about state-initiated indoctrination, whereas the religious-garb 
cases are about state hostility toward the religion of state employees. These regulated 
teachers are simply asking that the state live up to the charge made by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Schempp, a charge initially articulated by the high court in 1870: the state’s duty 
is to protect all, prefer none, and disparage none.267 
To help schools embody this vision, states can turn to national consensus 
statements drafted by leaders in civil liberties and religious groups, who agree that public 
schoolteachers should not indoctrinate students in any religion. For instance, in 2000, the 
U.S. Department of Education disseminated A Teachers’ Guide to Religion in Public 
Schools268 to every public school in the country. It translated for educators, parents, and 
students the widely accepted constitutional parameters of religion in public schools. 
Endorsed by twenty-two national organizations,269 the document read as follows: 
                                               
 
267 “Almost a hundred years ago in Minor v. Board of Education of Cincinnati, Judge Alphonso Taft . . . 
stated the ideal of our people as to religious freedom as one of “absolute equality before the law, of all 
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268 Based on guidelines originally developed by James V. Panoch and published in 1974 by the Public 
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C. Haynes, A Teachers’ Guide to Religion in Public Schools (Washington, DC: Religious Freedom Center 
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see Charles C. Haynes and Oliver Thomas, Finding Common Ground: A First Amendment Guide to 
Religion and Public Schools (Nashville, TN: First Amendment Center, 2011). 
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• The school’s approach to religion is academic, not devotional.  
 
• The school strives for student awareness of religions but does not 
press for student acceptance of any religion.  
 
• The school sponsors study of religion, not the practice of religion.  
 
• The school may expose students to a diversity of religious views but 
may not impose any particular view.  
 
• The school educates about all religions; it does not promote or 
denigrate religion.  
 
• The school informs the students about various beliefs; it does not seek 
to make students conform to any particular belief. 
 
This consensus statement was designed to teach school leaders about the legal 
parameters of religion and public education. It also was distributed to formally instruct 
teachers on the legal parameters of engaging students in the academic study of religion270 
in history, literature, and social studies classes.271 This consensus statement is also 
helpful in distinguishing between the teachers who wear religious garb and the teachers 
who indoctrinate children. The wearing of religious garb is a personal act by a 
government employee and cannot be used to force anyone, let alone a child, to engage in 
                                               
 
Administrators, American Federation of Teachers, American Jewish Committee, American Jewish 
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270 Diane L. Moore, Chair, et al. “Guidelines for Teaching About Religion in K-12 Public Schools in the 
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a devotional activity; coerce students to accept the teacher’s religion for themselves; 
compel students to engage in a spiritual practice; impose or expose students to what they 
would not otherwise experience in the workplace or in the public square; or seek to 
conform students to any religious behaviors or beliefs, regardless of whether the teachers 
identify as religious or not. 
The result of this analysis is twofold: public schools and their employees—
whether acting on behalf of a state legislature or acting by themselves—may not 
inculcate religion, and religious garb worn by teachers in public schools does not, in 
itself, indoctrinate its student observers. Religious garb simply informs onlookers of the 
wearer’s identity. 
Informing is, admittedly, a type of instruction—religious garb informs another 
about a wearer’s lived religion in public life. As previously noted, Pennsylvania 
Education Code §1505-E details specific forms of “prohibited instruction”—there can be 
no public-school activity that “instructs . . . students in a specific religious . . . belief.” 
The question then arises: does being informed about another’s religious identity meet the 
definition of “religious instruction”? 
Religious garb cannot be used for religious instruction. One of the most often 
cited quotes in the contemporary literature on this topic272 was offered by the Kentucky 
Appellate Court, in Rawlings 1956, which held that, 
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While the dress and emblems worn by these Sisters proclaim them to be 
members of certain organizations of the Roman Catholic Church and that 
they have taken certain religious vows, these facts do not deprive them of 
their right to teach in public schools, so long as they do not inject religion 
or the dogma of their church. The garb does not teach. It is the woman 
within who teaches [emphasis added].273 
 
The view that garb does not teach; teachers do is not merely an opinion. It is a 
verified fact as a result of decades of case law (Table 3). As I demonstrated in the 
“factual parameters” section of Chapter III – Methodology, in all the cases that took up 
the narrow question of teachers’ religious garb, the trial courts found no evidence of 
religious instruction (Table 3). 
For instance, Zellers (1951) was primarily an Establishment Clause question 
involving a taxpayer challenge of the state of New Mexico’s decision to rent church 
buildings to operate a public school led by members of the church. This is a set of facts 
distinct from the narrow Free Exercise inquiry into whether the state can regulate the 
religious garb of a public employee. Zellers was similar to other cases that involved 
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public school districts acquiring private schools that continued to operate as religious 
schools and other cases in which religious institutions received taxpayer funds. In these 
cases, the teachers’ wearing of religious garb was done in the context of public funds 
being used to administer a private religious school.274 Put simply, these sets of cases were 
about the schools, not the teachers. 
This delineation suggests that courts took great care to determine during the fact-
finding period whether the religious garb-wearing teachers were, in fact, engaging in 
religious instruction. If such evidence existed, the cases would become about the 
proselytization of children, which is a distinct set of legal issues that fall outside the 
parameters of facts in this study (see Chapter III – Methodology).  
The example of the “Jesus-2000—J2K” T-shirt275 is a clear act of religious 
persuasion on the part of an authority figure. The intent and effect were to prey on 
students at a time when young people had many speculations about the “catastrophic” 
effects of Y2K—fears that the world would end or that a massive computer bug triggered 
at the turn of the millennium would cause global chaos. 
Religious garb is more benign than a blatant act of proselytization or 
indoctrination. The religious garb simply denotes that a teacher is “a member or adherent 
of any religious order, sect, or denomination,” which a Christian can do in a variety of 
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ways—to wear a cross neckless, a What-Would-Jesus-Do bracelet, ash on the forehead 
during Ash Wednesday, and so on. As a result, an accommodation policy that permits the 
wearing of religious garb law would not privilege one religion over another; it would 
simply need to make explicit that religious garb cannot be used for indoctrination, 
proselytization, or religious instruction. 
The fact that all the religious-garb cases do not involve religious instruction or 
proselytizing (Table 3) proves that the courts have already distinguished the definition of 
religious garb from the meaning of religious instruction. If we know what religious 
instruction is not, then how can we know what it is? We turn now from the literature on 
law to the literature on religion. 
To alleviate any further ambiguity, the definition of religious instruction, also 
known as religious education or faith development,276 is this: a holistic and often 
immersive way to cultivate the 3Bs of religious identity formation—a person’s beliefs 
and behaviors through acts of belonging.277 Beliefs may come in the form of theological 
or ethical worldviews that are expressed through ideas, doctrines, scripture, or oral 
narratives. Behaviors may come in the form of what Richard J. Foster classified as 
inward disciplines (meditation, prayer, fasting, and study), outward disciplines 
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(simplicity, solitude, submission, and service), or corporate disciplines (confession, 
worship, guidance, and celebration).278 Acts of belonging may weave beliefs with 
behaviors to give people an understanding that they belong to something larger than 
themselves (a tribe, community, tradition, or transcendent reality). The history of 
American religious education279 reveals a longstanding commitment to cultivate people’s 
faith development across the lifespan. A person’s decision to wear religious garb may 
reflect certain beliefs (e.g., modesty or discretion), as reminders to engage in everyday 
spiritual practices (e.g., to count the rosary), or as a reflection of a person’s belonging in a 
community or tradition (e.g., long hair worn by Native Americans).  
In the context of this study, religious garb simply denotes that a teacher is “a 
member or adherent of any religious order, sect, or denomination.” The legislator’s 
definition of religious garb suggests that it is simply an expression of a person’s selfhood, 
which justices have taken great care to distinguish from an act of religious instruction. In 
other words, in civil society, wearing religious garb is a private act in a public place; in 
public schools, however, teachers wearing religious garb is a private act with public 
significance.280 
Admittedly, witnessing someone’s religious garb is certain to create an 
impression, but to what degree and in what direction? 
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Yes, students are impressionable—in what way? The U.S. Supreme Court 
rightfully understands the Constitution to prohibit public schools from engaging in 
religious indoctrination and religious instruction—neither of which defines religious 
garb, as previously demonstrated. These prohibitions derive from the Court’s 
longstanding commitment to shield highly impressionable children from religious 
coercion. 
The impressionability standard arises mostly from Establishment Clause cases281 
designed to measure the degrees to which the state religiously compromises students. 
This measurement problem for judges mirrors the “enduring problem for all educators,” 
Justice Stephens asserts—the “risk of treating students as adults too soon, or alternatively 
to risk treating them as children too long.”282 
The unique challenge of measuring the degrees of students’ impressionability 
today is that, in an age of social media, students of all ages are inundated with images of 
authority figures who wear religious garb in:  
• advertisements (e.g., Amazon’s 2016 Super Bowl commercial depicting a 
friendship between a priest an imam;283 Macy’s introduction of the Verona 
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Collection, an “international modest clothing brand” for Muslim 
women284);  
 
• cartoons (e.g., religious identities of Marvel superheroes);285 
 
• movies and television (e.g., reality-TV show Breaking Amish,286 actors 
Meryl Streep and Philip Seymour Hoffman in Doubt about Catholic 
clergy,287 or Hindu characters portrayed in Life of Pi or Slumdog 
Millionaire);288 
 
• newscasts (e.g., anchor wearing a cross necklace);289  
 
• sports (e.g., Olympian Ibtihaj Muhammad winning a gold medal in 
fencing);290 
 
• toys (e.g., Mattel introducing a hijab-wearing Barbie doll);291 and so on. 
 
The assumption behind the question of impressionability is that exposure to the 
garb of the “religious other” will result in observers’ increased affection for, admiration 
of, or interest in the wearer’s religion. Is this even more so when a student’s teacher 
                                               
 
284 Christina Carton and Maya Salam, “Macy’s Courts Muslims With New Hijab Brand,” New York Times, 
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285 Howard Kramer, “Seven Most Religious Superheroes of the Marvel Universe,” The Complete Pilgrim, 
May 17, 2017. 
286 TLC, Breaking Amish. Creators Eric Evangelista and Shannon Evangelista. The Learning Channel, 
2012. 
287 Doubt. Directed by John Patrick Shanley. Los Angeles, CA: Miramax, 2008. 
288 Life of Pi. Directed by Ang Lee. Century City, CA: Fox 2000 Pictures, 2012; Slumdog Millionaire. 
Directed by Danny Boyle and Loveleen. Century City, CA: Fox Searchlight Pictures, 2008. 
289 Fox News Channel contributor stated, “For the record, I’m wearing crosses again. If you don’t want to 
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Ashburn, “My cross to bear—why I no longer hide my faith in the newsroom,” Fox News, March 16, 2014. 
290 “In 2016, fencing champion Ibtihaj Muhammad became the first Muslim woman wearing a hijab to 
represent the United States at the Olympics. She became the first female Muslim-American athlete to win 
an Olympic medal when she took home the bronze in the team sabre event at the Summer Games in Rio.” 
A&E Biography, “Ibtihaj Muhammad Biography,” Biography.com, A&E Television Networks, Nov. 14, 
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adorns religious garb in the public classroom? This question can imply a negative 
connotation related to the more heightened concerns of naïve students being susceptible 
to religious indoctrination and religious instruction at the hands of agents of the state.  
In twelve decades, courts in Pennsylvania (1894 and 2013),292 North Dakota 
(1936),293 Indiana (1940),294 Kentucky (1956),295 and Mississippi (1990)296 agreed that 
schoolchildren are impressionable, easily influenced, and worthy of protection. These 
courts accepted as reasonable the notion that students are impressionable but these courts 
did not agree any of the following three claims: that (a) children, by the nature of their 
age, are too sensitive to be exposed to teachers’ religious garb; that (b) students’ exposure 
to teachers’ religious garb for long periods of time would “inspire respect if not sympathy 
for the religious denomination to which the [teachers] so manifestly belong”297 (see 
discussion of the “size, frequency, and visibility” standards in IV. B.); and (c) that 
teachers were somehow less than an ideal role model298 because they wore religious garb. 
The case of Deborah McGlothin illustrates these points.  
In 1990, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the claim made by a school 
principal that it was “inappropriate” and a terminable offense for a teacher to periodically 
                                               
 
292 Hysong v. Gallitzin, 164 Pa. 629 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894); Nichol v. Arin, 268 F.Supp 2d 536 (W.D. Pa. 
2003). 
293 Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 44 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1936). 
294 Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1940). 
295 Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S. W. 2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App., 1956). 
296 Mississippi v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879. 
297 Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1918). 
298 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted concern for teachers’ unique influence as a role model: “a state 
exerts great authority over students in elementary and secondary public schools through mandatory 
attendance requirements, and because of the students' emulation of teachers as role models and the 









wear an African-style headdress, such as during a school-sponsored event celebrating 
Black History Month. The principal’s rationale was that “[a]ll children need positive role 
models, but especially do elementary-aged children because of their very impressionable 
young minds.” When firing the teacher, McGlothin, for periodically wearing an Ethiopian 
headdress, the principal wrote, “I am concerned that your appearance is giving [students] 
a distorted view of what is appropriate.”299  
The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated McGlothin’s 
employment, noting that the school district and the school board had previously 
articulated the pedagogical interest in promoting diversity through multicultural 
education. This ruling suggests that exposure to multiple cultures, including religious 
cultures, is a compelling state interest. This is further supported by the U.S. Supreme 
court, when writing for a unified bench, Chief Justice Roberts expressed that the state 
must take “‘relevant differences’ into account,” including racial and religious.300 In this 
way, the courts have affirmed that exposure to difference is considered a positive value, 
creating valuable impressions such as diversity, religious liberty, and peaceful 
coexistence. (The precise question of whether a religiously diverse teacher corps meets 
                                               
 
299 Mississippi v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879. 
300 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). In reflecting upon 
the decision to uphold the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Chief Justice Roberts 
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the definition of a compelling pedagogical interest is untested and worthy of future 
consideration.) 
When examining the constitutionality of anti-religious-garb statutes, courts must 
also take into consideration the negative impressions that may result when a student 
perceives the state as being hostile to religion.301 In McGlothin’s case, imagine the 
impressions the student body would have when discovering their teacher was fired for 
wearing an African headdress, particularly the black students in the school. 
Nebraska’s statute created an even more dramatic scenario. The law threatens 
criminal penalties for teachers who wear religious garb while teaching in public schools, 
including possibly being “committed to the county jail for a period not exceeding thirty 
days.”302 Although there is no evidence of this part of the statute being implemented, 
imagine what impressions students would form when seeing their habit-wearing teacher 
being handcuffed, forced into a police car outside the school, and sent to jail. I imagine 
that a reasonable child would have the impression that the state wants to expel Catholics. 
In this context, would not an impressionable child equate banning Catholic nuns from 
teaching in public schools as a less severe extension of the state’s violent history in 
                                               
 
301 The U.S. Supreme Court held, “it cannot be said that the danger that children would misperceive the 
endorsement of religion [by permitting religiously affiliated student clubs to meet on campus after school 
hours] is any greater than the danger that they would perceive a hostility toward the religious viewpoint if 
the Club were excluded from the public forum. Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 
(2001). 
302 Neb. Code § 79-898 (2016) statute was first enacted in 1919 (c. 248, § 1, p. 1018) and reaffirmed in 









expelling other religious minorities, such as with the Indian Removal Act (1830),303 when 
more than 4,000 Cherokees were displaced through the Trail of Tears, or with Mormons 
in 1838, when the governor of Missouri issued an extermination order against all 
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints?304 These violent visuals of 
banishment are rooted in the policy objective of promoting uniformity over diversity—an 
unrealistic policy objective in a nation as diverse as the United States. Whether physical 
violence, job loss, or psychological despair, religious animosity in law creates a lasting 
impression. 
Another way to approach the subject is to ask whether the state’s enactment of 
anti-religious-garb laws says less about the students’ impression of the teachers and more 
about their impressions of themselves. Imagine, for instance, a Muslim girl in 
Philadelphia who wears a hijab learning that her teacher, Mrs. Reardon, was just fired 
because she wore a hijab. Imagine a Sikh boy or girl in Oregon learning that their teacher, 
Mrs. Cooper, was just fired for wearing a turban. Would not these students ask 
themselves, “Will the school kick me out too? Do I belong here?” Consider that the 
students may have religious-garb-wearing family members who work for the school 
district. Might they ask, “Will they lose their jobs, too? Will our family have to move 
(again)?” Consider the impressions of non-Muslim or non-Sikh students in these 
                                               
 
303 A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774–1875. 
Statutes at Large, 21st Congress, 1st Session, Chap. CXLVIII., May 28, 1830 (Washington, DC: Library of 
Congress) p. 411. 
304 “The Mormons must be treated as enemies, and must be exterminated or driven from the state if 
necessary for the public peace—their outrages are beyond all description,” Governor Lilburn Boggs, Mo. 









classrooms. Would they conclude that their school fears, disfavors, or even hates 
Muslims and Sikhs, teaching them that they should too? Might not this lead some 
students to think they can look down upon or mistreat fellow students who identify as 
Muslim or Sikh? As previously discussed, religious-based harassment in the workplace305 
and religious-based bullying of students in schools is on the rise.306 As of 2017, forty-two 
percent of Muslims with children enrolled in K-12 schools report bullying of their 
children because of their religion, compared with twenty-three percent of Jews, twenty 
percent of Protestants, and six percent of Catholics.307 In this context, would not non-
Muslim teachers who may have a personal bias against Islam feel emboldened to mistreat 
their Muslim students because their supervisor terminated the employment of a fellow 
teacher who wore a hijab? After all, the perpetrators in one in four of the cited bullying 
incidents against Muslim students were teachers and administrators.308 If students are 
already seeing their teachers bully Muslim students, would not those students, regardless 
of their identity, perceive the state to be hostile to Muslims if a hijab-wearing teacher was 
removed from the public schools? 
Given these trends, it is imperative for states to develop school cultures in which 
the entire teacher corps effectively implements anti-bullying programs and models for 
                                               
 
305 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reports that since September 11, 2001, the “the EEOC 
saw a 250% increase in the number of religion-based discrimination charges involving Muslims.” In 
response, the EEOC “filed nearly 90 lawsuits alleging religious and national origin discrimination 
involving Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern and South Asian communities, many of which involved 
harassment.” EEOC, What You Should Know about the EEOC and Religious and National Origin 
Discrimination Involving the Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern and South Asian Communities. 
(Washington, DC: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2018). 
306 Dalia Mogahed and Youssef Chouhoud, American Muslim Poll 2017: Muslims at the Crossroads, 
Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, (Washington, DC: ISPU, 2017). 
307 Ibid., Mogahed and Chouhoud (2017). 
308 Ibid., Mogahed and Chouhoud (2017). See also Beatrice Dupuy. “Muslim Students are Getting Their 






students how to promote peaceful coexistence. One way this can be achieved is to repeal 
the anti-religious-garb laws. This way, students who wear religious garb may see 
themselves represented in leadership, and all students will learn the important civic skill 
of interacting with diverse authority figures. In this scenario, the impression would not 
imply an endorsement or inoculation of religion but a promotion of the civic 
understanding of the mission of American education—public schools serve the entire 
public.  
Imagine, in this context, the children who share the religious-garb-wearing 
teacher’s religion. Would not they feel a greater sense of self-worth or belonging, 
believing that they, too, can one day dedicate their life to public service? The children 
with different religious identities, or none at all, may develop essential socialization 
skills, better preparing them for a diverse workforce and global society. Should not the 
public school prepare students to possibly work with—or work for—someone whose 
religious identity is different from their own? Will not these civic competencies benefit a 
student who in the future sits on a jury to hears the account of a religious-garb-wearing 
witness? Or a student who, after coming of age and registers to vote, listens to a debate 
between two candidates for political office, one of whom does and one of whom does not 
wear religious garb? Or a student, who in the future is pulled over by a police officer who 
wears religious garb?309 Would the public school have adequately prepared them to 
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respect the authority of a witness, a political candidate, or a police officer? Teachers are 
not the only authority figures students will encounter in society—why not prepare them 
accordingly? In other words, could it be that learning from diverse authority figures is a 
compelling pedagogical interest?310 
There are no court cases that address the specific question of the pedagogical 
benefits of exposing students to a religiously-diverse faculty. Would there be? I base this 
conjecture on legal cases that affirmed the pedagogical benefits of exposing students to a 
racially diverse student body.311 Chief Justice Roberts cites this benefit when issuing a 
landmark ruling312 about religious liberty in which he explicitly connects racial diversity 
and religious diversity. In writing for the unanimous court, he stated, “the Court has 
noted that ‘context matters’313 in applying the compelling interest test, and has 
emphasized that strict scrutiny’s fundamental purpose is to take ‘relevant differences’ 
into account.”314 
Public schools may consider taking relevant differences into account when 
examining the constitutionality of anti-religious-garb statutes. Doing so may help 
students understand how lived religion315 manifests in public and private life—aware that 
                                               
 
310 Although not applicable to religion, it has been argued that a racially diverse student body is a 
compelling pedagogical interest. Patricia Gurin, “Expert Report of Patricia Gurin: Selections from The 
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Michigan,” Journal of Equity & Excellence in Education, 32:2, 36–62 (1999). 
311 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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313 Citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), 327. 
314 Ibid., citing, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), 228. 
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understanding does not imply agreement. Scholars refer to this educational process as 
cultivating the civic competency of religious literacy.316 This educational objective is 
championed by professional associations of scholars of religion317 and social studies 
educators.318 When the state upholds religious literacy as a positive pedagogical 
objective, the state views students’ academic exposure to religious diversity as not an act 
of coercion, but a product of civic education. 
Empirical research on this topic is worth noting. Emile Lester and Patrick S. 
Roberts conducted a study of the civic competencies developed in students when a school 
district in Modesto, California, introduced a mandatory religious literacy program about 
the world’s religions.319 Their study showed that “the pre-test found students alarmingly 
intolerant on questions dealing with respect for First Amendment rights. After the course, 
students were more willing to extend the rights to run for public office, teach in public 
schools, hold public rallies and make a public speech to their ‘least-liked group.’” They 
found that exposure to the academic study of religion did not change the students’ 
religious identity but decreased their intolerance of others. 
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American Education,” in Michael D. Waggoner and Nathan C. Walker, The Oxford Handbook of Religion 
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In light of this research, scholars agree that both religious literacy and religious 
liberty are compelling pedagogical objectives for public schools to promote. Whether 
those precise objectives are achieved by exposing students to teachers’ religious garb has 
yet to be determined. This study, on the other hand, demonstrates that terminating the 
employment of religious-garb-wearing teachers may give students a wide range of 
impressions, including that the school is not adequately preparing them to participate in a 
religiously diverse society.   
In light of this research, religious literacy and religious liberty are compelling 
pedagogical objectives for the state to consider. In doing so, they will develop alternative 
means of promoting diversity over uniformity rather than justify banning private acts of 
devotion from public places. 
Prepare students for a nation of religious minorities. Today, public schools in 
the United States have a unique challenge of educating the next generation in an age of 
insurgent nationalism, as expressed in the fears that “The Mexicans are coming!”320 and 
“The Africans and Haitians are coming!”321 and “The Muslims are coming!”322 These 
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people,” Donald J. Trump, Announcement for Candidacy for President of the United States. (New York, 
NY: Trump Tower), June 16, 2015. Trump, Donald J. (2015, June 16). Video and transcript available on C-
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sentiments of ethnic and religious animosity harken back to the original age of anti-
religious-garb legislation, which benefited from people believing the warnings of a 
“Heathen Invasion”323 or fearing that the Irish Catholics would seize the public schools, 
as this study shows.324 
These historic fears of a non-white, non-Protestant “takeover” of America325 were 
embedded in immigration laws. From 1790, the year before the Bill of Rights was 
ratified, to 1954, there was one requirement for citizenship: applicants had to be white.326 
The legal definition of “white” had a profound impact on the nation’s racial and religious 
demographics, which is important to note when examining the origins and effects of anti-
religious garb legislation; it is also an important factor to consider when examining the 
purposes of public education today.  
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For instance, in 1922, Japanese immigrant Takao Ozawa was denied citizenship 
on the grounds that Japanese were not considered white327—a U.S. Supreme Court ruling 
used to further justify the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.328 In 
1923, Bhagat Singh Thind, an Indian Sikh who wore a turban, was unable to persuade the 
U.S. Supreme Court that Indians, as a branch of Aryans, were Caucasian. Even though he 
had previously served in the U.S. Army during World War I, the high court upheld the 
decision to deny him citizenship.329 These cases reveal how the white Protestant 
majority’s fears of a “takeover” were pervasive in various laws, not only anti-religious 
garb legislation. Just as race was legally constructed,330 so were the religious 
demographics of the country.331  
A review of this history shows that the fears of a “takeover” of the white 
Protestant establishment have been and continue to be actualized: 
• John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the first Irish Catholic to serve as the President 
of the United States, was elected in 1960332 and Barack Hussain Obama,333 
the first African American to serve as President of the United States, was 
elected in 2008;  
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• Thirteen U.S. Supreme Court justices have identified as Catholic, five of 
whom currently serve on the court;334 eight U.S. Supreme Court justices 
have identified as Jewish, three of whom currently serve on the court.335 
 
• In 2006, Keith Ellison became the first Muslim to be elected to 
Congress;336 in 2012, Tulsi Gabbard337 became the first Hindu to be 
elected to Congress and in 2012 Mazie Hirono became the first Buddhist 
to be elected to Congress, and the first U.S. Senator born in Japan; 
 
• In 2012, Protestants, for the first time in U.S. history, became a minority, 
representing forty-eight percent of the population;338  
 
• In 2016, the religiously unaffiliated, previously referred to as “heathens,” 
now make up the largest group in twenty states;339 and most notably, 
 
• In 2016, White Christians made up less than half of the public (forty-three 
percent), of which white Protestants made up less than a third of the 
American population (thirty percent). 340 
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This data suggests that, in 2012, the United States became the first, as far as I 
know, nation of religious minorities—where no one religious tradition represents more 
than half of the population.  
These tectonic shifts in American demographics may help explain some of the 
return of xenophobic political rhetoric, which teachers are forced to address in the public 
classroom. This is significant in many ways. Public schools are educating students in a 
time unlike any other in American history. These changes must be taken into 
consideration when articulating the compelling state interests used to regulate the 
dynamic and diverse public education system in America. These interests inevitably will 
need to acknowledge the religious identities of the diverse student body and teacher 
corps. After all, the United States has become a nation of religious minorities.  
Today, public schools are forced to ask the question: What does a nation of 
religious minorities require of its residents? How will the public schools prepare students 
to navigate the inevitable complexities of living in and self-governing a minority–
majority country? Many leaders in the fields of law, education, and religion agree that 
public schools must cultivate two civic competencies in the next generation of citizens: 
religious literacy and religious liberty.  
Religious literacy is not merely the development of content knowledge about 
religion, as Professor Steven Prothero stresses the “key stories, doctrines, practices, 






religions.”341 A religiously literate person understands, as Professor Diane Moore 
explains, that religions are internally diverse, change over time, and are embedded in all 
aspects of culture.”342 A religiously literate person can also understand how people and 
groups form their religious identities, as Benjamin Marcus explains in his scholarship on 
the 3Bs of religious identity formation—the degrees of influence that beliefs, behaviors, 
and acts of belonging have on a person’s or group’s identity.343  
A legally literate person can understand that religious liberty is not a political 
wedge issue but a constitutional and human right that protects people of all religions and 
none.344 In the United States, the guarantee to freely exercise religion along with the 
promise that governments will not establish a religion or privilege one religion over 
another are two principles of the one right described as religious freedom. Or, as John 
Courtney Murray stated, the religious liberty clauses of the First Amendment are “articles 
of peace,” not “articles of faith.”345 These articles of peace build upon the U.S. 
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Constitution’s commitment to chartered pluralism. Os Guinness, the primary architect of 
the Williamsburg Charter346 explains: 
Chartered pluralism is a vision of religious liberty in public life that, 
across the deep differences of a pluralistic society, forges a substantive 
agreement, or freely chosen compact, on three things that are the “3Rs” of 
religious liberty in a pluralistic society: rights, responsibilities, and 
respect [emphasis added].  
 
The compact affirms that, first, that religious liberty, or freedom of 
conscience, is a fundamental and inalienable right [emphasis added] for 
peoples of all faiths and none; second, that religious liberty is a universal 
right joined to a universal duty [responsibility] to respect that right for 
others [especially for those with whom we disagree]; and third, that the 
first principles of religious liberty, combined with the lessons of two 
hundred years of constitutional experience, require and shape certain 
practical guidelines by which a robust yet civil discourse [respect] may be 
sustained in a free society that would remain free347 [emphasis added]. 
 
Free schools have a special duty to promote liberty for all members of society, 
especially the most vulnerable. Public schools serve as the training ground on which 
students will become the first generation with the burden and opportunity to self-govern a 
nation of religious minorities.  
It is my hope that public school today will teach students, first by showing them, 
that religious liberty is not simply a political slogan but a way of life for people of all 
religions and none. 
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V – CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Pennsylvania’s and Nebraska’s statutory bans on teachers wearing religious garb 
in public schools, as demonstrated in this study, (1) failed the general applicability test 
and (2) substantially burdened religions, as defined under the provisions in Sherbert and 
the Religious Freedom Protection Act (RFPA). The statutes (3) partially met the rational 
basis test, but when faced with strict scrutiny, the statutes (4) failed to meet the 
compelling interest and (5) narrowly tailored tests. I close this chapter with a discussion 
of how when it came to state bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb, the strict 
scrutiny test is “strict in theory and fatal in fact.”1 
Legal Conclusions 
 
The Statutes Are Neither Neutral nor Generally Applicable  
The Pennsylvania and Nebraska statutes failed the general applicability test 
(Chapter IV – General Applicability) because they targeted religious practice for 
government regulation and therefore were not “facially neutral.” The religious activity 
that it sought to regulate was the wearing of “any dress, mark, emblem or insignia 
indicating the fact that such [public school] teacher is a member or adherent of any 
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religious order, sect or denomination.”2 By the end of World War II, twenty-two states, 
either through state statutes or administrative regulations, prohibited public 
schoolteachers from wearing religious garb in the classroom. These laws were enacted in 
an undisputed era of anti-Catholic bias, which is why habit-wearing Catholic nuns were 
the targets of government regulation. The fact that in the nineteenth and twentieth century 
only religious minorities brought suit demonstrated that these laws were discriminatory 
in, not only, design but also effect. The contemporary cases targeted religious-garb 
wearing Muslim and Sikh teachers, which served as further evidence that the statutes 
were not neutral. A generally applicable law would have been one that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court authorized the state legislature to create, but it did not.3 To date, it 
remains undisputed that the statutes are neither neutral nor generally applicable laws, as 
required under the Smith standard.  
Having failed to meet this threshold, the Sherbert standard was triggered, 
beginning with an inquiry into whether the statutes burdened religion, which they did 
substantially.  
The Statutes Substantially Burdened Religion  
There were seven ways in which the study demonstrated that the statutes 
substantially burdened religion (Chapter IV – Substantial Burden Test, §1–§7), as defined 
under Sherbert and the Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act (RFPA). This 
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meant that a burden could have been direct or indirect or fundamental or incidental to 
religion. Pennsylvania had additional requirements: The law… 
substantially burdens a person’s religion when the state’s action: 
Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by a 
person’s sincerely held religious beliefs; Significantly curtails a person’s 
ability to express adherence to the person’s religious faith; Denies a 
person a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities which are 
fundamental to the person’s religion; Compels conduct or expression 
which violates a specific tenet of a person’s religious faith.4 
 
The anti-religious-garb laws in Pennsylvania and Nebraska directly burdened 
licensed public schoolteachers through legal penalties. Catholic, Mennonite, Muslim, and 
Sikh teachers were terminated for wearing religious garb while teaching in public 
schools. The criminal and professional burdens they faced were severe, creating a 
substantial burden on them as individuals and on their families. The statutes also directly 
burdened school directors for failing to comply, extending the circle of criminality to 
accomplices. The statutes indirectly burdened women; every case in this 123-year saga 
involved female teachers. The statutes indirectly burdened religious minorities because of 
how their religious practices manifested. The statutes also targeted some religions over 
other religions because of garb visibility, size, and frequency of wear, as well as 
burdened religion over non-religion. The local communities were also indirectly 
burdened because the implementation of the statutes contributed to school districts 
becoming even more religiously segregated. For these reasons, teachers in Nebraska 
successfully passed the substantial burden test under Sherbert. Teachers in Pennsylvania 
                                               
 






also passed the substantial burden test under Sherbert, as well as met all four of the tests 
under RFPA, though they were only required to meet one. 
The plaintiffs successfully passed the burden standard, which triggered strict 
scrutiny—a series of tests the defendants (the government) was required to pass. The 
Pennsylvania and Nebraska had to provide at least one compelling reason that the statutes 
created such a burden, and if that reason was deemed compelling under the highest 
standard of judicial review, the states had to demonstrate that the statute was narrowly 
tailored to achieve the least restrictive means possible. This study shows that they failed 
all parts of strict scrutiny.  
The Statutes Partially Met the Rational Basis Test  
 The case law reveals that any negative treatment of teachers was a result of the 
state persuading the courts that their reasons for regulations, at times, met the rational 
basis test (Chapter IV – Discussion, §2 and 4§). The problem is that the some of the more 
historic trend-setting cases pre-date the U.S. Supreme Court’s development of the 
rational basis and strict scrutiny standards. After surveying the eight reasons states used 
to justify the regulation (Chapter IV – Compelling Interest Test, §1–§7), the study shows 
through an examination of eleven findings (Chapter IV – Discussion, §1–§11) that the 
justifications failed at least one of the three-pronged strict scrutiny test. 
The Statutes Failed the Compelling Interest Test  
 The states failed to demonstrate compelling reasons for prohibiting teachers from 
wearing religious garb. It may have been reasonable to want to create a “secular school 






Discussion, §7). which legal scholars and the U.S. Supreme Court consider code for anti-
Catholicism (Chapter IV – General Applicability). Regardless of the origins, the present 
study shows that the effects of a secular agenda were rooted in a misunderstanding of the 
U.S. Constitution. The First Amendment uses the two principles of no establishment and 
free exercise of religion to promote one right: freedom of religion—unlike the freedom 
from religion approaches used in France and Turkey’s constitutions (Chapter IV – 
Discussion, §7). As a result, some objectives met the rational basis test (Chapter IV – 
Discussion, §2 and §4) but none passed the definition of “compelling” under the highest 
standard of judicial review.  
 The study also revealed that it is neither rational nor compelling for the state to 
justify banning public schoolteachers’ religious garb on the grounds that it indirectly 
resulted in taxpayers subsidizing religion (Chapter IV – Discussion, §6). No court in the 
123-year-old history found this objective to be credible when it came to the narrow cases 
filed by teachers. As a result, the question of publicly-subsidized schoolteachers using 
their salaries to make donations to religious organizations from which they belong has no 
bearing on this study. 
 It may have been reasonable to avoid being perceived as a school that approved or 
favored religion (Chapter IV – Compelling Interest Test, §3); however, this study found 
that the statutes disproportionately inhibited minority religions and privileged non-
religion over religion (Chapter IV – Substantial Burden Test), justifications did not meet 
the heights of the compelling interest test.  
The study examined the safety justifications for banning certain types of religious 






safety regulations were not rational because they were not responding to a verified 
problem, nor meet the narrowly tailored standard under strict scrutiny (Chapter IV – 
Discussion, §2 and §3). 
 The study considered the states concerns of a “religious takeover,” religious 
indoctrination, and religious instruction in order to protect highly impressionable 
students (Chapter IV – Compelling Interest Test, §5–§7). The study concluded that the 
irrational fear of the religious “other” is not compelling (Chapter IV – Discussion, §2 and 
§11), nor is it accurate to say that religious garb, in itself, indoctrinates or instructs—
positions that contract the legal definitions in the statutes and the case law that found no 
evidence of religious instruction (see Table 3 and Chapter IV – Discussion, §8–§9). The 
study problematized the view that exposure to the religious garb of a public schoolteacher 
can have only a unidirectional negative impression on children (Chapter IV – Discussion, 
§10). The study scrutinized the assumptions about what constitutes impressionability and 
warned against states creating a chilling effect in the classroom, giving religious-garb-
wearing children the impression that they, too, should be fearful of their own status in the 
school. Such behavior by the state could impress upon children whose identity differs 
from that of their teachers that the state is hostile to religion, whether those children 
identify as religious or not. The defendants’ claim that religious garb only negatively 
influences children (e.g., convert them to the religion of their teacher) failed to 
acknowledge the positive pedagogical impressions students may develop when exposed 
to religious diverse authorities—a necessary civic skill to develop in order to participate 






 Having failed to provide compelling justifications for banning teachers’ religious 
garb, the study did not technically need to proceed with an examination under the 
narrowly tailored test; however, for the sake of answering the research questions the 
study included a brief discussion of the application of this third prong of the strict 
scrutiny standard (Chapter IV – Narrowly Tailored Test).  
The Statutes Failed the Narrowly Tailored Test 
 A dominant rationale was used to justify that the anti-religious-garb statutes were 
narrowly tailored. States claimed that the restriction applied only to the religious garb 
worn by teachers while they were teaching in public schools—because it was not an 
absolute ban on the wearing of religious garb in public by all people it was, therefore, by 
its nature narrowly tailored. On its face, this seemed reasonable; however, other less 
restrictive means were then and now available. The teacher could have been invited to 
work for the administration or the school board, rather than be fired or sent to jail. As 
benevolent as this suggestion may be, the study shows that this created more problems 
than it solved: Will a religious-garb-wearing professional be prevented from serving as a 
school principal or be barred from running for a seat on the school board—two positions 
that have much more influence and authority over students and the school’s culture? 
Even this administrative accommodation would have resulted in religious discrimination, 
which the study determined was unlawful. Regardless, the states in this study failed not 
only to provide compelling interests for justifying the burden on religion but also failed to 
demonstrate regulatory alternatives (e.g., anti-mask laws) that achieved their interests 
(e.g., public safety). 






Strict Scrutiny Is “Strict in Theory and Fatal in Fact” 
These conclusions reinforced the findings in Adam Winkler’s legal research on 
the effects of the strict scrutiny standard.5  
In what would be become “one of the most quoted lines in legal literature,”6 
Gerald Gunter explained that, when examining Free Speech and Equal Protection cases, 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny standard is “strict in theory and fatal in fact,”7 
suggesting that the method itself will determine its outcome.  
In testing this hypothesis, Winkler conducted an empirical analysis of how federal 
courts applied strict scrutiny, concluding that Free Speech and Equal Protection cases 
were not, in fact, destined for failure. In religious liberty cases, however, he found that 
they “had the highest survival rate of any area of law in which strict scrutiny applie[d]: 59 
percent, more than double the mean of the other doctrinal categories.”8 (Professor Ira C. 
Lupu characterized the high rate, but not absolutely guarantee, of survival of Free 
Exercise claims as “strict in theory, but ever-so-gentle in fact.”9) 
Winkler went on to examine the courts’ application of this standard with statutory 
origins (e.g., the federal RFRA or RLUPA) and those based on the Free Exercise Clause 
(a similar bifurcation found in the design of this study). One of his key findings is that the 
primary types of religious liberty claims—exemption and discrimination—may factor 
into whether a government action will survive strict scrutiny. Winkler concluded that 
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statutes challenged under an exemption argument survived seventy-four percent of the 
time, leading the courts not to grant religious accommodations three-quarters of the time. 
In contrast, if the statute in question was filed as a religious discrimination case, then the 
government regulation on religion survived zero percent of the time—meaning that it 
truly is fatal in fact. Winkler explains:10 
In the discrimination cases… the courts confront laws or other government 
actions that explicitly single out religious organizations or practices for 
disadvantageous treatment—for example, a police department’s ban on 
facial hair that permits medical but not religious exceptions.11 That 
scrutiny in such cases is particularly deadly ought to be expected. As the 
Supreme Court wrote in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, “a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible.” 
Yet, to warrant strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause in the first 
place, the law has to subject religions to exactly such discriminatory 
treatment. In other words, strict scrutiny only applies to laws that are by 
their very nature already unconstitutional. 
 
This study supports Winkler’s conclusion. The very fact that Pennsylvania and 
Nebraska targeted religious garb for government regulation triggered a discrimination 
claim. Under strict scrutiny, Winkler’s study demonstrated and my study supports, it is 
possible to meet the required compelling interests and least restrictive means doctrine to 
justify substantially burdening someone in an invidiously discriminatory fashion. 
Therefore, when it comes to religious discrimination cases, such as the question of state 
bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb, strict scrutiny is “strict in theory and fatal 
in fact.” 
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By design, this research project is interdisciplinary. The findings make 
meaningful contributions to the fields of education, religion, and most importantly, law. 
Education research. The study told an important story about what religious-
garb-wearing public schoolteachers have faced over the last twelve decades. The findings 
contributed to the question of public officials’ religious liberty rights and the 
constitutional limits of the states’ power to regulate religion. The findings also 
contributed to educational questions about students and their exposure to religious 
differences and revealed new insights about the purpose of public education in a multi-
religious society.  
Future education researchers may find helpful the legal research methods 
developed in this study. The five-step process methodology included: (1) synthesizing 
judicial tests, in order to narrow the analysis to distinct legal causes of action; (2) 
collecting primary and secondary documents to determine the historical fact patterns in 
the anti-religious-garb cases; (3) articulating narrow legal research questions; (4) set 
factual parameters; and (5) conducting a legal analysis using legal methods such as 
deductive analysis, rule-based reasoning techniques, analogical reasoning strategies, and 
identifying logic fallacies. Non-lawyers looking to conduct research on education law 
may find helpful these legal research methods and legal analysis techniques. 
Religious studies. The study contributed to the academic study of religion by 
illustrating how state legislatures have defined and how courts have interpreted the legal 






the nature of religion and people’s free exercise thereof. As later discussed in the 
limitations section of this chapter, the second phase of this study will map the judicial 
systems’ evolving legal definition of religion, which may contribute to academic study of 
how both the courts and scholars of religion define religion. Also, the study shed light on 
core assumptions that lawmakers and courts have about students’ impressionability—
how they perceive religion to manifest in public places and how people form their 
religious or non-religious identities, including their own. In this context, this study could 
serve as a case study for psychological research on religious identity formation, the 
cultural-studies research on lived religion, and the education research that justifies that 
the civic competency of religious literacy is a compelling pedagogical objective. 
Reporting on religion. In addition, this 123-year-old history contributed to the 
field of journalism, in that the study illustrated how news media reported on law and 
religion in the wake of these controversies. Some of the reports were descriptive in 
nature—historically documenting the results of legislative initiatives—whereas others 
were investigative. These reports, spanned thirteen decades, further affirming this 
subject’s importance by archiving various political and legal conflicts. The consistency 
with which the media reported on these developments suggested that this is a perennial 
and unsettled issue that captures the public’s attention, generation after generation. The 
study contributed to the field of journalism education by providing a case study in how 







Legal Contributions  
This research on statutory bans on public schoolteachers’ religious garb made the 
following contributions to the study of law and religion. 
 Filled the gap and corrected the record. First, this study filled a series of gaps 
in the literature. It verified the accuracy of previous studies and corrected the record on 
how many states regulated public schoolteachers’ religious garb and classified them into 
state statutory bans and administrative regulatory actions. It illustrated how these laws 
were enacted by members of state legislatures, introduced as administrative bans by 
superintendents and school boards, and, in one case, enacted through a statewide public 
referendum. These findings demonstrated how pervasive the attempts were to prohibit 
public schoolteachers from wearing religious garb, specifically “suspect” religious 
minorities of the day. 
Enumerated the causes of action. The study documented the complex lineage of 
case law regarding the regulation of teachers’ religious garb. It demonstrated that there is 
no uniformity in legal reasoning among state or federal courts under the thirty-two 
different causes of action used by plaintiffs to challenge anti-religious-garb laws and 
regulations. The only consistent pattern is the fact that public schoolteachers won their 
cases in states that did not have an anti-religious-garb statute at the time, whereas this 
study affirmed that they consistently failed when challenging states whose legislatures 
had enacted statutory bans. 
It also distinguished two types of cases that were otherwise conflated in the 
literature: cases that challenged schools and cases brought by teachers. Those in the first 






public school district acquired a private school or authorized the use of public funds for 
private religious schools. In these cases, the evidence of teachers wearing religious garb 
was presented with a plethora of other facts used to test an Establishment Clause claim. 
The study explained why these were distinct from the narrow set of cases involving true 
public schools who happened to employ religious-garb-wearing teachers. 
Connected historical and contemporary conflicts. The study demonstrated that 
scholars considered the legal question of anti-religious-garb laws worth studying not only 
because of its historical significance but also because of the continuation of these 
conflicts today. In making these connections, the revealed systematic patterns of religious 
discrimination in the judicial system over a 123-year period.  
The study also proved that it is possible to resolve the longstanding legal 
questions as to the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s current garb statutes under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Pennsylvania 
Religious Freedom Protection Act. The study concluded that both Nebraska and 
Pennsylvania violated the federal neutral and generally applicable and strict scrutiny 
standards. It also concluded that Pennsylvania’s law, the only remaining anti-religious-
garb law in the country, violated Pennsylvania’s unique, four-part substantial burden test. 
The study concluded that these statutory bans on teachers’ religious garb are unlawful.  
Documented anti-Catholicism in the law. It also provided additional historical 
evidence of local and state governments using the rule of law to target Catholics. This 
meaningfully contributed to the body of literature on the conflicts between Protestants 







 Introduced new data about the Smith effect. The study also brought a new 
understanding to the effect that the Smith decision has had on the judicial system. It 
revealed that several of the contemporary cases involving African Hebrew Israelite, 
Muslim, and Sikh teachers were absorbed in the widespread confusion about how to 
apply Smith. The research showed the influence that federal and state religious freedom 
restoration acts had Free Exercise cases, further explaining why, to date, no court has 
used strict scrutiny to test the constitutionality of a state ban on public schoolteachers’ 
religious garb. 
Connected domestic and international conflicts. Finally, the study connected 
the domestic legal conflicts over regulating religious garb to comparable conflicts around 
the world. It situated the historical and contemporary conflicts about legal bans on 
religious garb in public schools in the United States, within current discussions in the 
United Nations, the European Union, and Canada. The study reviewed how the question 
of government regulation of religious garb worn by both teachers and students in public 
schools has recently erupted in six countries and in the European Court of Human Rights. 
The analysis drew upon research that showed that at least thirty-two countries throughout 
the world currently prohibit some forms of private acts of devotion in public places. The 
study drew from research that illustrates that countries with high restrictions on religion 
are more likely to experience greater increases in social hostility and violence. This study 
connected these global trends to historic conflict over public schoolteacher’s religious 
garb in the United States. Taken together, the study demonstrated the real-world 







The results of this study reveal important legal and educational implications as 
well as significant considerations for public education in a religiously diverse democracy. 
For Legislators, Policymakers, and Administrators 
 First, lawmakers, school boards, state superintends of education, and principals of 
public schools throughout the United States may find helpful the documentation of the 
systematic discriminatory effects of regulatory and statutory bans on public 
schoolteachers’ religious garb. They may heed the warnings revealed in this study as well 
as implement use education law to build common ground where the entire public is 
served by public education. Pennsylvania legislators, in particular, may benefit from 
using the data presented to take responsibility for the negative results of previous 
generations’ actions and, as recommended in this study, repeal the nations’ last religious 
garb law. Doing so would definitively end to this 123-year-old saga. 
For Judges, Attorneys, and Scholars of the Law 
 Second, judges and attorneys may resonate with the ways in which the study 
integrated both the Smith and Sherbert standards to test the legitimacy of these statutes. 
They may find useful the classification of various arguments used for and against 
regulations on public schoolteachers to better prepare them to defend or adjudicate 
teachers’ religious liberty claims. Legal professionals and scholars of the law may also 
find intriguing the finding that, when applied to religious discrimination cases, strict 






For Public Schoolteachers and Teachers’ Unions 
 Third, educators may resonate with the findings of this study. Teachers and the 
unions that represent them may draw upon the reverberating arguments in this study to 
better advocate for religious liberty in public schools. As made explicit in this study, this 
does not mean that public schoolteachers can or should engage in religious 
indoctrination, proselytizing, or in any way religiously coerce students. Such behavior is 
unconstitutional and betrays centuries of religious justifications made by religious people 
for separating religion and government (Chapter IV – Discussion, §7). This study does 
show, however, that public officials, in their limited function, retain their fundamental 
constitutional rights. This study demonstrates how it is possible to accommodate a 
teachers’ religious garb without infringing on the rights of others.  
For Public Education in a Pluralist Democracy 
 Finally, this study reveals additional implications for the public’s understanding 
of public education in a pluralist democracy. As previously cited, in 2012, Protestants 
became, for the first time in U.S. history, a minority. As a result, public schools now face 
an unprecedented challenge: to prepare generations of students to self-govern a nation of 
religious minorities. This tectonic shift in demographics requires educators and 
lawmakers to ask: What does a nation of religious minorities require of its residents? This 
study concludes that public schools are the primary locus for the next generations to 
cultivate two necessary civic competencies in an age of unprecedented diversity: 
religious literacy and religious liberty. These competencies are developed when public 
schools serve as laboratories for constitutional democracy, starting with ensuring that the 







 The legal analysis in this study of state bans on public schoolteachers’ religious 
garb is limited in the following ways.  
Nebraska’s Repeal 
The most obvious deficit is the fact that, midway through this research project, 
Nebraska repealed its anti-religious-garb law. The repeal was introduced on January 5, 
2017 and signed into law on March 27, 2017. To maintain the integrity of the two-state 
design, I bracketed my study period from 1894 to 2016.  
Establishment Clause 
 The study is admittedly deficient because it does not include a comprehensive 
legal analysis of the statutes under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment—a 
set of arguments that serve as the primary rebuttals to Free Exercise claims.  
As the study established, there are two principles for the constitutional right to 
religious freedom in the United States: the right to free exercise of religion and the 
restriction on government from establishing a national or state religion. These are 
inseparable, reinforcing rights that when analyzed together result in legally sophisticated 
and politically balanced views. When they are read in isolation of one another, a court 
can miss the wisdom that each principle has to offer and fall victim to the politicization of 
religious freedom. 
In this context, this study is limited to the time and place in which it took place. 






history.12 On the right, religious freedom has become a battle cry to rally conservatives 
against initiatives to legalize same-sex marriage and to provide contraception coverage, 
for example, and to reject arguments in favor of the separation of religion and state. On 
the left, “religious freedom” is cartooned with air quotes because of the view that claims 
of conscience are mere guises for discrimination and religious justifications for law are 
mere attempts at establishing a state religion. These stereotypes propagate division, as if 
political conservatives are only for their religion and progressives are against all religion. 
One way to transcend this zero-sum thinking is to give equal treatment to both the 
principle of free exercise of religion and the guarantee to no establishment of religion. In 
doing so, we can see how both principles contribute to America’s bold new experiment of 
governing a nation of religious minorities. 
This study, however, focused only on Free Exercise jurisprudence to meet the 
requirements of a narrow academic research project. Hopefully readers will understand 
that this draft is the first part of a larger research project that I intend to conduct once 
outside the academy. That next study will include a comprehensive examination of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and apply those judicial standards to these same anti-
religious-garb laws.  
Free Speech 
 The next stage of the study will include an analysis of free speech law, aware that 
religious garb is an expressive act also protected by the constitutional guarantee of free 
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speech. The intersectionality of these rights is also best analyzed together, which it is 
proposed to add this analysis to the second stage of the research. 
Workplace Discrimination 
Similarly, the second study will include an analysis of statutory provisions that 
prevent religious discrimination in the workplace. Some plaintiffs in this case who 
experienced religious-based discrimination in public schools sought remedies under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The second stage of the study will include an 
examination of whether the statute has either or both a disparate treatment (intentional) 
or disparate impact (unintentional) on teachers’ religion. It will also apply the Title VII 
standards to test whether a public school district experiences “undue hardship” when 
accommodating a religious-garb-wearing teacher. 
Together, this continued examination under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
and the Establishment Clause and Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment will 
further illustrate the intersectionality of these constitutional and civil rights protections 
against religious discrimination.  
Legal Definition of Religion 
Although there are many more shortcomings in this first stage of research, there is 
a final limitation worthy of mentioning before transitioning into listing the 
recommendations for future research. 
This study on the 123-year-history of anti-religious-garb laws implied but did not 
make explicit that the judicial system operated from different legal definitions of religion 






distinct definitions onto the legal justifications for regulating teachers’ religious garb. 
Meaning, this study I did not make explicit how a court in 1894 was operating from a 
proudly different legal definition of religion than a court may in 2018.  
For instance, at the U.S. Supreme Court level, nineteenth-century legal definitions 
of religion13 were limited to monotheism.14 Later, the Court broadened the constitutional 
meaning of the term to include non-theistic traditions while rejecting the idea that 
religion is “merely a personal moral code.”15 Then the Court found a that “legitimate 
religion” would need to have had a “longstanding” and “sincere”16 belief system and 
could only receive constitutional protections if it did not contravene criminal laws. These 
legal definitions of religion continued to change under Smith, the federal and state 
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, and the Hobby Lobby decision that extended the 
religiously liberty definition of person to corporations, which I discuss in Chapter II – 
Literature Review.  
Throughout this history not only did the definitions of religions change and the 
definitions of religious persons, but also the methods for defining religion changed, too. 
Methods used to legally define religion ranged from scholarly interpretations, to narrow 
or broad analogies to beliefs and practices observed in established religions, to detailed 
multi-pronged17 judicial tests. These various legal definitions of religion were intimately 
                                               
 
13 Eduardo Peñalver, “The Concept of Religion” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 791 (1997); Kent Greenawalt, 
“Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law” 72 Cal. L. Rev 753 and (1985–1986) and Kent Greenawalt, 
“The Concept of Religion in State Constitutions” 8 Campbell L. Rev. 437. 
14 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); United States v. McIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). 
15 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United 
States, 393 U.S. 333, 339 (1970). 
16 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 






related to competing religion clauses in state constitutions which give their own unique 
definitions of religions. The methods that courts used to legally define religion resulted in 
the lack of a uniform definition of religion, which meant that legal questions about 
regulating religion were particularly vulnerable to government bias. 
The second stage of the study will include a comprehensive rubric of the 
competing legal definitions of religion, and the methods used by the U.S. Supreme Court 
to define religion, with special attention to the legal definitions of “exercise” of religion. 
The study will distinguish between government regulations that seek to compel beliefs or 
to force theological confessions and a person’s religious “acts” that may cause another 
harm, thus justifying government regulation of religious behavior. The untested 
hypothesis is that that the problem of legally defining religion is rooted in the influence 
that Protestant Christianity had on the legal system. As this study shows, this influence 
disproportionally disenfranchised religious and racial minorities who wore religious garb 
while teaching in public schools. This hypothesis is worth further examination in the 
second phase of this study. 
Recommendations 
In addition to addressing the study’s limitations, it is recommended that additional 
research be conducted on the following subjects.  
No Aid to Religion Laws 
The study of bans on teachers’ religious garb in public schools resulted in the 
discovery of a complex network of no aid to religion laws in state constitutions—laws 






dismisses these provisions because many state constitutions include the term “sectarian,” 
which legal scholars and courts have dismissed as code for anti-Catholic bias. In many 
instances, there is evidence for this deduction, as this study affirms. 
Upon a closer look, there are additional nuances worthy of future consideration:18 
(a) the no sectarian sections in state constitutions is only one example of no aid to 
religion laws, many of which predate the ratification of the First Amendment; (b) in some 
regions Catholics were the targets of these laws and in other regions the targets were 
other minorities (e.g., Anglicans, Baptists, Jews, Mormons, Quakers, and so on); and (c) 
in some instances, they were even proposed and advanced by Catholics and therefore 
cannot simply be dismissed as anti-Catholic rhetoric. The reason for this last point is that 
many religious people had their own religious justifications for separating religion and 
government, which counters the unidirectional position that no aid to religion laws were 
a part of a secularist agenda. 
I recommend that future research be conducted on the four types of no aid to 
religion laws that further analyzed in the unpublished dataset that arose from this study: 
state laws from 1775 to present that banned funding of (1) teachers of religion (e.g., 
clergy); (2) sectarian instruction; and (3) seminaries (e.g., theological schools to train 
clergy). This data set reveals that these first two types of laws were commonly discussed 
in the literature and that the no seminary laws are intermittently discussed, whereas a 
fourth type of no aid to religion is routinely overlooked: (4) constitutional provisions that 
prevent funding dedicated to public education from being diverted for other purposes. 
                                               
 
18 Nathan C. Walker, “Local, State and Religious Origins of No Aid to Religion Laws,” under review with 






The no diversion laws, found in the financial sections of state constitutions—not 
in the religion or education clauses—do not explicitly mention religion, which may 
explain why they have been regularly overlooked. Yet, the case law on teachers’ religious 
garb reveals that these laws were used to restrict public funding to public schooling long 
before Congress’ failed attempt at passing the Blaine Amendment in 1876. This proposed 
constitutional amendment in 1876 nearly banned all federal and state governments from 
financing private religious schools, but the fact is that, despite its failure, 87 percent of 
states had already enacted some type of no aid to religious education law, many of which 
predated the ratification of the First Amendment. 
The field of law and religion would benefit from a comprehensive analysis of 
these state laws, especially in the aftermath of Smith, when courts have become more 
reliant on state constitutions to expand religious freedom protections. The unpublished 
dataset developed from but not integrated in this study on teachers’ religious garb could 
advance a future study on no aid to religion laws.   
No Religious Test for Teachers Laws 
 This study also revealed another under-researched area: state constitutions with no 
religious test for teachers laws. As previous cited, examples include clauses in the 
following constitutions: Nebraska (1875), Colorado (1876), Montana (1889), Idaho 
(1889), Utah (1889), Wyoming (1890), New Mexico (1911), and Arizona (1912).  
These laws are geographically bound, potentially revealing an important legal 
trend that was occurring during the western-expansion era. A future study on this subject 
may reveal the role that the federal laws played as these regions went from being 






reveal particular insight into the role that the Church of Latter-day Saints had on the 
development of these laws, either with Mormon-majorities advocating for these laws or 
federal authorities introducing them in suspicion of Mormons. In Arizona and New 
Mexico, similar legal patterns may exist but this time in regions with a strong Catholic 
influence. At this point, these reasons are based on a preliminary review, worthy of a 
more comprehensive study. 
Comparative Law 
It is also recommend conducting a multi-national study on legal restrictions on 
religious garb in public schools. The study could take both a historic and contemporary 
look at policy trends and their impacts. The field of comparative studies in law and 
religion may provide helpful lenses through which to examine the global findings.19 
For instance, there are four common understandings of religious liberty in 
constitutions throughout the world: freedom of, for, from, and within religion.20 These 
conceptual frameworks could bring additional insight into the examination of legal 
restrictions on religion in public schools. 
                                               
 
19 An excellent template from which to build this study can be found in Maria Zhurnalova’s 2007 doctoral 
dissertation in comparative law from Central European University provides a comprehensive survey of 
religion and public schools in seven countries, which provides specific treatment of students’ and teachers’ 
religious dress worn in public schools. Maria Zhurnalova, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Public Schools 
and Religious Symbolism: A Comparative Analysis.” Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD) diss., Central 
European University, 2007. 
20 I was first exposed to this framing when attending the biannual meeting of the International Consortium 
for Law and Religion Studies, of which I am a member. Freedom of for from within Religion: Differing 
Dimensions of a Common Right? St. Hugh’s College, Oxford England, Sept. 8, 2016 – Sept. 11, 2016. The 
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every human being, is the first dimension, but not the only one. Freedom from religion, that is the right to 
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The final and most important recommendation for future research concerns the 
“impressionably” of children. 
As documented, legal experts from a wide range of ideological perspectives 
support the conclusion that it is unconstitutional to single out teachers’ religious garb for 
government regulation. There are, however, disagreements on how best to balance the 
rights and interests of children and religious-garb-wearing teachers. These disagreements 
often hinge on the assumptions the observer brings to the question of the 
“impressionability” of students in compulsory education settings.  
The literature on teachers’ religious garb reveals a dominant assumption that 
students’ impressions are unidirectional: that students will have negative impressions if 
exposed to religious garb worn by public schoolteachers (e.g., the fear children will be 
religiously coerced and converted to the religion of their teacher). This is an verified 
claim that requires a series of replicated and independent studies in order to fully 
substantiate. In this context, I close this study with a reflection on five concerns that I 
have with resting the fate of students’ and teachers’ constitutional rights on this 
assumption. My hope is that these questions will help inform future studies about the 
impressionability of elementary, middle, and high school students. 
First, the degree of “impressionability” of teachers’ religious garb question is 






religious identity.21 As a result, it is inconclusive that students’ impressions are or will be 
negative. It is recommended that future research include a longitudinal study of 
elementary, middle school, and high school students and their attitudinal and educational 
impressions of teachers’ religious garb. Studies should also examine the effects of 
students’ exposure to religious garb worn by a wide variety of authority figures, such as 
friend’s parents, medical professionals, police officers, military personnel, elected 
officials, celebrities, athletes, and so on.  
Second, the negative assumption about children’s impressionability may also 
underestimate the intellect and agency of the very children it seeks to represent. Future 
studies should also include how students themselves form their religious or non-religious 
identities and how they view others do the same. The literature and research on faith 
formation could inform research designs, such as the work of James Fowler, Sharon 
Daloz Parks, and others. As previously cited, Ben Marcus’ research serves as a helpful 
conceptual lens through which to examine students’ impressions by using the 3 B’s of 
religious identity formation: belief, behavior, and belonging. The use of these 
frameworks could help test the assumption that adults bring to students’ identity 
development. The goal is to test students’ ability to self-differentiate at different ages, 
especially at a time when news media, entertainment, sports, and changing social 
demographics expose children to far more religious diversity than any other previous 
generation has known. 
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Third, the historic and contemporary conclusions made about students’ 
impressions contradict the religious literacy scholarship. As previously cited, Emile 
Lester’s Modesto Study reveals positive results when students complete a required 
world’s religion curriculum. Diane Moore’s research on how teachers prepare students to 
be religiously literate provides an important conceptual framework for testing students’ 
impressions about whether they understand that “religions are internally diverse as 
opposed to uniform; religions evolve and change over time as opposed to being 
ahistorical and static; religious influences are embedded in all dimensions of culture as 
opposed to the assumption that religions function in discrete, isolated, ‘private’ 
contexts.”22 
Fourth, the assumption that students will have negative experiences when exposed 
to teachers’ religious garb ignores the question of the professionalism of teachers. It is 
recommended that future studies also examine whether teacher training programs an 
education leadership programs include religious literacy or religious liberty training in 
their curriculum, and if so, what the effects of this training are, and if not, what the 
possible consequences are of teachers and administrators being unprepared to face this 
potential legal conflict. Embedded in this recommendation is my belief that legislatures 
and courts will benefit from hearing directly from the teachers. Educators are very good 
at measuring the impact of their actions in their classrooms. What do they think is really 
going on and why? In other words, what are their impressions of children’s learning 
process—how and when and why do children have a change in their impressions? What 
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are the qualities of those impressions from the teacher’s perspective? This line of 
questioning gets at the heart of how people learn about religion and the short- and long-
term effects of that learning.  
Finally, the unidirectional conclusion of students’ impressions of teachers’ 
religious garb also assumes parents’ motivations for enrolling their children in public 
schools—an assumption that is also untested. Embedded in this position is the view that 
parents are and should be fearful of their children being exposed to teachers’ religious 
differences. Does this position accurately represent parents today? If so, what are their 
concerns and why? Do they expect public schools to be purely secular environments? Do 
they expect school leaders to advance the agenda of freedom from religion, or do they 
expect that public schools should serve the entire public, which by its nature will expose 
their children to ideas, people, and customs that are different from their own? Such a 
study may find, as I suspect, that parents have many fears and many desired outcomes. 
One of those outcomes may be, as I affirm in this study, for public schools to serve as 
laboratories for democracy where fundamental constitutional rights, such as religious 
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Appendix A – Legal Terms and Judicial Standards 
Religious Garb is defined as “Any dress, mark, emblem or insignia indicating the fact 
that such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order, sect or 
denomination.”23 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
declares that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” [of 
religion].24 The U.S. Supreme Court applied the constitutional guarantee to one’s free 
exercise of religion to all state laws in 194025 through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which proclaims that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”26 There are two predominant judicial tests used by federal 
courts to rule on Free Exercise cases, which this study will refer to as the Sherbert and 
Smith standards. 
The Sherbert Standard is a three-part judicial test that courts use to apply the strict 
scrutiny standard to Free Exercise cases. Judges first turn to the plaintiffs to determine 
whether (1) their constitutional right to free exercise of religion was substantially 
burdened, regardless of whether that burden is incidental or fundamental, indirect or 
direct. If so, the court turns to the state to examine whether lawmakers had a (2) 
compelling government interest to justify the burden and then examines whether the 
legislature (3) narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest through the least 
restrictive means possible.27 This study refers to this three-part test as the Sherbert 
standard because of the U.S. Supreme Court’s application of these steps in the 
landmark case Sherbert v. Verner (1963).28 See “Evolution of Free Exercise Standards” 
in Chapter II – Literature Review for a complete analysis of the origins and evolution 
of this judicial test. 
 
  
                                               
 
23 Pennsylvania Statute 24, Religious Garb § 11-1112 (1895–2018). This anti-religious-garb statute was the 
first in the United States, enacted in 1895. It was reaffirmed in 1949 and 1982 and remains active today. 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. I., Free Exercise Clause. 
25 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).  
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
27 See Chapter II – Origins and Evolutions of Free Exercise Standards for a discussion of why courts and 
scholars use the terms “narrowly tailored” and “least restrictive means” interchangeably. 







Appendix A. Continued. 
The Yoder Exemption originated from the landmark case Yoder v. Wisconsin (1972),29 
in which the U.S. Supreme court applied the first two steps of the Sherbert test. The 
court held that (1) Wisconsin’s compulsory-education law “unduly burdened” the free 
exercise of religion of Amish and Mennonite families and threatened their way of life; 
and (2) the state’s interest in school attendance until the age of 16 was not compelling, 
given the vocational and peaceful nature of the religions and the families’ willingness 
to enroll their children in all but two of the required years—implying the court’s 
recognition of a least restrictive alternative. Having failed the second question of the 
Sherbert test, the court did not explicitly determine whether the state narrowly tailored 
the law. The Yoder decision reaffirmed the application of the Sherbert test, which is 
why “the period from 1963 to 1990 is often labeled the Sherbert/Yoder era of Free 
Exercise Clause law.”30 This ended with the controversial Smith decision. 
The Smith Standard, also known as the general applicability test, requires that 
government regulations must be “neutral and generally applicable” and cannot “target 
religious conduct for distinctive treatment.”31 This study refers to this as the Smith 
standard because of its prominent use in the highly disputed case, Employment 
Division v. Smith (1990), in which the Court held that Native Americans who used 
peyote for sacramental purposes could not receive an exemption from general laws 
banning the use of narcotics. The Smith court limited the previously uncontroversial 
Sherbert standard to laws that are not neutral and generally applicable.32 See Chapter 
IV – Presentation and Analysis of Findings for an analysis of why Pennsylvania and 
Nebraska’s anti-religious-garb laws are not neutral and generally applicable because 
the statutes seek to regulate particular kinds of religious conduct. 
 
  
                                               
 
29 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
30 Eugene Volokh, Some Background on Religious Exemption Law, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY. June 12, 
2010, www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy. 
31 See my later discussion of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), in 
which Justice Kennedy wrote for the unanimous court: “A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive 
treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation 
will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases. It follows from what we have already said that these 
ordinances cannot withstand this scrutiny.” 
32 In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the decision to 






Appendix A. Continued. 
The Federal Religious Freedom Protection Act of 1993: In response to the 
controversial Smith decision, Congress sought to restore the Sherbert (strict scrutiny) 
standard by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA, 
pronounced riff-ra). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) the U.S. Supreme 
Court found that Congress overstepped its constitutional enforcement powers when 
seeking to apply the federal RFRA to the states, thus limiting the Sherbert test to 
federal laws. In response to this development, twenty states33 have since passed their 
own “mini-RFRAs,” which restored the Sherbert standard to state laws, such as the 
Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002. 
Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002 (RFPA, pronounced riff-pa) 
follows the federal general neutrality and strict scrutiny standards, thus incorporating 
the Smith and Sherbert tests to Pennsylvania law. RFPA statute makes explicit that “an 
agency shall not (1) substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion, including 
any burden which results from a rule of general applicability.”34 The statute continues: 
“An agency may substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion if the agency 
proves, by a preponderance of the evidence,35 that the burden is all of the following: 
(2) In furtherance of a compelling interest of the agency and (3) The least restrictive 
means of furthering the compelling interest.”36 
The Four-Part “Substantial Burden” Test in Pennsylvania’s RFPA explains that a state 
agency substantially burdens a person’s religion when the state’s action: 
“(1)  Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by a person’s 
sincerely held religious beliefs; (2)  Significantly curtails a person’s ability to express 
adherence to the person’s religious faith; (3)  Denies a person a reasonable opportunity 
to engage in activities which are fundamental to the person’s religion; (4)  Compels 
conduct or expression which violates a specific tenet of a person’s religious faith.” 
                                               
 
33 Conn. (1993), R.I. (1993), Ala. (1998), Fla. (1998), Ill. (1998), Ariz. (1999), S.C. (1999), Tex. (1999), 
Idaho (2000), N.M. (2000), Okla. (2000), Pa. (2002), Mo. (2003), Va. (2007), Tenn. (2009), La. (2010), 
Kan. (2013), Ky. (2013), and Miss. (2014). 
34 Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act of 2002, 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. §2404, section 4a. 
35 Two evidentiary judicial standards used in civil cases include preponderance of the evidence and clear 
and convincing evidence. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines the preponderance standard as “An evidence 
presented that provides more convincement than the pre-existing evidence presented in court.” The Legal 
Information Institute defines this as “a requirement that more than 50% of the evidence points to 
something,” thereby meeting the necessary burden of proof. Clear and convincing evidence is the a more 
rigorous standard requiring “positive, precise and explicit” evidence “as opposed to ambiguous, equivocal, 
or contradictory proof,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 2nd ed. Both of these standards are less restrictive 
than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” test used in criminal cases. 









Appendix B – Statutes in Question  
Original Text of Pennsylvania’s Religious Garb Law of 189537 
 
 
AN ACT to prevent the wearing in the public schools of this Commonwealth, by any 
of the teachers thereof, any dress, insignia, marks or emblems indicating the fact that 
such teacher is an adherent or member of any religious order, sect or denomination, 
and imposing a fine upon the board of directors of any public school permitting the 
same. 
Whereas, It is important that all appearances of sectarianism should be avoided 
in the administration of the public schools of this Commonwealth. 
Section 1. Be it enacted, That no teacher in any public school of this 
Commonwealth shall wear in said school or whilst engaged in the performance of his 
or her duty as such teacher any dress, mark, emblem or insignia indicating the fact that 
such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order, sect or denomination. 
Section 2. That in case of violation of the provisions of the first section of this 
act by any teacher employed in any of the public schools of this Commonwealth notice 
of which having been previously given to the school board employing such teacher that 
it shall be the duty of such school board to permanently suspended such teacher for 
employment in such school for the term of one year, and in case of a second offense by 
the same teacher it shall be the duty of said school board to permanently disqualify 
such teacher from teaching in said school, and any public school director failing to 
comply with the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be 
punishable, upon conviction of the first offense, by a fine not exceeding one hundred 
dollars, and in case of a second conviction or the violation of the provisions of this act 
the offending school director shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred 
dollars and shall be deprived of his or her office as a public school director. A person 
thus twice convicted shall not be eligible to appointment or election as a director of any 
public school in this State within a period of five years from the date of his or her 
second conviction.   




                                               
 
37 The Pennsylvania General Assembly first enacted the Pa. 24, Religious Garb § 11-1112 in 1895, in 
response to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s affirmation of Catholic nuns from wearing habits while 
teaching in state public schools in Hysong v. Gallitzin School District, 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894). The 
Pennsylvania General Assembly reenacted the statute in 1949 and 1982. Two proposed repeals of the laws 
failed to get out of committee in 2011 and 2012. Pennsylvania’s statute is the only anti-religious-garb law 






Revised Text of Pennsylvania’s Religious Garb Law 194938 
 
 
Section 1112.  Religious Garb, Insignia, etc., Prohibited; Penalty.— 
 
(a)  That no teacher in any public school shall wear in said school or while engaged in 
the performance of his duty as such teacher any dress, mark, emblem or insignia 
indicating the fact that such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order, sect 
or denomination. 
 
(b)  Any teacher employed in any of the public schools of this Commonwealth, who 
violates the provisions of this section, shall be suspended from employment in such 
school for the term of one year, and in case of a second offense by the same teacher he 
shall be permanently disqualified from teaching in said school.  
 
Any public school director who after notice of any such violation fails to comply with 
the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction of 
the first offense, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars 
($100), and on conviction of a second offense, the offending school director shall be 
sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) and shall be deprived 
of his office as a public school director. A person thus twice convicted shall not be 
eligible to appointment or election as a director of any public school in this 




                                               
 
38 The Pennsylvania General Assembly reenacted the statute in 1949 and 1982. The 1949 version removes 
the previously contradictory statement that the suspension was both “permanent” and yet only last “one 
year.” Two proposed repeals of the laws failed to have enough votes to get out of committee in 2011 and 






Text of Nebraska’s Religious Garb Statute of 191939 
 
 
Chapter 248 | House Roll No. 115 
Introduced by Mr. H. E. Anderson and Mr. Randall 
School—Teachers—Denomination Dress 
 
AN ACT declaring the wearing in the public schools of this state by any of the teachers 
therefor of any dress, or garb, indicating the fact that such teacher is an adherent or 
member of any religious order, sect or denomination, to be a misdemeanor, providing a 
punishment for the violation thereof and imposing a fine upon the Board of Directors 
or other school officers of any public school permitting the same. 
Be in Enacted by the People of the State of Nebraska 
Section 1. Unlawful to wear dress indicating membership in religious order—
penalty.—Any teacher in any public school in this state who shall wear in said school 
or while engaged in the performance of his or her duty any dress, or garb, indicating 
the fact that such a teacher is a member or an adherent of any religious order, sect or 
denomination, shall upon conviction therefore, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and 
fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred ($100) dollars and the costs of prosecution 
or shall be committed to the county jail for a period not exceeding thirty days or both. 
Sec. 2. Duty of educational board—violation—penalty.—In the case of 
violation of section 1 of this act by any teacher employed in any public school, notice 
of which having been previously given to the school board, board of education or 
board of directors employing such teacher, it shall be the duty of such school board, 
board of education or board of directors to suspend such teacher from employment in 
such school for the term of one year. In case of the second offense by such teacher, it is 
the duty of the Board of education, board of directors or school board to disqualify 
permanently such teacher from teaching in such school and any public school director, 
member of a board of education or school board who fails to comply with the provision 
of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a 
find not exceeding one hundred ($100) dollars and costs of prosecution. 
Sec. 3. Emergency.—Whereas an emergency exists, this act shall be in force 
from and after its passage and approval.  




                                               
 
39 Nebraska Religious Garb Statute of 1919, Code § 79-898 (1919–2017) was first enacted in 1919 (c. 248, 
§ 1, p. 1018) and reaffirmed in 1922, 1929, 1943, 1949, and 1994 and then repealed in 2017. Source of 
original text: Darius M. Amsberry, Secretary of State, Laws, Resolutions and Memorials Passed by the 







Appendix C – Examples of Religious Garb 
 
 
1. African Hebrew Israelite (headdress40) 
2. Buddhist (saffron robe,41 dharma wheel insignia, malas/prayer beads)  
3. Catholic (habit,42 rosaries/beads,43 devotional scapular/two rectangular 
pieces of cloth,44 or an Ash Wednesday marking)  
4. Church of the Brethren (hair covering and long dress45) 
5. Daoist (yin-yang insignia) 
6. Hindu (bindi/red dot on forehead, Om insignia, saffron robe46) 
                                               
 
40 Mississippi Employment Security v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324 (1990). School dress codes can 
disproportionally impact African Americans, which illustrate that the question of regulations of “religious” 
garb can also affect cultural and ethnic expressions. For a recent example see, Kay Lazar, “Black Malden 
charter students punished for braided hair extensions,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2017; Kay Lazar, “Mystic 
Valley charter school drops ban on hair extensions,” Boston Globe, August 12, 2017. 
41 Justice Stevens’s example in his concurrence in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
42 Hysong v. Gallitzin School District, 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894), overturned in Commonwealth v. 
Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68 (1910); O’Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1906); Johnson v. 
Boyd, 217 Ind. 348 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1940); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501; 236 P.2d 949 (1951); Rawlings v. 
Buttler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (1956). See also Grant Shulte (2017) “Nebraska targets ban on religious garb worn 
by teachers,” Associated Press, January 17, 2017; Michael Shively (2017) “Legislative Bill Would 
Eliminate 100-Year-Old Religious Garb Law,” KWBE Nebraska News Chanel, January 18, 2017. 
43 Chalifoux v. New Caney, 976 F.Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
44 Justice Brennan’s example in his dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
45 Kennedy v. St. Joseph’s Ministries, 657 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2011). 









7. Jewish (yarmulke/skullcap,47 beard,48 tzitzit/knotted tassel,49 mezuzah50 
pendant,51 tichel/headscarf)  
8. Mennonite (bonnet52) 
9. Muslim (beard,53 burqa/full-body covering, hijab/headscarf,54 
niqab/mouth-nose covering) 
10. Native American (hair length55)  
11. Nazirite (hair length56) 
12. Protestant Christian (cross necklace57) 
13. Rastafarian (dreadlocks58) 
14. Shriner (fezz/hat) 
15. Sikh (kirpan,59 turban60)  
16. Wiccan (pentacle) 
                                               
 
47 Student case: Menora v. Illinois, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982). Military case: Goldman v. Weinberger, 
475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
48 Rocco Parascandola, “Hasidic NYPD Recruit Fired Over Beard,” New York Daily News, June 2, 2012; 
Rocco Parascandola, “Hasid cop recruit bashes NYPD’s terror claim in firing over refusal to trim beard.” 
Lawyer for defendant claims the “city has come up with an ‘after-the-fact rationalization’ by saying facial 
hair would prevent him wearing a gas mask with a proper fit.” New York Daily News, June 27, 2013. 
49 Justice Brennan’s example in his dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
50 Justice Brennan’s example in his dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
51 Justice Ackerman’s example in his concurrence in United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 
F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
52 Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68 (1910). 
53 Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. ___ (2015). 
54 United States [Reardon] v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990); EEOC v. READS, Inc. 759 
F.Supp. 1150 (U.S. Dist. Ct. of Pa. 1991); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 Sup. Ct. 2028 
(2015). 
55 Student cases: Coushatta v. Big Sandy, 817 F.Supp. 1319 (E.D., Tex. 1993); Betenbaugh v. Needville 
Independent School District, 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010). 
56 EEOC (2012) “Taco Bell Operator Pays $27,000 to Resolve EEOC Religious Discrimination Lawsuit: 
Fayetteville Restaurant Fired Worker Over Religion-Mandated Long Hair, Federal Agency Charged.” U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Press Release, 27 April 2012. 
57 Nichol v. Arin, 268 F.Supp 2d 536 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
58 Flowers v. Columbia College Chicago, 397 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2005). 
59 Student case: Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995). 
60 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 (1986), app. Dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (1987). 
